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FOREWORD 
This document brings a final and extended version of a research project which has been taking 
place since early 2010
1
. The initial goal was to develop an evaluation of the Eureka Program for 
Spanish participants (only firms), taking into account data from projects’ Final Reports for 
companies with such projects completed between 2000 and 2005 (lately including projects from 
years 2006 to 2008). The methodology used was somewhat novel in this context: for reasons 
outlined in the methodological section of this dissertation, I did not resort to counterfactual 
econometric techniques as the core approach. Fortunately, much literature supported our decision 
regarding the usefulness of distinct quantitative approaches (and an amazing conversation with 
Professor Stan Metcalfe at the University of Manchester confirmed that point of view. I cannot thank 
him enough for these insights). 
As a result of these efforts, I had the opportunity to present (and to gather valuable feedback) 
previous stages of this research at the DIME Final Conference in Maastricht, April 2011, XIII World 
Economy Meeting in San Sebastian, May 2011, EU-SPRI PhD and Early Career Researchers 
Conference (where I received important reviews from Prof. Stefan Kuhlmann), in Manchester, 
September 2011, at the 7
th
 Iberian International Business Conference, October 2011 and, lastly, at 
the 2013 IAMOT Conference, April 2013. Also, we had the pleasure of seeing a working paper 
version of this research to be cited by the Danish Agency for Science, Technology and Innovation in 
their Analysis of 25 years of Danish Participation in Eureka Report. So far, two articles that were 
originated from this research were published in peer-reviewed journals, namely:  
 Fischer, B.B. and Molero, J. (2012). Towards a taxonomy of firms engaged in international R&D 
networks: an evaluation of the Spanish participation in Eureka. Journal of Technology Management & 
Innovation, v. 7, n. 3, pp. 121-134.  
 Fischer, B.B. (2012). Methodological lock-in and the evaluation of R&D policies: a critique to quasi-
experimental assessments. Current Opinion in Creativity, Innovation and Entrepreneurship. V. 1, n. 1.  
Furthermore, I had the great opportunity of spending 3 months at the Manchester Institute of 
Innovation Research (University of Manchester) under the supervision of Prof. Jakob Edler and 
supported by a grant from the EU-SPRI Forum. The goal was to further develop this piece of 
research and I believe this was succesfully achieved – while I also was exposed to one of the most 
challenging and exciting environments of the academic world when it comes to innovation 
economics and policy. I would also like to acknowledge valuable contributions from Professors 
Phillip Shapira and Paul Cunningham.  
Lastly, I would like to thank Professor José Molero for his outstanding guidance throughout my 
doctoral studies, as well as reviews provided by Professors Vitor Corado Simões (ISEG, Lisbon), 
Manuel García Goñi (Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Spain) and John Rigby (MIoIR, 
Manchester) which contributed substantially to the quality of this work. The usual disclaimers apply. 
  
                                                          
1
 During this period (January 2010-December 2011) I was working as a research assistant for the 
Research Group on Economics and Innovation Policy (www.grinei.es) at the Instituto Complutense 
de Estudios Internacionales.  
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ABSTRACT 
 
Innovation is increasingly becoming an internationalized process. A strategy that has 
recently been playing a central role in this regard is that of R&D collaboration. In the case 
of firms this is mainly driven by the search of more efficient operations, reduced costs and 
risks of innovative activities, as well as access to pools of knowledge available outside the 
traditional organizational boundaries. However, relationships among firms increase 
complexity of managerial processes, thus evidencing the need for closer coordination 
between agents, which is expected to be even more complex when these connections 
happen between companies from different nations, provided that there are additional 
transaction costs involved, e.g., language, institutional settings, etc. In the European 
context, efforts have been made towards organizing an integrated Innovation System 
across the continent, favoring international linkages within the European Union. This 
situation poses a need for specialized research to focus on the improvement of such 
initiatives to strengthen the bloc’s competitiveness. Moreover, we stress the case of the 
Spanish Innovation System, one of the largest economies of the European Union with an 
Innovation System that occupies a relatively laggard position in the EU. The approach 
undertaken in this dissertation focuses on determining the influential aspects of firms’ 
results, which are expected to lie on three fundamental dimensions: Microeconomic, 
Contextual (project-specific), and Macroeconomic. Furthermore, behavioral patterns 
regarding firms’ outcomes are assessed, aiming at providing policymakers with workable 
information for programs’ evaluation and improvement. To cope with these goals we 
develop logistic regressions to identify determinants of success in terms of: a) 
technological outcomes; b) market achievements; and c) future expected 
accomplishments. Data is gathered from Eureka’s Final Reports (2000-2005 and 2006-
2008) from Spain (research focus), Italy, France, United Kingdom, and Germany 
(benchmark countries). Results highlight the core importance of the Contextual Dimension, 
whereas the National Innovation System to which a given firm belongs has marginal 
relevance (Macroeconomic Dimension), and firms’ characteristics (Microeconomic 
Dimension) do not seem to be related to projects’ achievements. This puts special 
emphasis on the fundamental role played by network coordination. The lack of significance 
of the Microeconomic Dimension as a determinant of achievements poses some 
implications for the use of quasi-experimental methodologies in assessing the 
effectiveness of innovation policies. Behavioral patterns were identified through log-
likelihood clusters. Results confirm trends suggested by Fischer and Molero (2012), where 
firms fall under three categories: Inventors, Consistent Innovators, and Risky Innovators. 
Implications for the specific case of Spain are offered, where international R&D 
cooperation seems to be a fundamental strategy for sustainable development of firms 
located in this particular country.        
Keywords: International R&D Cooperation; Eureka Programme; Spain; Innovation Policy; 
Spanish Innovation System.  
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RESUMEN 
 
La innovación presenta características crecientemente internacionales. Una estrategia de 
fundamental importancia en este escenario es la cooperación internacional en I+D. Para 
las empresas, esta estrategia representa la oportunidad de alcanzar niveles más altos de 
eficiencia, reducción de costes y riesgos en actividades innovadoras, además de acceso a 
conocimientos existentes fuera de la estructura tradicional de las firmas. Sin embargo, las 
relaciones entre agentes de distintos países añaden complejidad a los procesos 
gerenciales, lo que pone de manifiesto la necesidad de mejores estructuras de 
coordinación entre las empresas debido a la presencia de costes de transacción 
adicionales (idioma, contexto institucional, etc.). En el contexto europeo, esfuerzos son 
dirigidos a la organización de un Sistema de Innovación integrado en el continente, 
favoreciendo relaciones internacionales entre miembros de la Unión Europea. Esta 
situación plantea la necesidad de investigaciones continuadas de las iniciativas existentes 
con el objetivo de mejorar la capacidad competitiva del bloque. Asimismo, nuestro 
enfoque dedica especial atención al caso del Sistema Nacional de Innovación español, 
uno de los más grandes en términos económicos en Europa, pero en una condición 
rezagada en la UE.  La propuesta se define en identificar los factores determinantes de 
los logros empresariales basados en tres dimensiones: Microeconómica, Contextual y 
Macroeconómica. Además, hemos creado un abordaje para determinar patrones de 
conducta de las empresas de acuerdo con sus resultados, proponiendo una estructura de 
análisis para la evaluación de políticas de innovación. La estrategia metodológica para 
abordar estos temas está basada en la construcción de modelos regresivos logísticos, 
buscando verificar los determinantes de éxito en términos tecnológicos y mercadológicos 
(obtenidos y esperados). Datos para los análisis provienen de los cuestionarios de fin de 
proyecto del Programa Eureka (2000-2005 y 2006-2008) para España (enfoque principal), 
Italia, Francia, Reino Unido y Alemania (efectos de comparación). Los resultados indican 
la importancia fundamental de la Dimensión Contextual. El Sistema Nacional de 
Innovación tiene una relevancia marginal (Dimensión Macroeconómica), y las 
características de las empresas no parecen tener influencia en los resultados de los 
proyectos de cooperación internacional en I+D. Estos resultados ponen énfasis en los 
aspectos de coordinación de las redes internacionales de innovación considerando sus 
impactos sobre los resultados alcanzados. La falta de significación estadística de las 
variables de la Dimensión Microeconómica como un determinante de los logros 
empresariales tiene implicaciones para el uso de metodologías cuasi-experimentales en la 
evaluación de efectividad de políticas de innovación. Algunos patrones de rendimiento 
fueron identificados a través de conglomerados agrupados por log-verosimilitud (log 
likelihood clusters). Los resultados confirman los patrones sugeridos por Fischer y Molero 
(2012): Inventors, Consistent Innovators y Risky Innovators. Son presentadas 
implicaciones para el caso español, donde la cooperación internacional en I+D aparece 
como una estrategia fundamental para un desarrollo sostenido de las empresas que 
hacen parte del Sistema Nacional de Innovación de España.  
  
Palabras clave: Cooperación Internacional en I+D; Programa Eureka; España; Políticas 
de Innovación; Sistema Nacional de Innovación Español.   
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1. Introduction 
 
Innovation is a central feature of the process of economic growth and 
development (Metcalfe, 1995). Therefore, related policies are a matter of great 
concern worldwide where the science-technology-innovation system is 
continuously and rapidly evolving and integrates a context in which business 
competition is increasingly based on its terms (Freeman & Soete, 2009). 
 In the European Union this situation is not different. The process of 
integration leads to incentives for agents to further invest in innovation, since an 
increase in incentives regarding relative market size arises (Weil, 2006). However, 
much has been said about the “European Paradox”, i.e., the difference between 
scientific capabilities and actual innovation performance in the continent 
(Georghiou, 2001). Several measures took place in order to modify this scenario. 
Europe needs to be more innovative in order to achieve a higher level of 
competitiveness – which requires a change in the valuation of innovative activities 
and a better framework for innovation to develop (European Commission, 2006).  
Broadly speaking, these programs that stimulate innovative activities take 
place to correct the market failures associated with R&D investments (Klette, Moen 
& Griliches, 2000). Nonetheless, unsatisfactory results in this area are mainly 
attributed to lack of R&D investment and to a low productivity of the resources 
invested (Benfratello & Sembenelli, 2002) showing a strong need for the analysis, 
evaluation and measurement of current innovation and technological policies 
(Edler, 2010).  
But this cannot be regarded as a simple task depending solely on 
recognizing the underlying difficulties and designating funds for it. Despite 
important conceptual and methodological advances in the economics of science 
and innovation in recent years, there is still little agreement on what “good” 
science, technology and innovation (STI) policy should look like and which 
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instruments should be used (Laranja, Uyarra & Flanagan, 2007; García, 2010). We 
can attribute this point of view to the fact that innovation involves systemic 
interactions between agents and the environment in which they are embedded 
(Smith, 2000). This gives an idea of the difficulty involved not only in formulating 
innovation policies, but also in evaluating their impact, and that is why a proper 
management of innovation is a challenge for many countries, including developed 
ones (Aghion & Tirole, 1994). 
On the other hand, innovation policy in recent years has increasingly paid 
attention to innovation systems and the underlying linkages between economic 
agents (Guy, 2009). The idea is to reinforce and foster the existing connections 
between firms and institutions, thus creating a context in which single firms’ 
projects still have importance in terms of RTD policy, but not as much as network-
oriented initiatives. Also, National Innovation Systems have a less “national” 
orientation than they did a couple of decades ago (Carlsson, 2003), giving room to 
the discussion of transnational integration of companies’ strategies and innovation 
policies.  
Embedded in this situation is the existence not only of firms’ strategies to 
cooperate in R&D, but also its international trend and a whole set of initiatives that 
promote this kind of activity. It is well known that not only for firms, but for 
innovation systems, this sort of integration can be very beneficial for technological 
growth and evolution, being a key determinant of competitiveness, as well as an 
effective way of transferring knowledge to catching-up regions (Archibugi & 
Iammarino, 1999; Suurna & Katel, 2010; Coe & Helpman, 1995; Fernández-Ribas 
& Shapira, 2009; Dyer & Powell, 2002). Nonetheless, approaches in this regard are 
somewhat controversial and there still is an important gap in terms of policymaking 
implications of R&D cooperation initiatives as well as a stronger framework to 
foster these activities (European Commission, 2011). 
Hence, there is a need in Europe to create international networks of 
collaboration in R&D that work as easily as networks within national borders, which 
13 
 
would generate a genuinely unified European Research Area (ERA), creating a 
critical mass for a stronger global competitiveness of European agents (European 
Commission, 2010a). Therefore, integrating the existing policies aiming at 
promoting international R&D collaboration in Europe is a main aspect in this regard 
(European Commission, 2008). Nonetheless, the bloc still lacks responsiveness in 
terms of policymaking regarding the challenges and opportunities of an 
international and integrated framework for research activities (Edler, 2007a; 
Grutzman, Halme & Reiner, 2009), which is largely based on the Framework 
Programme and the Eureka Initiative (Georghiou, 1999a), among other more 
recent initiatives.  
Given this context, the scope of this dissertation lies in analyzing the 
outcomes – or at least the verifiable outcomes2 - from market oriented R&D 
cooperation in the international arena comprising data from the European Union. 
This is justified by the current quest for deeper integration between EU’s agents 
(firms, research institutes, universities, etc.) and the systemic consequences of 
closer R&D cooperation at the international level.  
Hence, our goal is to assess firm level data in order to identify 
determinants of performance (technological and commercial) for companies 
participating in international R&D cooperation initiatives in Europe. We are 
trying to look into the development of processes and their respective outcomes 
instead of resorting to quasi-experimental techniques that evaluate if a given action 
provided better results than the absence of such initiative. Additionally, we use the 
gathered information on such outcomes to explore firms’ patterns and, thus, 
suggest a workable taxonomy of companies engaged in international R&D 
cooperation. 
The foundation of such assessment lies on the author’s uneasiness with the 
relative lack of literature focusing on differential impacts of innovation policies on 
                                                          
2
  Issues regarding of time-lags and systemic results of RTD policies are further discussed in the 
Methodological Discussion section.   
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companies. While there are extensive studies of policies’ effectiveness based on 
counterfactual methods as well as on impacts on companies’ innovative and/or 
economic performance, we find a gap in terms how these policies affect different 
companies in heterogeneous ways. What we want to know is how companies 
benefit (or not) from participation in international R&D cooperation activities 
according to their characteristics, their experience in the venture, and their 
macroeconomic context, i.e., what are the main drivers of success of firms 
engaging in such activities.  
Our expectation is to build upon these findings a useful methodology to 
classify firms participating in international R&D cooperation projects and to extract 
information regarding patterns of technological and innovative behavior according 
to companies’ outcomes resulting from their participation in a given project. Such 
analysis should provide policymakers with relevant managerial information 
regarding processes of international R&D collaboration between agents, as well as 
a suitable tool for innovation programs’ monitoring, not to mention the direct 
impacts for R&D managers.    
Data was gathered from Eureka projects divided in two time-sets: 2000-
2005 and 2006-20083, thus allowing an assessment of the stability of trends over 
time (even though data availability does not allow an actual time-series approach). 
As already presented, Eureka plays a central role in the integration process within 
the EU in terms of R&D cooperation, also acting as a strategic element of the 
European Research Area because of its market-oriented approach and its links 
with the business environment (Eureka, 2003). In addition, Eureka gathers a 
substantial amount of data from participating companies, offering the possibility of 
drawing a clearer picture of microeconomic phenomena related to international 
cooperation in R&D. We must also keep in mind that such data deals with a 
                                                          
3
 This particular timeframe permits the evaluation of results without the direct interference of 2008 
crisis’ effects, which can potentially distort results when verifying the characteristics of the 
international R&D cooperation phenomenon per se. Archibugi, Filippetti and Frenz (2012), for 
example, mention the reduced willingness of firms to invest in innovation during periods of uncertain 
expectations.  
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fragmented vision of a given nation’s tendencies and possibilities. Nonetheless, 
Eureka’s data can be useful in examining the aspects under scrutiny in this 
research.   
Furthermore, we chose data from projects in which Spanish companies 
participated as the core of the analysis undertaken. This is justified by the 
interesting position of this country in terms of innovation and international R&D 
collaboration within the Eureka framework: while Spain occupies a laggard position 
in comparison to other EU Member States in terms of innovation, it also engages 
relevantly in international R&D networks, especially in Eureka. Given its situation, 
Spain might gather substantial benefits from interaction with more advanced 
nations. We also justify the selection of Spain based on the few empirical works 
focused on analyzing cooperative R&D in the Spanish context (Bayona, García-
Marco & Huerta, 2001)4.  
To cope with this approach we have used a relevant object of analysis 
considering the central goal of this research: a database of projects’ Final Reports 
from Eureka activities. This allows the achievement of an approximation of 
companies’ ex ante and ex post profiles when joining such an initiative5, generating 
workable indicators of output determinants in this framework in a context of impact 
measure, a largely unexplored area of R&D collaboration (Silipo, 2008; Bayona, 
García-Marco & Huerta, 2001). Determinants of commercial and technological 
success for these companies were assessed primarily via binary logistic 
regressions. A second stage of the methodological rationale includes a 
classification according to firms’ outcomes, thus further exploring the validity of the 
abovementioned determinants. For this, we developed log-likelihood cluster 
structures. These results are compared to those of a set of European countries 
(benchmark countries): Germany, France, United Kingdom and Italy. This will 
                                                          
4
 Even though this picture has changed since 2001, there is still a lack of studies of Spain’s 
cooperation in R&D, especially in the international context.   
5
  For this we used clustering algorithms.   
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provide a framework of comparison for consistencies and inconsistencies across 
samples, thus allowing a robustness check of this research.  
 After the introductory aspects, we move to a theoretical and empirical 
overview of the R&D cooperation process, putting emphasis on the international 
scope (chapter 2). This chapter involves a thorough conceptual examination of 
several features regarding the environment of R&D collaboration, main factors 
determining firms’ propensity to cooperate and reported outcomes from R&D 
collaboration. Chapter 3 brings literature regarding innovation policy evaluation, 
providing special attention to European Union’s case. Given its characteristics of 
integration, it contains a certain number of specificities that should be taken into 
account for this research. Furthermore, since data used for this assessment was 
gathered from Eureka, the empirical outcomes of this study also point in the 
direction of policy evaluation, i.e., as a contribution for policymaking processes 
aiming at fostering international R&D cooperation.   
Chapter 4 outlines the main features of the Eureka Initiative, as well as a 
compilation of previously reported evaluations on its impacts and characteristics. 
Chapter 5 makes a brief description of the Spanish Innovation System, 
approximating its situation through selected indicators. An introductory comparison 
to the Innovation Systems of the benchmark countries is also presented. Chapter 6 
sums up the findings from previous chapters and their implications, thus 
developing a set of hypotheses to be empirically tested. Chapter 7 depicts the 
methodological approach and underlying rationale, including operational aspects 
regarding data and analytical tools. This chapter also debates the methodological 
reasoning and contributions of this research, as well as its inherent limitations. 
  In chapter 8, empirical results are presented and discussed in detail. 
Initially, samples’ profiles are observed through descriptive statistics. Estimations 
of logistic regressions, as well as complementary statistics, are developed 
following the structure proposed in the methodological section (chapter 7). Results 
are compared with the expected results as outlined in the hypotheses. Finally, 
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cluster classification procedures are applied, offering additional insights on the 
process of international R&D cooperation evaluation and on the determinants of 
firms’ outcomes in these alliances. Main outcomes and implications are further 
explored in chapter 9 (Policy and Managerial Implications), aiming at summarizing 
the impacts and relevance of the research. Chapter 10 concludes with some final 
remarks.     
 
1.1 Research question and goals 
 
 In this section we outline the core propositions of this research: its driving 
question, the main goal to be achieved and the operational goals involved.  
 
Research question 
 
 What factors determine firms’ performance as a result of their participation 
in international R&D cooperation projects?6 
 
Main Goal 
 
 To identify drivers of innovative performance for companies participating in 
international R&D cooperation projects, and develop a workable 
segmentation of such firms based on the outcomes of their participation in 
international R&D cooperation.  
                                                          
6
 This implies that the assessments contained in this research concerns a microeconomic perspective.   
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Operational goals 
 
a) Build a database with relevant and workable data for the case of 
international R&D cooperation focusing on the relative situation of Spanish 
firms; 
b) Identify patterns – and variations – of performance according to theoretically 
and empirically relevant variables; 
c)  Identify associations between variables in order to further explore 
behavioral patterns; 
d) Categorize firms according to their performance in projects.  
e) Empirically test the proposed hypotheses.  
 
1.2 Justification and Relevance 
 
The focus of this research lies in the field of international R&D cooperation. 
Increasingly, companies have been relying on external sources in order to achieve 
higher degrees of innovative performance. Resorting to knowledge located abroad 
can be seen as an extension of such collaborations (with several additional 
aspects influencing the processes involved). In literature, we find a large body of 
knowledge related to such activities, as well as pertinent policy evaluations. 
As this trend further unfolds – especially in developed nations and regions, 
such as the EU – governments perceive it as an effective way to promote 
innovation within and across borders, even though results for firms may differ 
according to the approach undertaken, the nature of agents involved, etc. Provided 
this brief context, policymakers have been trying to create behavioral change in 
firms in terms of cooperating more in R&D and other innovation related activities. 
Following this perspective, evaluations have been trying to assess if these 
initiatives are effective or not.  
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However, there is a gap in the assessment of these firms’ behavior 
throughout the process of international R&D cooperation. Knowing if the 
participation in an international consortium had a positive impact or not, and if 
these impacts were in fact related to the collaboration that took place, are 
important aspects of economic dynamics, but it is a narrow view of the whole 
phenomenon. Given the methodological tools available, providing more in-depth 
knowledge in alternative perspectives can be a very beneficial exercise for 
managerial and policymaking processes.  
Thus, by focusing our analysis on workable indicators - at the firm level - 
that allow the construction of company’s profiles regarding their inherent 
characteristics, their experience as part of a R&D consortium, as well as their 
perceived outputs, we believe that we can provide a deeper understanding of firms’ 
engagement in international R&D networks. A throughput of this contribution lies in 
setting a practical framework of analysis that can be replicated elsewhere.  
In this regard, following the main goal of our research, identifying 
determinants of innovative performance considering both ex ante and ex post 
aspects and categorizing these firms can be seen as an effective way to 
reformulate existing initiatives that promote international R&D cooperation, driving 
it towards an orientation based on segments and their evolution over time. The 
usefulness of this methodology relies on the consistency of groups, as well as on 
the theoretical background upon which our assumptions are based upon.  
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2.  Notes on International R&D Cooperation  
 
All indicators, such as co-publications, co-inventions, and joint research 
projects (through networks, alliances and other forms of international cooperation) 
point in the direction of an increasing relevance of international collaboration in 
science and technology, followed by a significant increase and broadening of 
international and transnational policy initiative and instruments to foster and shape 
international S&T collaboration (Edler, 2010; Edler, 2008; Edler, 2007a; Edler & 
Polt, 2008; Carlsson, 2003; Kuhlman & Edler, 2003; Archibugi & Iammarino, 1999). 
In the case of firms, this is mainly driven by the search of more efficient operations 
(López, 2008; De Prato & Nepelski, 2012), but these linkages also extend to 
relationships between firms and universities and/or research institutes (Hall et al, 
2000).  
 In the case of organizational cooperation with international partners, 
strategic partnerships in R&D represent also a subject of increasing interest for 
companies, researchers and policymakers (Hagedoorn & Schakenraad, 1994; 
Edler & Polt, 2008; Bayona, García-Marco & Huerta, 2001). Along with this trend, 
national governments increasingly perceive international research collaboration as 
a positive and desirable phenomenon (Jonkers & Castro, 2010; Quintas & Guy, 
1995).  
History shows that R&D partnerships have been growing since the 1960s 
with a noticeable acceleration in the 1980s. This is the result of the increasing level 
of complexity of R&D projects in recent decades, higher uncertainty surrounding 
R&D, increasing costs of R&D projects, stronger competition and shortened 
innovation cycles. Hence, collaboration is understood as an effective strategy to 
deal with an environment composed by more specialized organizations in terms of 
knowledge production (Pavitt, 2002; Hagedoorn, 2002; Narula, 2001; Zeng, Xie & 
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Tam, 2010; Barajas & Huergo, 2006; Katz & Martin, 1997; Jonkers & Castro, 2010; 
Pellegrin et al, 2010; Motta, 1992)7.  
This increased interest in technological cooperation analysis is followed by a 
higher level of complexity involved in studying it, including technical and economic 
idiosyncrasies that make R&D networks of difficult comparability (Barajas & 
Huergo, 2006; Archibugi & Iammarino, 2002). To cope with this, R&D cooperation 
has usually been assessed via two main theoretical perspectives: the Industrial 
Organization approach which is concerned with the dynamics of collaboration 
regarding R&D investment and spillovers (incoming and outgoing; also using 
Game Theory settings); and the Management literature which focuses on the 
interaction between firms (transaction costs and Resource-Based View of the firm) 
(Belderbos, 2004; Veugelers, 1998).   
This situation leads to a situation in which many companies cannot handle 
the shortened innovation cycles and complexity of new technologies individually 
(Saxenian, 1991). This promotes a business sector which has been involved in 
global strategic technological alliances with firms maintaining distinct ownership 
structures, but agreeing to exchange and/or generate information and knowledge 
(Archibugi & Iammarino, 1999). Consequently, firms must take into account the 
opportunities offered by other agents within/between innovation systems and must 
develop their abilities to absorb this existing knowledge in order to access these 
“available” resources and stocks of knowledge (Edler, 2007a; European 
Commission, 2008).  
These inter-firm relationships often occur in a quasi-cooperative manner 
(Smith, 2000), which should be attributed to current innovative practices that 
require a bigger role of specialization and, thus, collaboration between agents 
(Molero, 2010). Consistent with this view, R&D cooperation between rival firms 
                                                          
7 A practical implication of this context is that cooperative settings are likely to produce more radical 
levels of innovative products and processes, whereas “new to the firm” innovations remain under 
the concept of internal development (Tether, 2002).  
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from different countries has become an increasingly common phenomenon (Song 
& Vannetelbosch, 2007; Petit & Tolwinski, 1999). This situation supports the 
hypothesis that, even in competitive environments, firms find it helpful to cooperate 
with rivals in certain aspects.  
Efforts towards stronger R&D cooperation are especially relevant in OECD 
countries, where the growing number of R&D strategic alliances stands for a new 
organization in industrial technological structure where focus lies on network 
promotion policies instead of direct financial assistance policies (De Jong & Freel, 
2010). Cooperative R&D policies gain more importance when one considers that 
the extent to which a country’s businesses, institutions and industries are linked 
with resources and capabilities located abroad is likely to positively impact the 
innovation performance of that country (European Commission, 2010; Filippeti, 
Frenz & Ietto-Gillies, 2009) creating local externalities from global relationships. In 
order to cope with these dynamics and underlying challenges of modern innovation 
systems, cooperation for innovation became a main issue in RTD policymaking 
(European Commission, 2002), even though it should be mentioned that it was not 
until recently that policymakers started paying attention to the internationalization 
of R&D activities (Edler & Flanagan, 2011).  
In Europe, the creation of the European Research Area stands for a 
coordination of closer R&D cooperation between organizations of EU’s Member 
States, working as a fundamental tool to achieve a more competitive dynamic in 
the bloc (Georghiou, 2001; Álvarez, 2004). One of the pillars of the ERA lies on the 
Framework Programme, which has enhanced EU’s quality and quantity of 
international R&D collaboration agreements across the continent (European 
Commission, 2008). Additionally, we can mention Eureka/Eurostars, the ERA-
NETs and the Joint Technological Initiatives as highly relevant policies tackling the 
goal of fostering closer interactions between agents within the Union in the process 
of technological change.  
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Complementing this regional perspective of international R&D collaboration, 
it cannot go unnoticed that innovative regions tend to cluster together in a situation 
of spatial dependence which has increased over time, influenced also by the 
availability of human capital and R&D expenditure (Freeman & Soete, 2009). 
Therefore we can expect an impact on the need of peripheral regions to adopt 
open innovation strategies and use R&D collaboration in order to have access to 
the pool of knowledge available at more developed regions. This underlying idea of 
geographical integration in R&D – such as the European Research Area – provides 
a framework for increased specialization, provided there are no barriers for the 
exchange of knowledge (European Commission, 2009). 
 
2.1 Conceptual Aspects  
The underlying challenge of R&D networking is related to the systemic 
aspects of innovation (Imai & Baba, 1989) and by the process of globalization 
itself, that has influenced firms’ behavior and technological characteristics of 
innovations by increasing outsourcing and strategic alliances and also by 
promoting increasingly multi-technological products (Narula, 2004). Cooperative 
R&D consists of an arrangement among firms (two or more) aiming at pursuing 
common objectives, sharing costs and results of an R&D project and can be 
achieved through R&D contracts, consortia, Research Joint Ventures, licensing 
contracts or other forms of interaction, including informal ones (Sakakibara, 1997; 
Archibugi & Iammarino, 1999; 2002; Huggins, 2001; Imai & Baba, 1989).  
The kind of cooperative agreement in which firms engage is largely 
determined by technological characteristics and sectors of industry, as well 
transaction costs and information asymmetry between agents (Hagedoorn & 
Narula, 1996; Zander, 1999; Silipo, 2008; Oxley, 1997; 1999). For example, in 
industries with a rapid rate of technological change, the dynamics favor “softer” 
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forms of collaboration instead of “harder” ones8, where the former can be 
understood as informal agreements (such as a “memorandum of understanding”, 
as Goyal & Moraga-González, 2001 exemplify), while the latter refers to 
contractual relationships with strong equity ties, e.g., Research Joint Ventures 
(Fernández-Ribas & Shapira, 2009; Pyka, 2000; Goyal & Moraga-González, 2001).  
But why do these cooperative agreements take place in an environment of 
tough competition, being the internalization of knowledge an alleged form of 
competitive advantage? This can be explained by the fact that firms might be 
extremely competent in one specific area, but this competence has limits and these 
firms will frequently find technological problems that are outside the range of their 
existing capabilities, thus providing them with benefits they believe will be larger 
than if the company would act on its own (Smith, 2000; Silipo, 2008).  
This brings to light the fact that individual firms are usually dependent on 
external sources of knowledge in order to develop innovations, leading to a 
growing importance of R&D cooperation between agents (Dyer & Powell, 2002). As 
a result, there is a maximization of the added value of a firm through the 
combination of complementary resources and knowledge between partners (Das & 
Teng, 2000; Hagedoorn et al, 2000; Sakakibara, 1997a; Roller, Tombak & Siebert, 
1997; Srholec, 2011a; Siebert, 1996; Mowery, 1989; Motta, 1992; Czarnitzki and 
Hottenrott, 2012). This is especially relevant for SMEs, since they are less likely 
than large firms to have inside its facilities all of the tangible and intangible assets 
required for R&D projects, making them more dependent on external sources of 
knowledge (Teece, 1986). 
                                                          
8
 Kreiner and Schultz (1993), based on a sample of biotech firms in Denmark, identify that R&D 
collaboration often happens through informal and personalized networks of individuals. That is an 
interesting perspective on what “Marshallian” industrial districts represented, even though 
decreasing costs of communications (as a result of efficient IT platforms) reduce the importance of 
geographical distances in these relationships. On the other hand, for as dynamic as these informal 
collaborations can be, they imply a significant amount of risks in sharing valuable knowledge 
without properly establishing managerial boundaries. We will address these issues in section 2.3.4 
Knowledge Spillovers, Transaction Costs and IPR.    
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Another potential feature of R&D cooperation is that of internal “reviewing” 
of results before they reach markets. Rigby and Edler (2005) find that in academic 
research, intra-network peer review leads to less variability in research outcomes. 
If we think of R&D performing networks, the process of interaction between agents 
can resemble what peer review does in basic science, thus one can expect a 
similar trend for the case of R&D collaboration, leading to less variability in 
innovative outcomes9. Such perspective is empirically supported by Hottenrot and 
Lopes-Bento (2012). 
Other explanatory aspects relate to rising scientific complexity and 
development costs, with (international) R&D collaboration providing firms with 
reductions on projects’ risks and expenditures, and also helping them to develop 
more business opportunities domestically and abroad (Álvarez, 2004; Grutzman, 
Halme & Reiner, 2009; Archibugi & Michie, 1997; Roller, Tombak & Siebert, 1997; 
Goyal & Moraga-González, 2001; Zu et al, 2011). Veugelers (1998) summarizes 
this by pointing out that R&D cooperation allows access to new markets, 
absorption of new skills and technologies, achievement of scale economies and 
sharing costs and risks of innovation projects. Roller, Tombak and Siebert (1997), 
Silipo (2008), and Katz (1986) also put emphasis on the importance of spillovers’ 
internalization as a core driver of collaboration in R&D, where D’Aspremont and 
Jacquemin (1988) propose that (precompetitive) R&D cooperation results in higher 
levels of overall R&D efforts, output and welfare, provided that spillovers are above 
a certain threshold.  
In an environment of constant technological change and high levels of R&D 
complexity, the best way to minimize risks and achieve sustainable 
competitiveness seems to be through specialization. It is impossible to imagine that 
this trend leads to economic growth if firms and agents do not interact with others 
(since they are all deeply specialized) or do not even have the capacity to do so.  
                                                          
9
 Such appreciation of Rigby and Edler’s (2005) work was discussed in detail with Prof. John Rigby, 
where the analogy presented herewith was consented by the author.  
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R&D cooperation practices have a twofold impact in this dimension. On the 
one hand, they create the possibility of firms addressing complexity in a multi-
capability and multidisciplinary manner, promoting valuable innovations. On the 
other hand, R&D cooperation increases absorptive capacity and learning 
capabilities in the company, generating better prospects for future collaboration. 
This latter aspect is also pointed out by Barañano (1995). Other benefits of 
cooperative R&D come from the assumption that it increases the efficiency of R&D 
efforts, provides more flexibility to adapt to technological changes and eliminates 
wasteful duplication (Katz, 1986). Hence, promoting companies’ technological skills 
through collaboration and providing them with higher levels of absorptive capacity 
should be the focus of technological policies (Molero, 2001; Luukkonen, 1998; 
Silipo, 2008).  
Nonetheless, special emphasis must be put on the micro-level of analysis.   
R&D collaboration poses serious complexity issues when putting together agents 
of different sizes, types and competences (Georghiou, 1999a), thus requiring 
intense coordination and information flows for firms  engaging in R&D cooperation 
(Teece, 1986). This means that the way in which a network or partnership 
develops can be highly associated with the quality of outcomes, as well as with the 
duration of the linkage. We can regard this aspect as an intuitive argument, since 
the status of a given cooperative R&D project’s functioning will at least partially 
determine firms’ willingness to actually cooperate with each other.  
We can add to this viewpoint another factor influencing these processes and 
which represents opportunities, as well as additional complexity, to the analysis: 
the idea of international scientific and technological cooperation can be regarded 
as fundamental for the development of products that demand joint R&D due to 
specialization patterns in different economies or regions (Archibugi & Michie, 
1997), i.e., the idea of complementarities between firms should also be considered 
as promoting integration between technically and economically heterogeneous 
territories.  
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Thus, collaboration fosters knowledge transfer in a context of international 
economics. Narula and Santangelo (2009) hypothesize that R&D alliances might 
even act as a substitute for collocation, or as a complementary mechanism for it. 
Moreover, firms cooperate with international partners aiming at assessing this 
knowledge available elsewhere, which results from the lack of certain capabilities 
in a given region/country, as well as an underdeveloped innovation system 
(Fernández-Ribas & Shapira, 2009; Bottazzi & Peri, 2007). In a similar vein, Mitsos 
et al (2012), use the case of the European Research Area to propose that further 
integration between domestic economies leads to higher degrees of specialization, 
thus demanding stronger collaboration between agents in order to tackle the 
existing challenges in innovation dynamics. Nonetheless, they point out that a 
core-periphery structure may arise if such hypothesis holds.  
But it is important to highlight that for firms, the decision between domestic 
or international R&D cooperation is often a fallacy. Firms that develop this kind of 
behavior tend to establish partnerships at both national and international levels 
(Srholec, 2011a). Nonetheless, diffusion of knowledge in an international context 
occurs less perfectly than within national borders (Bottazzi & Peri, 2007). We can 
relate this latter aspect to many variables, including language, geographical 
distance, cultural background, legislation, etc.  
Also, policymakers that envisage international collaboration in R&D as a 
desirable phenomenon must put into perspective how to assess the specific 
policies in terms of the existing “barriers” related to it. For example, the main 
factors hindering international R&D partnerships are related to market and 
coordination aspects of the relationship between agents (Fernández-Ribas & 
Shapira, 2009). These issues were previously stated for cooperation in general, but 
at the international level one must expect a higher level of difficulty involved in the 
management of such joint projects, since additional transaction costs arise.  
Governmental policies aiming at promoting global R&D collaboration for 
firms within a national territory should focus on upgrading the national STI 
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competences, since higher levels of technical and scientific potential are likely to 
turn a given National Innovation System into a more attractive partner (Archibugi & 
Iammarino, 1999). Fostering country-level collaboration can enhance the capacity 
and attractiveness of companies within a nation by both “training” them to 
cooperate and turning them into more competitive and knowledgeable agents. 
Policies fostering cooperation also show adaptive characteristics since they cannot 
be regarded as linear: they promote a more complex and holistic approach to 
innovative processes in opposition of direct funding initiatives.  
But why would R&D cooperation be desirable for economic policy? As a first 
explanation we find that firms that engage in R&D cooperation often spend more 
on internal R&D (Veugeleres, 1997; Sakakibara, 1997a). This situation poses a 
virtuous circle, in which a company – by investing in R&D – becomes more 
attractive for potential partners and also absorbs more knowledge, thus becoming 
even more attractive for collaborative projects and so on.  
Nonetheless, for many sectors, cooperation regarding innovation may be 
too dangerous for companies’ appropriability strategies. Sharing valuable 
information with competitors or “potential competitors” might be too big of a threat 
for some firms. In a collaborative R&D project there is the risk of the partner 
imitating the innovator’s technology and competing with him (Teece, 1986), which 
would represent a case of free riding. The same can hold true for the case of entire 
regions or countries, taking advantage from knowledge generated elsewhere 
(Rodríguez-Pose, 2001). This is due to the fact that R&D collaboration implies a 
certain level of potential opportunism because of asymmetric information which 
might lead to insufficient investments from the parts involved (Socorro, 2007; 
Rodríguez-Pose, 2001).  
When collaborating in R&D, firms may not be able to monitor the level of 
R&D effort undertaken by its partner(s), thus creating a moral hazard problem 
(Silipo, 2008). This whole situation highlights the importance of project functioning 
in a collaborative setting. But even if properly managed, R&D cooperation carries 
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with it a wide array of transaction costs involving information asymmetry, 
opportunistic behavior and moral hazard (Veugelers, 1998). Nevertheless, there is 
a perspective that firms should be focused on accessing new technologies that 
might be crucial for upcoming generations of products and processes in spite of the 
risks associated in sharing valuable knowledge (Larédo, 1998). This view might be 
of governmental or policymaking interest, but will probably find scarce supporting 
evidence on micro-level data: the potential costs and benefits are still likely to be 
core drivers of cooperation between agents. Notwithstanding these risks, firms see 
R&D cooperation with rivals, suppliers and customers as more relevant than 
cooperation with universities and research institutions (De Backer, López-Bassols 
& Martinez, 2008). 
But not all R&D collaborations can be considered socially desirable at both 
national and international levels. Policies aiming at fostering the creation of 
interfirm networks do so because there is a belief that these activities might 
enhance economic productivity, particularly through the generation of technological 
spillovers (Petit & Tolwinski, 1999). However, firms have their own agenda when 
cooperating and sometimes these objectives might be considered perverse for the 
economic system. Governmental agencies must consider the possibility of 
cooperation between firms leading to collusive outcomes – which is especially 
relevant for cooperation between rivals (Tao & Wu, 1997; Silipo, 2008; Grutzman, 
Halme & Reiner, 2009). 
Regarding the structure of networks, cooperation may happen in different 
stages of R&D. Some projects are related to basic R&D, others to pre-competitive 
activities and, lastly, close-to-market cooperation (the one which poses the biggest 
risks for companies, and also for society, given the possibility of collusion amongst 
agents)10. Greenlee and Cassiman (1999) suggest that a case-by-case analysis of 
                                                          
10
 Collusive outcomes are often found in market-driven networks (D’Aspremont & Jacquemin, 1988; 
Hennart, 1988), such as the case of Eureka’s individual projects (which represent the sample of 
analysis in this research). Kamien, Muller and Zang (1992) identify reduced levels of technological 
improvements in such collusive structures. 
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R&D Joint Ventures is the only feasible way of attaining efficient (and socially 
desirable) levels of R&D cooperation, thus avoiding the generation of such market 
collusions.    
But we must remind that R&D alliances can be distinguished from 
production-based alliances in terms of its fixed-term horizon and the fact that it 
covers only a small part of the value-adding activities of companies (Narula, 1999). 
Nonetheless, depending on the market impacts, R&D networks might change 
aspects in different levels of the production chain, i.e., even though it covers only 
part of the value-adding process, it might also alter this same process. 
In tables 1 and 2 we illustrate the main findings of these introductory 
sections by offering a summary that highlights the main aspects, theoretical 
features and the most relevant authors cited so far.  
 
2.2 The Open Innovation and Absorptive Capacity Perspectives  
As a theoretical complement to the analysis being developed, it is 
interesting to assess some related concepts to those of R&D cooperation. As 
previously stated, innovation and R&D in firms are processes facing an increasing 
level of openness, where knowledge and ideas are often sourced outside the 
organizational boundaries (Grutzman, Halme & Reiner, 2009)11. On the other hand, 
agents must be able to absorb knowledge generated elsewhere in order to benefit 
from these relationships, thus openness must be followed by an absorptive 
capacity so the former can increase productivity more efficiently (Veugelers, 1997; 
Belderbos et al, 2004; Parisi, Schiantarelli & Sembenelli, 2006; Caloghirou, 
Hondroyiannis and Vonortas, 2003). Edler, (2008) even concludes that costs and 
benefits from internationalization of R&D lie on firms’ absorptive capacities. 
 
                                                          
11 Open innovation has been boosted by increasing levels of virtual communication (cloud, mobile 
and collaborative computing) (European Commission, 2010a).  
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Aspect Main Theoretical Findings Main sources
Broad Definition
Firms (tw o or more) pursuing together common or 
complementary R&D objectives, sharing costs and result
Sakakibara, 1997; Archibugi & Iammarino, 1999; 2002; Huggins, 2001; Imai & 
Baba, 1989
Main Theoretical Approaches
- Industrial Organization approach
- Game theory
- Management Approach
Belderbos, 2004; Veugelers, 1998
Main Modes
- R&D contracts
- Consortia
- Research Joint Ventures (RJVs)
- Licensing contracts
Hagedoorn & Narula, 1996; Zander, 1999; Silipo, 2008; Fernández-Ribas & 
Shapira, 2009; Sakakibara, 1997; Archibugi & Iammarino, 1999; 2002; Huggins, 
2001; Imai & Baba, 1989
Motives
- Limited competence of individual agents
- Rising scientif ic complexity of projects
- Risk sharing
- Cost sharing
- Internalization of technological spillovers
Smith, 2000; Silipo, 2008; Dyer & Powell, 2002; Das & Teng, 2000; Hagedoorn et 
al, 2000; Sakakibara, 1997a; Roller, Tombak & Siebert, 1997; Srholec, 2011a; 
Siebert, 1996; Mowery, 1989; Teece, 1986; Álvarez, 2004; Grutzman, Halme & 
Reiner, 2009; Archibugi & Michie, 1997; Roller, Tombak & Siebert, 1997; Katz, 
1986; Veugelers, 1998
International scope
- Increased complexity for management and transfer of results
- Different political, economic and social background
- Integration of National Innovation Systems
- Access to foreign capabilities
Archibugi & Michie, 1997; Narula & Santangelo, 2009; Fernández-Ribas & 
Shapira, 2009; Bottazzi & Peri, 2007; Srholec, 2011a; Archibugi & Iammarino, 
1999
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Summary of findings on R&D cooperation between firms (concepts) 
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Aspect Main Theoretical Findings Main sources
Risks for Firms
- Free riders
- Moral hazard
- Opportunism
- Information asymmetry
Teece, 1986; Socorro, 2007; Rodríguez-Pose, 2001; Silipo, 2008; Veugelers, 
1998
Risk for Society - Collusions Tao & Wu, 1997; Silipo, 2008
European Scenario
- European Research Area - ERA
- Framew ork Programmes
- Eureka/Eurostars
- Joint Technological Initiatives
Georghiou, 2001; Álvarez, 2004; ETAN, 1998; Foray & Lhuillery, 2010; Aguiar & 
Gagnepain, 2011
Justifications for Policy Action
- Flexibility
- Avoids w asteful duplication of R&D efforts
- Productivity
- Competitiveness
- Absorptive capacity
Barañano, 1995; Molero, 2001; Luukkonen, 1998; Silipo, 2008; Veugeleres, 1997; 
Sakakibara, 1997a; Petit & Tolwinski, 1999
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. (cont.) Summary of findings on R&D cooperation between firms (concepts)  
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The concept of absorptive capacity was initially developed by Cohen and 
Levinthal (1989; 1990), where they assessed firms’ abilities to exploit external 
knowledge as a core feature of their innovative potential. The authors build upon 
criticisms to the idea of costless transmission that underlies assumptions behind 
the exploitation of publicly available technology, since the absorption of such 
knowledge would have to rely on existing capacities of internalizing it to the 
intramural environment of the firm, thus representing substantial costs in the long 
run.  
This so-called absorptive capacity, they argue, is a function of prior 
knowledge existing within the firm, where learning skills are increased as a function 
of information that has been previously learned, thus developing the fundamental 
characteristic of absorptive capacity: it is a self-reinforcing process, given that 
learning is cumulative (therefore, it is highly path dependent). In the organizational 
context, this would involve not only individuals’ competences, but firms’ experience 
in managing knowledge flows with the external environment and within its own 
boundaries. 
In this context, R&D investment serves two purposes: to generate new 
knowledge and to provide firms with a higher capacity of absorbing knowledge 
generated outside the organization (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; 1989). We can thus 
relate the concepts of R&D investment and absorptive capacity to the presence of 
firms in innovation-driven networks. In order to fully cooperate with partners, i.e., to 
take full advantage of a network, agents must be capable of properly interacting 
with each other (basically because of knowledge transfers and technological 
spillovers), which requires a body of knowledge that is above a certain threshold 
(which depends on the technological dynamics of industries). Furthermore, such 
R&D investment will provide companies not only with the desired levels of 
absorptive capacity, but also make them more attractive partners in these inter-
organizational relationships.  
35 
 
It is also important to notice that there is a strong emphasis in the 
commercial aspect of this absorption process, thus implying that the absorptive 
capacity concept is not primarily technique-oriented, but rather business-oriented, 
involving interdisciplinary bodies of knowledge that ultimately contribute to the 
organizational innovative potential. For example, Bogers and Lhuillery (2011) 
approach absorptive capacity through a multifaceted perspective, where R&D 
investment is only one side of it. They also consider investments in manufacturing 
plants and in marketing as sources of improvements in absorbing knowledge from 
external sources, finding that the former is especially relevant for capturing 
knowledge from suppliers and competitors, while the latter is key for understanding 
customers’ knowledge.  
In the assessment of the necessity of external interactions between firms, a 
complementary perspective to that of absorptive capacity relates to the idea of 
open innovation, which formalizes the importance of networking initiatives and 
absorptive capacity while reducing the focus on internalization of R&D activities 
(De Jong & Freel, 2010). Consequently, external sources of knowledge and skills 
play an important role in innovation and the capacity of accessing and exploring 
this knowledge is fundamental for companies’ competitiveness (Cohen & Levinthal, 
1990; Lin et al, 2012).  
Chesbrough (2003) coined the concept of open innovation as opposed to 
closed innovation. He identified the growing number of firms engaging in 
collaborative projects regarding innovation related activities. This, he argues, is an 
important mechanism to generate inflows of knowledge, thus accelerating 
innovation inside the firm. Firms are more prone to share core strategic knowledge 
than it is generally expected (Archibugi & Iammarino, 1999), which makes open 
innovation a subject that has received increasing attention in the business 
management literature and also in the policymaking debate, building mainly upon 
the ideas of networking and collaboration (De Backer, López-Bassols & Martinez, 
2008; Grutzman, Halme & Reiner, 2009).  
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An environment of “open innovation” means that many companies across 
industries externalize several R&D activities, focusing on their core competences 
and absorbing third parties’ capabilities (Wagner & Edelmann, 2002; Herstad et al, 
2010; Savitskaya, Salmi & Torkkeli, 2010). This implies that firms use R&D 
partnerships to access knowledge, expertise or skills and build global R&D 
networks, where the choice of partners is dictated by the complementary resources 
which the counterpart controls, allowing companies to improve their performance 
(Miotti & Sachwald, 2003; Georghiou, 1998; Nesta & Mangematin, 2004).  
One significant outcome of this context is that especially large companies 
are likely to capture results more easily – because of an expected higher 
absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990) in comparison to SMEs – as well as 
to become less self-sufficient in their processes, being able to incur in the division 
of innovative activities (Pavitt, 2003; Fritsch & Lukas, 2001; López, 2008; Bayona, 
García-Marco & Huerta, 2001). According to economic theory (deeper 
specialization, steeper learning curves) this should lead to scale economies12. 
Furthermore, firms that increase their absorptive capacity and learn to exchange 
knowledge become active agents of innovation systems’ internationalization 
(Carlsson, 2003), which has in international R&D cooperation one of its main 
vehicles.  
But, as previously stated, in order to achieve higher levels of absorptive 
capacity – and thus achieve full benefit of open innovation strategies – firms cannot 
neglect internal R&D expenditures. Hence, in an environment of deeply specialized 
players, the firm must take an active position, instead of simply relying on 
knowledge generated elsewhere. We can attribute this aspect to an incapacity of 
properly interacting with partners in the innovative process and, also, being 
unattractive as a partner for R&D and innovation networks. If this proposition holds 
in empirical cases, it would pose a natural economic barrier for purely opportunistic 
                                                          
12
 This does not mean at all that R&D cooperation has no effect on SMEs. The point to be noticed 
here is that smaller firms are not likely to proceed to internalization of processes in the first place, 
making them more prone to outsourcing by their own organizational definition. 
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behavior through free riding, since a minimal threshold of absorptive capacity 
would have to be achieved in order to provide companies with the capacities of 
developing proper innovation-driven interactions.   
Chesbrough (2003) also highlights that even though the external availability 
of knowledge might discourage firms to invest internally in its own R&D activities, 
there is a high level of complementarity between the two (external and internal 
R&D) because of the capacities required to make full use of existing knowledge. In 
sum, an open innovation strategy does not reduce the importance of internal R&D 
efforts (Grutzman, Halme & Reiner, 2009) given the absorptive capacity required to 
engage in such initiatives. A major consequence of an increasing use of open 
innovation strategies and the impacts they have in economic systems shall lead to 
the institutional evolution required for an optimal functioning of collaborative R&D 
(Dreyfuss, 2011).  
 
2.3 The Collaborative Context 
 
In this section we explore the main determinants for firms to engage in R&D 
collaboration ventures/projects, as well as the contextual environment in which 
these interorganizational arrangements take place. Special emphasis on 
cooperation at the international level is given. Even though there is no agreement 
in literature regarding the influence of firms´ characteristics – such as firm size, 
R&D intensity, technological spillovers and sector of activity - on their propensity to 
cooperate in innovative activities (Barge-Gil, 2010; 2010a), a series of insights and 
patterns can be drawn from it.  
Besides micro-level aspects, firms’ propensity to engage in international 
R&D cooperation should be regarded as largely nation-specific, which is mainly a 
function of: a) national STI capabilities; b) perceived advantages of international 
cooperation; and c) foreign partners’ characteristics (Fernández-Ribas & Shapira, 
2009). Next we will briefly develop on these main aspects that influence firms’ 
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propensity to commit to cooperative agreements aiming at developing innovative 
activities.  
 
 
2.3.1 Firm Size 
 
 There is a general perception (but not an agreement) that large companies 
are better positioned to capture benefits from R&D cooperation. But the kind of 
partners they search for give room to some discussion. While some authors 
suggest that they usually prefer networks with smaller companies in order not to 
expose critical knowledge to potential competitors (Sinha & Cusumano, 1991; 
Barnard & Chaminade, 2011; Grutzman, Halme & Reiner, 2009), others propose 
that large firms are not prone to establish cooperative projects with smaller firms 
since this action will not provide the former with greater market power, thus 
networks would tend to be constituted by firms of similar sizes (Roller, Tombak & 
Siebert, 1997).  
The former assumption puts large firms as being the backbone of R&D 
networks, with SMEs also playing an important role as partners in these 
interorganizational structures, whereas the latter suggests the existence of 
networks of large firms and networks of SMEs co-existing “separately”.  In this 
sense, firm size as a propensity determinant regarding international R&D 
collaboration remains as a blurry spot in theoretical arguments. Larger firms have a 
better structure to engage in international cooperation, since they have the 
capacity to internalize knowledge-intensive activities and the opposite is true for 
SMEs (Fernández-Ribas & Shapira, 2009; Rammer, Czarnitzki and Spielkamp, 
2009). While large corporations have a greater capacity to engage in such 
cooperative settings, SMEs might have a greater necessity to do so. Hence, R&D 
collaboration can be regarded as especially relevant for SMEs, since it increases 
their opportunities to obtain knowledge that is not available within organizational 
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boundaries (Rese & Baier, 2011). Consequently, SMEs are bound to benefit more 
than large companies in terms of knowledge spillovers (Nishimura & Okamuro, 
2013), provided they have the capabilities required to internalize intellectual inputs.  
This last comment leads to a widespread empirical perspective: there is a 
higher propensity of larger firms to engage in international R&D cooperation – 
which is mainly attributed to firms’ absorptive capacity (this view is also supported 
by Faems et al, 2010; Veugelers & Cassiman, 2005; López, 2008; Anderson, 1995; 
Cusmano, 2001; Barge-Gil, 2010a; Silipo, 2008). But it must be kept in mind that 
this higher absorptive capacity will be largely dependent on a company’s R&D 
intensity and prior innovative behavior (López, 2008; Ebersberger & Herstad, 
2013). Additionally, a firm can increase its investments in R&D through R&D 
cooperation (Bayona, Corredor & Santamaría, 2006). This generates an 
endogenous relationship between these variables, where a firm which is intensive 
in R&D will achieve higher levels of absorptive capacity, thus allowing a firm to 
better capture results from R&D networks, increasing its absorptive capacity and 
so on.  
Complementarily, we must mention the role played by company past 
behavior (Hernán, Marín & Siotis, 2003), i.e., the positive influence that networking 
strategies from the past have on current and future conduct. This can be attributed 
to successful results, encouraging further engagement in cooperative settings, but 
we should also point out the possibility of an endogenous relationship between 
variables, as already debated. 
Large corporations can also benefit more from networking because of their 
capacity of participating simultaneously in various different networks (Anderson, 
1995). But Veugelers and Cassiman (2005) emphasize a conditioning aspect for 
this: large firms are more prone to engage in industry-science links whenever risks 
of disclosing critical assets are low, thus allowing them to better capture the 
benefits of collaboration.  
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On the other hand, large companies or firms that are part of conglomerates 
may have additional financial resources for innovation activities and to cope with 
risky innovation projects – which can make them less prone to engage in R&D 
alliances (Belderbos et al, 2004; Smith, 2000). In this case the reasoning of “cost 
sharing” behind the motivation for establishing R&D networks would be weaker.  
Nonetheless, data from innovation surveys show a trend that suggests that 
larger firms innovate more openly than SMEs, which is mainly attributed to the lack 
of resources from the latter firms to engage in these relationships, especially at the 
international level (De Backer, López-Bassols & Martinez, 2008; Hageedorn & 
Schakenraad, 1990). This highlights the importance of having enough financial and 
technological capacity to participate and to manage the participation in such 
networks (costs that will most likely rise whenever firms from different territories are 
involved).  
This pattern reveals that governmental intervention regarding R&D 
cooperation should not be restricted to large firms, since SMEs may not have the 
same level of formal R&D investment as large firms, but they account for a large 
share of innovative products (Sakakibara, 1997a; Audretsch, 2003).  One fruitful 
example in this regard is provided by the US, which has started to focus on SMEs 
innovative capabilities since the early eighties – via the Small Business Innovation 
Research Program - as a response to its loss of international competitiveness 
(Audretsch, 2003).  Therefore, SMEs must attain increasing levels of performance 
in order to maintain overall economic growth, which can be achieved mainly 
through novel and strategic management of R&D and innovation (Raymond & St. 
Pierre, 2010).  
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2.3.2 The Resource Based View and Inter-Organizational Arrangements 
 
The Resource-Based View (RBV) provides a framework for analyzing 
economic units according to their capabilities and endowments, thus characterizing 
companies according to their competences and existing possibilities, where 
technological skills and knowledge pool can be regarded as core resources in 
terms of innovative potential (Wernerfelt, 1984). The RBV perspective over firm 
competitiveness is dependent upon inimitable, non-substitutable and imperfectly 
mobile resources and capabilities (Peteraf, 1993). In other words, strategic 
positioning is related to companies’ unique competences.  
In a multidisciplinary context, where several of dynamic features of 
innovation apply (as previously outlined in section 2.1), such “uniqueness” 
becomes harder to achieve independently. Inter-firm collaboration, then, plays an 
important role in directing independent companies in a joint effort of combining 
their most relevant resources towards the common goal of generating value, where 
collaborative arrangements will exist if, and only if, firms foresee a synergistic 
combination in the combination of individual capabilities (Lorenzoni & Lipparini, 
1999; Madhok & Tallman, 1998). Hence, emphasis is increasingly put on 
competence-sharing and competence-combining among economic agents (both 
horizontally and vertically)13.  
Even though addressing the case of mergers and acquisitions only, 
Wernerfelt (1984) offers the concept of non-marketable resources and its 
relationship with firms’ necessity of absorbing relevant bodies of knowledge that 
exist outside its organizational boundaries as a requisite for increased 
competitiveness. Such perspective can be easily adapted to the environment of 
                                                          
13 RBV literature often refers to the use of external sources of competences as a “make-or-buy” 
decision. Collaborative agreements provide an example that shows that such decision is of a more 
complex nature, as Ahuja (2000) pinpoints. Such complexity is a function of non-tradable assets, 
such as knowledge itself.  
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inter-firm collaboration involving knowledge flows (as suggested by Ireland, Hitt 
and Vaidyanath, 2002). Literature usually defines these strategic resources as:  
a) Supplementary – deepening of firms’ existing capabilities. 
b) Complementary – extension of competences that can be combined with 
those which firms already possess.  
While geographical proximity and prior relationships among agents are 
important determinants of the establishment of international R&D networks in 
Europe, knowledge and technological overlaps seem to be the core drivers of such 
activities, highlighting that these alliances have a strong orientation towards 
linkages based on supplementary capabilities (Paier & Scherngell, 2011; 
Scherngell & Barber, 2008, both works based on FP evidence). Nonetheless, when 
these overlaps are too strong, limitations to learning are expected to arise (Keil et 
al., 2008), thus providing networks with potentially low levels of knowledge to be 
absorbed.  
Another conclusion drawn from the RBV literature is that the choice of 
partners in the formation of alliances is highly related to external resources firms 
need in order to improve their competitive position (Mowery, Oxley & Silverman, 
1998). On the other hand, firms’ attractiveness as partners is defined by their 
existing (valuable) resources, especially technological and commercial ones 
(Ahuja, 2000). Consequently, R&D networks can function as mechanisms not only 
for value creation, but also for resource generation for partners, thus increasing, 
improving and expanding their pool of intra-organizational competences and 
resources14 (Ireland, Hitt & Vaidyanath, 2002; Lorenzoni & Lipparini, 1999). 
Moreover, this combination of firms’ internal resources in collaborative R&D 
agreements is also likely to generate some kind of convergence in partners’ 
                                                          
14
 We can highlight two main resources related to R&D networks: knowledge per se (embodied 
and/or disembodied) and, additionally, managerial/relational capabilities, as they are likely to be 
improved through inter-firm interactions. The latter aspect can become extremely valuable in further 
collaborative relationships the firm might be involved with (Lorenzoni & Lipparini, 1999).  
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technological portfolios, pointing towards an effective distribution of knowledge 
across networks (Mowery, Oxley & Silverman, 1998).  
A central feature of the RBV in a context of redefined organizational 
boundaries, therefore, is that firms’ critical resources are often part of inter-
organizational settings, where complementary assets, knowledge-sharing 
mechanisms and relational governance highly define the competitive position of 
alliance partners (Dyer & Singh, 1998)15. This conclusion offers an important 
addition to traditional RBV approaches (such as that of Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 
1997), which often neglect the dynamics of inter-firm relationships in building a joint 
set of valuable competences.  
  
2.3.3 Industry 
 
Regarding sectoral background as a propensity determinant for engagement 
in R&D networks, firms in industries with higher rates of technological change have 
also more incentives to participate in cooperative R&D projects (Belderbos et al, 
2004). Another influential aspect is that of divergent technological trajectories and 
the fact that they shall influence in firms propensity to cooperate in R&D (as shown 
in works of Pavitt, 1984 and Leiponen, 2001). These propositions generate a 
positive association between firm-size and innovative intensity in sectors that offer 
more technological opportunities (Archibugi & Evangelista, 1995)16.  
                                                          
15 In empirical terms, R&D networks that are formed with the sole goal of cost reduction represent 
relevant microeconomic risks in the long run
15
, while synergy-oriented alliances represent a 
stronger case for successful cooperation (Lee et al., 2010), thus indicating that a RBV approach to 
strategic reasoning is expected to be more economically sustainable over time in comparison to a 
“labor division” perspective.  
16
 Nonetheless, Edwards-Schachter et al (2012) estimate that technological intensity does not 
perform well as an explanatory variable on the propensity of firms in engaging in technological 
cooperation at the international level.  
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Furthermore, Sakakibara (2002) identifies two industrial features that are 
highly related to drive cooperation: oligopolistic concentration and knowledge 
appropriability conditions of knowledge. Regarding the former, oligopolistic 
industries show higher levels of R&D cooperation than those found in competitive 
industries, since potential for joint benefits are larger. On the latter aspect, 
industries with poor conditions for knowledge appropriability drive firms towards the 
formation of R&D networks, as a consequence of the fact that individual efforts are 
likely to be easily available for imitation elsewhere, increasing risks related 
technological and knowledge spillovers.  
Also, other industrial settings play an important role in this approach. Firms 
send signals to the market by disclosing knowledge and this strategy (conduct) 
gives them a reputation that makes them more prone to engage in R&D networks – 
and to play a central position in these partnerships (Muller & Pénin, 2006). Authors 
conclude that, even though this behavior can be risky in the short run, it enables 
firms to access a wider pool of knowledge than its non-disclosing peers, which 
provides them with advantages in the longer run. Hageedorn and Schakenraad 
(1990) also put emphasis on market positioning as a determinant for R&D 
collaboration, while Hernán, Marín and Siotis (2003) mention the importance of 
industrial concentration.  
In this regard, the conduct (strategy) of a company should be understood as 
a function of the industrial structure, thus determining performance. If we assume 
the idea of R&D networking as a desirable signal, we must perceive it as more 
relevant in sectors with higher degrees of competition and with more potential for 
external rivalry (substitutes). Industries that are highly concentrated and with low 
current risks of substitutes would behave differently, as a result of their 
environment (and the lower pressure for differentiation signals it would exert on 
companies). 
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2.3.4 Knowledge Spillovers, Transaction Costs and IPR  
 
Economic relationships are bound to face what theory describes generically 
as transaction costs. In cooperative agreements, risks of opportunistic behaviors, if 
high enough, bring with them the need for stronger coordination (governance) 
between partners, thus shaping the contractual context and defining whether or not 
the collaboration will take place (Katila & Mang, 2003). The most basic rationale 
behind innovation-driven economic incentives lies in the capacity of firms exploiting 
results of their efforts in the market (Leiponen & Byma, 2009). If these incentives 
are distorted by existing risks, levels of R&D efforts are expected to be lower than 
their optimal level, thus affecting the dynamics of networks.  
The role played by technological spillovers in R&D cooperation is of great 
relevance for companies in their strategic decisions regarding these activities 
(Hernán, Marín & Siotis, 2003). When choosing to participate in R&D agreements, 
a company must consider the levels of spillovers involved, in and out of the 
organization. While external technological adoption is a key ingredient of 
innovation (Bogliacino and Pianta, 2010), having competitors accessing a given 
firm’s pool of knowledge might represent an undesirable risk in the medium/long 
term (Arranz & Arroyabe, 2008a). As Oxley (1999, p. 284) puts it: “how can we 
[firms engaged in R&D alliances] promote technology transfer and learning, without 
losing control of valuable intellectual property?”. This question pinpoints an intrinsic 
and central feature of transaction costs when collaboration involves R&D 
interactions17: sharing critical knowledge with external agents (as suggested by 
Teece, 1986; Kreiner & Schulz, 1993; Hennart, 1988)18. Ultimately, appropriability 
hazard issues are likely to affect the success of such collaborative agreements 
                                                          
17
 This issue is so critical in the formation of R&D networks that the European Commission launched 
a guide for IPR management in projects related to the 7
th
 Framework Programme. This document, 
“Guide to Intellectual Property Rules for FP7 projects” clearly states that IPR conditions are strongly 
connected with projects’ coordination and exploitation of results. 
18 We may assume a certain level of cultural/institutional influence in this regard: Sakakibara 
(1997a), e.g., finds that opportunistic behavior and spillovers of critical knowledge are not perceived 
as important problems in R&D cooperation in the case of Japanese firms. 
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(Frenz & Ietto-Gillies, 2009)19, as well as to determine aggregate propensity of 
firms to engage in R&D cooperation (Tripsas, Schrader & Sobrero, 1995). Inter-firm 
R&D alliances face appropriability hazard issues when relevant activities are hard 
to be incorporated in contracts, or when these are contain elements that are hard 
to monitor and enforce (Oxley, 1997). Moreover, the complexity involved in a 
contract which addresses the development of new technologies represents 
additional uncertainty, given the unpredictable nature of innovation.    
Alternatively, incoming spillovers in R&D cooperation increase a firm’s 
profitability once it reaches a certain minimum level, but if this level is high enough, 
it may foster free riding issues, thus posing a duality for these “leakages” of 
knowledge – higher levels of incoming spillovers promote cooperation, but high 
levels of outgoing spillovers may hinder firms from engaging in such an activity (De 
Bondt & Veugelers, 1991; Kesteloot & Veugelers, 1995; Eaton & Eswaran, 1997). 
These risks depend largely on the structure of the R&D network that is 
established. They will be more representative the more the partners are capable of 
competing with each other in their specific core markets. This situation occurs as 
value appropriation takes place in an environment of rivalry, causing opportunism 
concerns that erode the potential of joint knowledge creation (Ritala & Humerlina-
Laukkanen, 2009; Helm & Kloyer, 2004). Intellectual Property Rights function as a 
catalyst in this process, allowing a stronger coordination of appropriability of 
innovative outcomes that arise from R&D networks.  On the other hand, Ritala and 
Humerlinna-Laukkanen (2009) propose through a game-theoretic approach that 
collaboration between rivals is likely to provide firms with better technological 
results, provided that common knowledge of markets and technologies is larger.  
 The level of opportunistic behavior risks largely defines the structure of 
networks. The contractual architecture in R&D collaboration is a way of building up 
                                                          
19 This issue implies that governments and institutions that promote R&D cooperation have a role to 
play in reducing transaction costs of such agreements through administrative mechanisms
19
 
(Tripsas, Schrader & Sobrero, 1995). 
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trust among partners (Blomqvist, Hurmelinna & Seppänen, 2005). Kim and Song 
(2007) find that more stable networks are more productive in terms of joint 
patenting than newly formed alliances. The authors relate this finding to higher 
managerial quality in the presence of lower transaction costs (as previous 
relationships increase trust between partners, as well as create the settings for 
better coordination of activities20), since firms are averse to share critical 
knowledge when appropriability risks are high.  
However, other factors can be understood as influential in determining the 
IPR framework in R&D alliances. Strategic flexibility influences the decision over 
the coordination of networks (softer agreements vs. equity-based alliances), since 
long-term interdependence can play a costly role for network members (as 
demonstrated by Roijakkers and Hagedoorn, 2006 in an assessment of R&D 
cooperation in the pharmaceutical biotechnology industry). An alternative 
perspective is provided by Mowery, Oxley and Silverman (1996), Lucena (2011) 
and Sampson (2007), who find that equity arrangements are more effective in the 
process of knowledge flows within networks, since these forms of cooperative 
arrangement provide firms with the abovementioned concept of network stability, 
reducing incentives for opportunistic behavior, thus increasing overall managerial 
quality of knowledge flows21.   
The use of patents and trade secrets as protection mechanisms against 
opportunistic behavior deserves some additional comments, since they can be 
regarded as managerial tools in a context of (undesirable) knowledge spillovers 
arising from collaboration. Katila and Mang (2003) find that the use of patents is 
significantly related to firms’ propensity of engaging in collaborative agreements, 
whereas Pénin (2005) highlights that patents can be used for firms as a strategy to 
protect knowledge from opportunistic behavior, not only as a way to achieve 
                                                          
20
 The findings of Gulati (1995) also support the concept of increased trust when repeated 
interactions take place among partners in an alliance, thus modifying the contractual relationship.  
21
 Nonetheless, Mitsuhashi (2003) finds that stable networks, while having higher levels of 
managerial quality, are bound to exchange redundant knowledge over time, making them less 
adaptable to new technologies and cutting-edge knowledge.  
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temporary monopoly. Emphasis would, hence, rest on patents’ coordination role, 
rather than on the rents they shall provide.  
However, other firm-level characteristics must be taken into account in this 
process. SMEs IPR strategies, for example, are significantly different from those of 
larger firms. Smaller firms are more likely to use time-to-market as a tactical form 
of appropriating the results from a collaborative project (Leiponen & Byma, 2009)22. 
Even though patents represent a more robust mechanism for knowledge 
protection/appropriation (Leiponen & Byma, 2009; Arundel, 2001), they represent 
an additional (and highly relevant) cost. As SMEs lack resources for registering 
and, more importantly, for enforcing their patents, stronger forms of coordination 
among members become infeasible. This is particularly relevant for the fragmented 
European framework for patents (European Commission, 2010a).  
Additional uncertainty can be attributed to networks that involve partners 
from multiple countries (Lhuillery & Pfister, 2009). As previously addressed, 
Intellectual Property Rights shape the governance structure of inter-firm alliances, 
where more hierarchical relationships (i.e., equity joint ventures instead of contract-
based alliances) take place when protection of knowledge is weak (Oxley, 1997; 
1999)23. This situation is influenced by both the transaction characteristics, and the 
institutional environment to which partners belong. Furthermore, international 
linkages face constraints related to distance, language and other cultural factors 
(Mowery, Oxley & Silverman, 1996), which hamper the optimization of inter-firm 
interactions.  
Regarding R&D alliances within the European Union, the stable institutional 
environment in terms of IPR protection across different Member States provides 
                                                          
22
 SMEs lack, for example, resources for registering and, more importantly, for enforcing their 
patents. This is particularly relevant for the fragmented European framework for patents (European 
Commission, 2010a). On the other hand, trade secrets are hard to keep in a collaborative setting, 
making patents a stronger mechanism for knowledge protection/appropriation (Leiponen & Byma, 
2009; Arundel, 2001).  
23
 This situation can be conceptually described as risks of opportunistic behavior, as well as an 
issue of moral hazard (or appropriability hazard). These are particularly relevant in international 
R&D networks, since monitoring behavior becomes extremely costly and difficult (Oxley, 1997).  
49 
 
firms with increased trust in inter-organizational structures. For instance, the 
European Patent Office sets the basic rules for patenting activities across Europe, 
providing countries with linear expectations concerning the protection of 
incorporated knowledge. An illustrative example of the opposite situation (distinct 
institutional settings) would be networks that involve locations with high degrees of 
variability in terms of such protection, posing a context in which additional 
transaction costs are present. 
In conclusion, transaction costs related to IPR management in 
(international) R&D alliances represent a critical issue in the managerial processes 
of these networks and, hence, they are expected to be linked with firms’ outcomes 
and their initial propensity to develop cooperative agreements in R&D. This 
complexity is enhanced by the fact that stronger coordination can be desired in 
many sectors, but if agents actively engage in knowledge-protection strategies, 
they can be seen by markets as less attractive partners for collaborative projects 
(Muller & Pénin, 2006), since networking with them can becomes too costly. A 
proper administration of the abovementioned aspects should take into account not 
only short-run risks, but also long-run orientation.    
 
 
2.3.5 National Innovation Systems 
 
 The last aspect to be assessed as a propensity determinant for engagement 
in R&D networks (especially at international level) makes reference to the 
geographic and institutional environment in which agents are embedded: National 
Innovation Systems – NIS. Adding this variable into our analysis provides a macro-
oriented perspective of the phenomenon under scrutiny.  
 First of all, country size, as well as degree of openness to globalization, is a 
relevant driver for agents to engage in international R&D cooperation, where 
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smaller and more open countries are more prone to develop these activities in 
relative terms (Srholec, 2011a; Hernán, Marín & Siotis, 2003). This proposition is 
related to the idea of complexity involved in R&D, leading to multi-technological, 
interdisciplinary, outcomes. Small countries usually have a relatively small width in 
terms of industrial capacity, thus requiring partnerships with agents from other 
countries in order to participate in more multifaceted technological developments.  
 Srholec (2011a) also states that firms from less advanced nations seem to 
be more prone to engage in international cooperative projects aiming at the 
generation of innovations. Complementing the former idea, firms from these 
nations are less likely to have the necessary knowledge in complex technologies, 
thus resorting to networks with foreign agents. De Prato and Nepelski (2012) find 
that this situation has led to a “core-periphery” structure in international 
collaboration, where countries with stronger innovation systems (called “hubs”) 
work as strong nodes in most networks. In this sense, Edwards-Schachter et al 
(2012) suggest that firms from countries with less-developed innovation systems 
are also less likely to achieve successful results from the interaction.  
 In terms of national policymaking, Fernández-Ribas and Shapira (2009) 
show that participation in national innovative initiatives positively influence the 
probability of firms to engage in international innovative networks. This approach 
emphasizes the importance of internal institutions promoting indirectly the 
international association of companies through local R&D partnerships. In this 
regard, we cannot neglect the role played by the NIS in terms of R&D expenditures 
by public sources, the education system, specific industrial policies, etc., which 
influence the macroeconomic landscape for firms, thus affecting their capabilities.  
  For the general case of Europe, an evaluation undertook by the European 
Technology Assessment Network (ETAN, 1998) concludes that European firms not 
only have a internationalized S&T profile, but are also increasing its technological 
alliances and international generation of innovations within Europe and beyond, 
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even though not in the same level as firms in the United States (Foray & Lhuillery, 
2010).  
 Next (table 3), we offer a summary of the findings related to the 
collaborative context of firms and their interaction within R&D networks with focus 
on the international level of such relationships. After, we move to an analysis of 
empirical findings on the outcomes of the subject under analysis.  
 
2.4 A Literature Survey on Empirical Outcomes  
 
As a starting point in the subject of outcomes from (international) R&D 
networks, we should point out that there is no consensus on how cooperative 
performance can be measured. Evaluation so far focuses on subjective (interviews, 
questionnaires) or objective sources (published financial data) (Veugelers, 1998). 
Moreover, collaborative R&D is more difficult to evaluate than individual R&D 
projects, since there are multiple perspectives involved in the former situation 
(Dyer & Powell, 2002), and, also, benefits of cooperative pre-competitive R&D can 
be only seen in the long-term and they are usually systemic rather than discrete 
(Quintas & Guy, 1995). 
The abovementioned context gives room to different kinds of assessments 
(and different dimensions) aiming at providing partial answers to the phenomenon. 
In this regard, none is capable of answering all of the questions involved, but a 
combination of such results might provide some robust hints on the microeconomic 
effects of these initiatives. We shall analyze the following findings under three 
constructs: Innovative Intensity & Performance; Corporate Performance; and 
Network Structure & Management. The first two give emphasis to outputs per se, 
while the third one is process-oriented.  
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Aspect Main Theoretical Findings Main sources
Firm Size
a) Large firms are better in a better position to capture benefits from R&D cooperation
b) SMEs play a relevant role in netw orks, but a secondary one compared to large companies
c) Large firms have a higher capacity (higher absorptive capacity and more f inancial resources) to engage in 
international R&D netw orks. Nonetheless, absorptive capacity should be proxied by a given firm's R&D intensity
d) SMEs have a greater necessity to engage in international R&D netw orks in order to become competitive in 
innovative activities
e) Large firms are more concerned w ith disclosing critical assets via R&D netw orks than SMEs
Sinha & Cusumano, 1991; Barnard & Chaminade, 2011; Grutzman, Halme & 
Reiner, 2009; Fernández-Ribas & Shapira, 2009; Faems et al, 2010; Veugelers & 
Cassiman, 2005; López, 2008; Anderson, 1995; Cusmano, 2001; Barge-Gil, 
2010a; Silipo, 2008; De Backer, López-Bassols & Martinez, 2008; Hageedorn & 
Schakenraad, 1990
Resource Based View
a) Firms cooperate w hen they foresee synergies arising from the alliance
b) Netw orking can provide f irms w ith 2 sorts of strategic resources: complementary and supplementary
c) The choice of partners is related to resources that are scarce w ithin the f irm 
Wernerfelt, 1984; Peteraf, 1993; Lorenzoni & Lipparini, 1999; Madhok & Tallman, 
1998; Ireland, Hitt and Vaidyanath, 2002; Ahuja, 2000; Dyer & Singh, 1998
Industry
a) Firms in industries w ith higher rates of technological change have more incentives to participate in cooperative 
R&D projects
b) R&D cooperation - especially at international level - gives f irms a reputation that favors further engagement in 
netw orks
c) Industrial structure plays a central role in determining f irm conduct (strategy) concerning R&D cooperation
Belderbos et al, 2004; Muller & Pénin, 2006; Hernán, Marín & Siotis, 2003; 
Hageedorn & Schakenraad, 1990
Transaction Costs, Knowledge 
Spillovers and IPR
a) High levels of incoming spillovers promote cooperation
b) High levels of outgoing spillovers may hinder f irms from engaging in R&D cooperation
c) Transaction costs and netw ork structure 
De Bondt & Veugelers, 1991; Kesteloot & Veugelers, 1995; Eaton & Eswaran, 
1997; Hernán, Marín & Siotis, 2003; Mowery, Oxley & Silverman, 1996; Oxley, 
1997; 1999
National Innovation Systems
a) Firms from smaller countries are more prone to engage in international R&D cooperation
b) The farther a country is from technological frontier, more benefits its f irms can gather from participating in 
international R&D netw orks, but f irms from less-developed innovation systems are less prone to be successful in 
such relationships
c) National R&D cooperation policies foster international R&D cooperation in the future
d) European firms have an internationalized S&T profile and are becoming more oriented tow ards international R&D 
cooperation, especially w ith partners from other European countries
Srholec, 2011a; Hernán, Marín & Siotis, 2003; Fernández-Ribas & Shapira, 2009; 
ETAN, 1998; Foray & Lhuillery, 2010; Edwards-Schachter et al, 2012
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Summary of findings on the contextual environment of R&D cooperation 
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2.4.1 Innovative Intensity & Performance 
 
 One of the most relevant outcomes from cooperative R&D in companies is 
the expectation it creates in providing greater innovative capacity, which can be 
attributed to external knowledge absorption as well as to a higher level of 
innovative intensity in collaborating firms. Nonetheless, there is no consensus on 
the effects of R&D cooperation and innovative intensity and/or performance.    
As a positive body of evidence regarding the relationship between 
innovative performance and R&D cooperation we find the works of Faems et al 
(2010), Zeng, Xie and Tam (2010), Cusmano, (2001), Chang (2003) and Beaudry 
(2011). To properly define the concept of innovative performance in each context, 
Faems et al (2010) and Zeng, Xie and Tam (2010) use the proportion of turnover 
attributed to new or strongly improved products, Cusmano (2001) and Beaudry 
(2011) use patenting activity, while Chang (2003) analyzes market introduction of 
technological innovations. Even though we acknowledge that these analyses 
provide a limited view of the complex definition of innovation, they are 
representative in defining a trend: R&D collaboration positively affects innovative 
performance. Nonetheless, we recognize that several variables influence this 
process, as addressed in several sections throughout this literature review. 
R&D collaboration – especially at the international level - also seems to be 
positively associated with higher innovation expenditures according to De Jong and 
Freel (2010), Beaudry (2011), Siebert (1996) and Czarnitzki, Ebersberger and Fier 
(2007). However, these aspects are representative of an innovation input, thus not 
being able to estimate actual innovation output, though they can contribute to a 
good assessment of innovative performance. Even if innovation cannot be 
regarded as a linear process, substantial differences in input indicators are usually 
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relevant indicators of distinct innovative performance (which is less likely to hold 
when there are only marginal differences in inputs). 
Franco, Marzucchi and Montresor (2011) find evidence that firms’ reliance 
on external knowledge tends to increase its absorptive capacity. Building upon an 
opposite direction of causality, Lin et al (2012) find that innovation performance 
(measured via patent indicators) arising from firms’ participation in R&D networks 
is highly dependent on existing levels of absorptive capacity, which highlights the 
driving potential that this construct is likely to have on the economic outcomes of 
such interorganizational arrangements.  
Additionally, Bogliacino and Pianta’s (2010) results show that technological 
cooperation agreements have a positive effect in the achievement of innovations 
which leads to better economic outcomes, suggesting an indirect relationship 
between cooperation and economic performance via innovations. Similar results 
are found by Surroca Aguilar and Santamaría Sánchez (2006). These results 
support an idea of R&D networks working rather successfully in providing firms 
with better corporate results through better innovative outcomes. We shall turn to 
these corporate aspects in the upcoming section.  
On the other hand, Fritsch and Franke, (2004) find that R&D cooperation 
plays a minor role in generating actual knowledge spillovers that can add efficiency 
to innovation activities, while Stenbacka and Tombak (1998) claim that R&D 
networks are highly dependent on external subsidies if the goal is to achieve higher 
rates of R&D intensity amongst partners, i.e., they do not represent an 
advantageous initiative in terms of its cost-efficiency. 
 
2.4.2 Corporate Performance 
 
 While innovative intensity and performance can be considered as a highly 
desirable output from R&D partnerships - along with higher levels of absorptive 
capacity and increased awareness of technological and non-technological 
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capabilities existing outside the boundaries of the firm – they only represent a 
source of competitiveness when they translate into better corporate performance 
(financial indicators, increased productivity, etc.).  
 In this sense, as already pointed out, the work of Bogliacino and Pianta 
(2010) reaches a favorable conclusion regarding the role that R&D networks play 
in improving corporate performance via better innovative results. Nonetheless, 
most empirical works approach this phenomenon in a direct, non-endogenous, 
manner, aiming at establishing a relationship between collaboration and firms’ 
outcomes.  As examples of R&D cooperation’s positive impacts on corporate 
performance we can mention the works of Hageddorn and Schakenraad (1994) 
and Sakakibara (1997a), which conclude that R&D cooperation improves corporate 
performance and industry competitiveness.  
 Another aspect to be pointed out is that international R&D collaboration also 
seems to provide firms with strategic flexibility to undertake short-term innovation 
projects with a variety of partners (Hagedoorn, 2002). Also, financial markets 
perceive international and cross-sectoral alliances (between two partners) as 
positive (drawing evidence from stock prices) (Bayona, Corredor & Santamaría, 
2006), indicating a market perception of R&D networks as signals of future 
improvements in corporate performance (as an expectation of stockholders and 
buyers).  
 In opposition, Siebert (1996) reports the achievement of lower profit margins 
for firms that collaborate in R&D – even though the same author found for the 
analyzed firms a larger rate of innovative returns. Similar results were proposed by 
Aguiar and Gagnepain (2011) for the case of small networks. Egbetokun (2012) 
finds positive technological results arising from innovation networks, whereas he 
does not find support for the hypothesis that such firms achieve better market 
outcomes in comparison to those firms that do not participate in R&D networks. 
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But it must be kept in mind that a core aspect to be taken under 
consideration concerning this situation is the timing of the assessment. Sakakibara 
(1997a) highlights the fact that the commercialization of a given project involving 
R&D collaboration drives the project’s positive or negative evaluation by 
participants. If further results arise after the evaluation takes place, there is a 
potential risk of misrepresenting companies’ outcomes if returns are not yet being 
commercialized. The same perspective holds for objective indicators of corporate 
performance. Besides, benefits from R&D cooperation seem to be largely 
intangible, related mainly to researcher training and increased awareness of R&D 
in general (Sakakibara, 1997a).  
 
 
2.4.3 Network Structure & Management 
 
In section 2.3.4 Knowledge Spillovers, Transaction Costs and IPR, it was 
streamlined that the innovation linkages among companies face an environment of 
complex interactions, where issues of knowledge sharing are at the core of the 
analysis, shaping governance modes of networks. However, even considering the 
risks involved in this context, firms are increasingly resorting to inter-organizational 
arrangements. Managerial capabilities become key to define outcomes from 
alliances, where proper coordination among agents seems to be fundamental for 
the achievement of efficient R&D activities.    
The “Network Structure & Management” dimension analyzed in this section 
refers to the impacts of R&D networks’ organizational impacts on firms’ outcomes. 
Provided that there is no standard way of cooperating in R&D – networks’ 
characteristics vary in structure, geography, level of rivalry, etc. – it is of significant 
relevance to verify what hints literature can give in this regard.  
Despite all the benefits that encourage co-production of knowledge between 
different organizations, its nature is highly complex and carries with it the challenge 
57 
 
of inter-firm coordination (Husted & Michailova, 2010). As a result, managerial 
processes of R&D networks represent core drivers of ultimate achievements, 
provided that they take place in an environment of complex transaction costs (as 
suggested by the works of Sampson, 2005; Sakakibara, 2002). For example, 
Granero and Vega-Jurado (2012), analyzing the case of the Spanish Ceramic Tile 
Industry, find strong support for the role of managerial practices (network 
coordination concerning knowledge sharing activities and formalization based 
mechanisms24) in determining market results of R&D-oriented alliances.  
The proposition that the quality of coordination is a main determinant of 
success in R&D networks is also supported by several other authors (e.g. Dyer & 
Powell, 2002; Caloghirou, Hondroyiannis and Vonortas, 2003; Husted & 
Michailova, 2010). Some have even stated that network coordination (intensity and 
quality), organization and cohesion are of similar importance for successful results 
as technological capabilities and market potential of products, provided that the 
former condition the process of enabling external knowledge to become a 
marketable output (Rese & Baier, 2011; Husted & Michailova, 2010; Granero & 
Vega-Jurado, 2012).  
Since innovation has become a more “open” process, where R&D 
interactions take place both horizontally and vertically, the development of the 
necessary capabilities to manage innovation strategically and across 
organizational boundaries represents a crucial aspect for companies’ 
achievements (Blomqvist et al., 2004). This happens because inter-firm 
collaboration faces several difficulties regarding its management and coordination, 
thus leading to a high rate of failures, abandonments and delays in these 
relationships (Dyer & Powell, 2002; Lhuillery & Pfister, 2009).  
Key aspects related to management processes of R&D networks are related 
to: i) planning of resources; ii) partners’ contributions; and iii) timing of contributions 
(Arranz & Arroyabe, 2008). As innovation needs to be integrated strategically with 
                                                          
24
 Understood as formal explicit rules of conduct.  
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financing functions, marketing and sales, human resources and so on, good 
coordination becomes harder to achieve when R&D processes involve suppliers, 
customers, competitors, etc. (Blomqvist et al., 2004). Furthermore, the process of 
network management regarding R&D-related activities is one of controlling inflows 
and outflows of knowledge25, where the firm must contribute to the network while 
also benefitting from it and protecting critical intangible assets (Husted & 
Michailova, 2010).  
The challenge, then, to achieve an efficiently managed cooperative R&D 
project, lies upon defining clear objectives, which coordinate tasks, solve conflicts, 
distribute results and hinder opportunistic behavior from alliance members (Arranz 
& Arroyabe, 2008). Firms that share similarities in their organizational structures 
and cultures are likely to achieve better results in inter-company relationships (Keil 
et al., 2008), as interactions are expected to be of higher quality. Hence, firms’ 
learning processes regarding partner selection (as an ex ante managerial task) 
represent a fundamental step towards establishing functional R&D networks 
(Chang, 2003; Hagedoorn, Roijakkers & Kranenburg, 2006; Arranz & Arroyabe, 
2008; 2008a). However, preliminary cost-benefit assessments are imperfect, since 
the market for knowledge-based assets is surrounded by uncertainty (Husted & 
Michailova, 2010). 
Besides aspects of managerial complexity that are common to networks in 
general26, we must remind the risks involved in R&D cooperation, which are mainly 
related to – undesired - knowledge flows, or technological spillovers. This implies 
that vertical networks are easier to manage than horizontal (among competitors) 
ones (Dyer & Powell, 2002; Tao & Wu, 1997; Badillo & Moreno, 2012; Lhuillery & 
Pfister, 2009), hence potentially leading to better outcomes27. That is to say, 
                                                          
25 For individual firms’ results, absorptive capacity and innovation appropriability are core features of 
the managerial processes involved in R&D networks (Hurmelinna-Laukkanen et al, 2012). 
26
 Such as organizational culture, information flows, free riding, opportunistic behavior, etc. For a 
review of transaction costs involved in R&D networks, see section 2.3.4 Knowledge Spillovers, 
Transaction Costs and IPR. 
27
 Kamien and Schwartz (1976) using theoretical formulations find that an intermediate level of 
rivalry would provide optimal results in terms of innovative achievements. 
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technological and knowledge spillovers are positive in a R&D network (and to 
some extent the reason why they exist in the first place), but, as pointed out 
previously, there are severe managerial threats when this “leaking knowledge” can 
affect agents’ competitiveness. Therefore, research consortia outcomes have 
positive association with levels of R&D spillovers and negative association with the 
degree of market competition between members (Branstetter & Sakakibara, 2002). 
Moreover, for managerial reasons, the configuration of a R&D network has 
influence on the capacity of this network in generating innovations (Liu & 
Chaminade, 2009), which can be attributed to aspects related to the 
aforementioned transaction costs involved in the relationship. Consequently, more 
perennial R&D partnerships increase trust and thus are more prone to provide 
higher quality results (Huggins, 2011; Rese & Baier, 2011; Musiolik, Markard & 
Hekkert, 2012; Mitsuhashi, 2003). However, as outlined previously in section 2.3.4, 
Mitsuhashi (2003) has found that high quality management, when it is achieved 
through network stability, may cause a lack of dynamism in innovative 
performance, where knowledge exchanges become redundant28.    
In geographical terms, cohesion seems to play an important role: R&D 
networks that are too dispersed experience worse technological performance 
(Barnard & Chaminade, 2011; Dyer & Powell, 2002). In this regard we should 
approach geography as a proxy for other influent variables in the process, such as 
cultural background, local market characteristics, language barriers and difficulties 
involving coordination from long distance. This latter aspect has been increasingly 
tackled at firms’ operational levels through the use of modern IT systems29, but 
considering R&D as a non-linear process and being subject to tactical and strategic 
plans, its international coordination implies different challenges.   
                                                          
28
 König et al (2012) find that the relationship between network efficiency and stability is highly 
related to industrial structure.  
29 Cooperative R&D relationships can benefit from internet-based real time connections between 
members to improve managerial quality of linkages (Kessler, 2003). 
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In addition, domestic linkages seem to be the most relevant determinant of 
innovative performance, where international linkages matter only in combination 
with domestic ones (Srholec, 2011). This poses a situation in which international 
R&D networks are effective when used as a complement of local networks. In this 
regard we should put some emphasis on the role played by country size in this 
perspective as already stated. However, Srholec’s (2011) results refer to data from 
the UK, Norway and the Czech Republic, being the latter two considered as small 
economies, thus theoretically more prone to resort to international R&D networks. 
A potential explanation for such results lies on the construction of managerial 
capabilities regarding networks, i.e., those firms that are engaged in larger 
numbers of collaborative agreements are likely to develop the necessary know-
how to properly manage such relationships. For proximity reasons, this learning 
process is expected to be stronger within national boundaries.  
In terms of policymaking regarding networks’ structure, Broekel, Schimke 
and Brenner (2011) suggest that collaborative RTD policy should focus on a large 
number of small projects instead of on a few large-scale ones. The authors also 
find that the success of collaborative R&D initiatives is more related to its 
specifications (number of supported projects, cooperative character and types of 
cooperation being supported) than to the amount of resources invested, putting 
emphasis on the relevance of the structural and managerial dimensions of R&D 
cooperation. 
Follows a summary of the main features presented in this section, gathering 
evidence on R&D networks’ outcomes regarding the three analyzed dimensions: 
Innovative Intensity & Performance, Corporate Performance and Network Structure 
& Management. Afterwards we outline the innovation policy elements involved in 
our analysis.  
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Aspect Main Theoretical Findings Main sources
Innovative Intensity & Performance
a) Firms engaging in technological cooperation outperform those that do not in terms of innovative performance
b) R&D collaboration – especially at the international level - is positively associated w ith higher innovation 
expenditures
c) Firms’ reliance on external know ledge tends to increase its absorptive capacity
d) R&D netw orks provide f irms w ith better corporate results through better innovative outcomes
e) R&D netw orks are highly dependent on external subsidies to achieve higher rates of R&D intensity 
Faems et al, 2010; Zeng, Xie & Tam, 2010; Cusmano, 2001; Beaudry, 2011; De 
Jong & Freel, 2010; Siebert, 1996; Czarnitzki, Ebersberger & Fier, 2007; Franco, 
Marzucchi & Montresor, 2011; Bogliacino & Pianta, 2010; Surroca Aguilar & 
Santamaría Sánchez, 2006; Stenbacka & Tombak, 1998 
Corporate Performance
a) R&D cooperation improves corporate performance and industry competitiveness
b) International R&D collaboration provides f irms w ith strategic f lexibility
c) Financial markets perceive international and cross-sectoral alliances as positive 
d) Commercialization of a given project involving R&D collaboration drives the project’s positive or negative 
evaluation by participants
e) Benefits from R&D cooperation seem to be largely intangible
f) Timing of evaluation is key
Hageddorn & Schakenraad, 1994; Sakakibara; 1997a; Hagedoorn, 2002; Bayona, 
Corredor & Santamaría, 2006
Network Structure & Management
a) Importance of quality of coordination and levels of know ledge sharing for success in R&D netw orks
b) Risks involved in R&D cooperation are mainly related to technological spillovers to (potential) competitors
c) Vertical netw orks are easier to manage than horizontal ones
d) Research consortia outcomes have positive association w ith levels of R&D spillovers and negative association 
w ith the degree of market competition betw een members of consortia
e) R&D netw orks that are too geographically dispersed incur in w orse technological performance
f) International linkages matter only in combination w ith domestic ones
G) collaborative RTD policy should focus on a large number of small projects instead of on a few  large-scale ones
Dyer & Powell, 2002; Tao & Wu, 1997; Branstetter & Sakakibara, 2002; Barnard & 
Chaminade, 2011; Srholec, 2011; Broekel, Schimke and Brenner, 2011
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Summary of findings on empirical outcomes of R&D cooperation 
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3. RTD policies in an integrated context: the case of the 
European Union   
 
Provided that the assessment contained in this research makes central 
reference to results of companies engaged in R&D cooperation activities promoted 
by the Eureka initiative, our approach is can be related to innovation policy 
evaluation, as well as a contribution for an improved policymaking process. 
Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to build a robust background on Research, 
Technology & Development policies’ rationale, the role played by evaluations, and 
some further notes on related aspects.   
Technological innovation policies represent a strategic area in the field of 
public policy regardless of governments’ political inclination or geographical 
relevance (national, regional, local or even supranational) (Aghion & Tirole, 1994).  
This is a result of the role that innovation and technological change play in 
fostering economic growth and its characteristics of public goods that are likely to 
create market failures (Álvarez, 2004; Molero & Fonfría, 2008; Branstetter & 
Sakakibara, 2002; Suurna & Kattel, 2010).   
However, RTD policies need to evolve, along with a changing 
socioeconomic environment, as well as regarding issues that leave room for 
improvement. Thus, they are often evaluated, adapted and modified in order to 
provide society with better outcomes, and agents with a better framework of action. 
Adaptive policymaking is about facilitation (enabling innovation), understanding the 
existence of unpredictability and indeterminacy in the results of policy initiatives 
(Metcalfe & Georghiou, 1997). Furthermore, innovation processes happen in 
conditions of uncertainty and (in the capitalist system) of competition and so must 
be approached in a holistic manner, considering not only technical capabilities but 
also the market environment and the social context (Pavitt, 2003; Kline & 
Rosenberg, 1986). 
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In the following sections we focus on theoretical and empirical aspects 
concerning the foundations and justifications for governmental intervention in terms 
of innovation, as well as the role of continuous evaluation of such initiatives in 
shaping the evolution of RTD policies. Special attention is given to the integration 
of innovation systems via international R&D collaboration in the EU context.     
 
3.1 The economic rationale behind RTD policies:  a brief outline 
 
Innovation is a costly process which can create market failures related to the 
nature of technological change, such as appropriability issues, amount of R&D 
investment, spillovers and externalities (Klette & Moen, 1999; Smith, 2000; 
European Commission, 2006a; NIST, 2006). Arrow (1962) argues that innovation’s 
inherent characteristics demand governmental action in order for society to 
produce an optimal level of economic valuable knowledge.    
This idea of “market failure” still is predominant in justifying the need for 
public policies that approach the problems related to the innovative process, 
fostering an innovation-driven environment (Bayona-Sáez & García-Marco, 2010; 
Nelson, 1959; Sanz Menéndez, 1995). The main argument is that in a context of 
perfect competition, there are not enough incentives for firms to innovate, given the 
lack of economic institutions that guarantee the return on investments. As 
examples of policies based on the “market failure” mindset we can highlight 
Intellectual Property Rights and R&D subsidies. 
However, it is known that the mere understanding of market failures does 
not provide enough information for technological policymaking (Aghion, David & 
Foray, 2009). Even though neoclassical approaches have been widely recognized 
as useful for the RTD policymaking process, the evolutionary theory in economics 
has also contributed with a systemic orientation, mainly through the viewpoints 
contained in the National Innovation Systems’ approach. The Innovation System 
approach considers the economic and social environment for innovation as one 
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where agents do not innovate in isolation, but rather through systemic interactions. 
Hence, innovation policy must focus in identifying systemic failures in the set of 
relationships existing within Innovation Systems (Edquist, 2011).  
This point of view regarding innovation policy highlights that innovation 
usually occurs within networks and alliances rather than in individual firms, 
stressing the relevance of a strongly interconnected innovation system (European 
Commission, 2002). We can mention the case of R&D cooperation policies as an 
example of “innovation systems”-oriented policies, since initiatives that promote 
R&D collaboration act as tools to foster not only innovation in participants, but also 
a structural and behavioral change in these agents (European Commission, 2002), 
with focus on existing and potential links between agents involved in innovative 
processes.   
Thus, we can add behavioral change or additionality as a main goal of 
innovation policy (Fernández-Ribas & Shapira, 2009; Hayashi, 2003; PREST, 
2002). Behavioral additionality refers to the fact that innovation policies have not 
only direct, but also indirect effects on companies’ strategies, where direct effects 
are obvious and concern the intentions of a given initiative, and indirect effects 
regard longer-term behavioral changes in agents (Fernández-Ribas & Shapira, 
2009; European Commission, 2006a).  
Despite its differences, innovation policy, either neoclassical or 
systemic/evolutionary, involves industrial, environmental, labor and social aspects, 
aiming at the generation of economic competitiveness (Kuhlman & Edler, 2003). 
But, evolutionary theory influenced technological policies to become more oriented 
to adaptation of firms and markets in an environment of change (Nelson & Winter, 
2002). They provide the framework for understanding endogenous systemic 
changes over time. Hence, existing institutional structures, including bodies of 
relevant law, and particular government policies and programs, can never be 
regarded as optimal and for this reason they are, and should be, always subject to 
evaluations and constructive criticism (Nelson, 2007). 
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During the last decades, globalization and the shift towards knowledge as 
the source of competitiveness rendered the traditional policy instruments less 
effective (Gilbert, Audretsch & McDougall, 2004), creating an environment that 
demands continuous adaptation in public policies and initiatives. Technology 
policies are part of a systemic economic landscape and must ensure that the main 
players - the firms - are able to realize their innovative potential (Molero, 2001), 
meaning that the appropriate R&D policymaking requires knowledge about context 
conditions, group behavior, instruments (and their mix) and policy effects 
(Ebersberger, Edler & Lo, 2006).  
Referring to this latter argument, given the complexity of business 
environments and different sectoral characteristics, innovation policies cannot 
afford to be fully standardized, since there is no optimal design for them: these vary 
across countries, technological domains and stages of innovative processes 
(Raymond & St. Pierre, 2010; Klette & Moen, 1999). Provided there is a high level 
of complexity and dynamism in the policymaking process regarding innovative 
activities, as well as the need for adaptation at the innovation system level, 
evaluation activities become a key element in designing better programs to 
develop innovative capabilities and desired changes in behavior and structure. In 
section 3.2 we shall approach the issue of RTD policy evaluation and adaptation in 
further detail. Table 5 summarizes some of the key elements in the analysis of 
innovation policies’ rationales. 
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Aspect Main Theoretical Findings Main sources
Market Failures
a) Appropriability issues
b) Amount of R&D investment
c) Technological spillovers
d) Externalities
e) IPRs and R&D subsidies (main kinds of intervention)
Klette & Moen, 1999; Smith, 2000; European Commission, 2006a; NIST, 2006; 
Arrow, 1962; Bayona-Sáez & García-Marco, 2010; Nelson, 1959; Sanz 
Menéndez, 1995
Innovation Systems
a) National Innovation Systems
b)Complex interactions betw een agents in order to generate innovations (importance of netw orks and alliances)
c) R&D cooperation initiatives (main kind of intervention)
Aghion, David & Foray, 2009; Edquist, 2011; European Commission, 2002
Behavioral Change/Additionality 
a) Indirect effects of public intervention, generating long-term changes in agents' innovative strategies
b) Policy focus should be upon agents that do not perform the desired conduct
Fernández-Ribas & Shapira, 2009; Hayashi, 2003; PREST, 2002; Barge-Gil, 
2010
Adaptation
a) Globalization and the shift tow ards know ledge as the source of competitiveness rendered the traditional policy 
instruments less effective
b) Necessity of know ledge about context conditions, group behavior, instruments, and policy effects
c) There is no optimal design for R&D and innovation policies: these vary across countries, technological domains 
and stages of innovative processes 
d) Importance of RTD/innovation policy evaluation
Raymond & St. Pierre, 2010; Klette & Moen, 1999; Ebersberger, Edler & Lo, 2006; 
Gilbert, Audretsch & McDougall, 2004; Nelson, 2007; Nelson & Winter, 2002; 
Kuhlman & Edler, 2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. Summary of findings on economic rationales behind RTD policies 
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3.1.1 Justifications for RTD policy in the European Union: Assessing 
international R&D integration and collaboration strategies30 
 
Innovation policy proposals in the European Commission context have long 
been considered of high importance. One significant milestone was the Green 
Paper on Innovation, released in 1995 (European Commission, 1995) and which 
tackles innovation challenges in Europe, broadly discussing structural hindrances 
for innovation systems across the bloc. It outlines the dynamics of innovation, and 
it introduces a systemic context, where strategic linkages and interdisciplinary 
technologies are fundamental.  
One of the pillars of this document is the so-called (and somewhat 
controversial) “European Paradox” concept, which states that Europe has a strong 
scientific base, lagging behind other countries (mainly Japan and the US) in terms 
of translating such knowledge into marketable outcomes, and to achieve this we 
can notice a strong political support to the creation of international R&D networks31. 
Georghiou (2008) had pointed out that technological policy reforms are needed for 
Europe to become a more research-friendly area. Several initiatives from the 
European Commission have tried to set the background for approaching this 
necessity effectively.  
Currently, the European Commission publicly acknowledges the role that 
innovation may have in restoring the continent’s economic competitiveness 
(seriously harmed by a series of crisis starting in 2008), thus generating the basis 
                                                          
30 It should also be noticed that the approach here undertaken does not aim at reviewing 
exhaustively the context of RTD policies in the European Union, but rather to provide an outlook of 
this context with special emphasis on the implications for international R&D collaboration within the 
bloc.  
31
 It should be noticed that this document is not the origin of collaborative support. Initiatives like the 
Framework Programmes and even Eureka (not subordinated to the EU) were going on since the 
80’s. The European Treaty itself, in articles 179-190 calls for R&D activities that are jointly 
undertaken by several Member States. Nonetheless, this Green Paper is an important landmark for 
innovation policy in Europe.    
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for economic recovery (European Commission, 2010b; 2010c; 201232). The main 
goal seems to be to avoid what the commission (European Comission, 2010b) 
calls “Sluggish Recovery” and “Lost Decade”. These are scenarios that represent a 
context in which the EU fails to address current obstacles to growth, thus facing 
wealth losses. The “Sustainable Recovery” optimistic scenario is one in which 
Europe is provided with conditions for closing the gap with the pre-crisis growth 
path, being able to raise its potential and achieve higher levels of output. The 
greatest challenge is, then, to invest in innovation-driven activities in a situation 
that involves political efforts towards governmental spending cuts (Mitsos et al, 
2012). 
In the Europe 2020 strategy, research and innovation appear in the five 
broad targets proposed by the commission as one of the core areas in the creation 
of a stronger and more competitive market in Europe. In another of its recent 
communications (European Commission, 2010b), the overall proposition is to 
enhance the European innovation system through a better institutional framework 
that promotes closer integration between countries (a recurrent subject in EC’s 
communications, even before Europe 2020 strategy), hence achieving higher 
returns from innovation investments, i.e., increased productivity of the bloc’s 
innovation system.  
We can, thus, attribute to these initiatives the search for a stronger 
coordination of innovation policies across the European Union, as well as an 
approximation of Member States’ innovation systems. According to the European 
Commission (2008; 2012), such integration, along with closer coordination in R&D 
efforts between Member States, is expected to foster both competition and 
cooperation within the bloc, thus providing the continental innovation system with 
more dynamic settings (Georghiou, 2001; European Commission, 2002; Álvarez, 
2004; Kuhlman & Edler, 2003; Eureka, 2001). This trend represents that 
                                                          
32
 Before the crisis, the competitiveness issue had been raised a number of times by the EC, and 
innovation was also at the core of its propositions. See, for example, European Commission (2004). 
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technology is becoming international in nature, making it difficult to manage related 
policies solely on the national level (Archibugi & Iammarino, 1999).  
In the center of this institutional “reform” lays the concept of the Innovation 
Union33 flagship. One of the relevant issues is that there is still a high level of 
fragmentation and duplication in European innovative efforts, which is a result of 
domestically-oriented policies, as well as to transaction barriers (such as different 
legislations, IPR, languages, cultural backgrounds, etc.) that hamper EU’s 
functioning as a economic union.  
The main strategy to tackle these challenges is the development of the 
ERA, which aims at bringing together regional and national innovative policies and 
initiatives34. The underlying rationale of the ERA relies on the concept of a 
European internal market and its economic implications, as well as a bloc-wide 
coordination of RTD policies (see, for example, European Commission 2006, 
among other EC’s communications that can be found in our References, and 
Georghiou, 199435). The ERA builds upon an increase of the integration between 
EU Member States in terms of Science and Technology and also to augment the 
resources dedicated to such activities, thus generating a unique innovation system 
across Europe (European Commission, 2008). It seeks to support the proposition 
of the Lisbon Summit in 2000, i.e., to turn Europe into the most dynamic and 
competitive knowledge economy in the world (European Commission, 2007).  
The importance of this integrated research area is reflected in the fact that in 
virtually every RTD policy communication from the EC it can be noticed that a 
substantial part is dedicated to the ERA’s implementation. Currently, one major 
                                                          
33
 The Innovation Union flagship is part of the Europe 2020 strategy and searches for innovative 
developments in key areas for society, such as: climate change, energy and resource efficiency, 
health, transport and demographic changes.  
34
 For example, in our datasets, several companies have highlighted issues with the 
synchronization of funding between partners in the network. Georghiou et al (1999) had also 
identified such constraints. This aspect is of core interest to understand that networks’ transaction 
costs that affect their respective managerial stability can be highly influenced by external agents 
such as financing bodies.   
35
 Georghiou (1994) makes reference to the specific case of the Framework Programme, where he 
states that this initiative is justified by its impacts on industrial competitiveness. 
70 
 
additional benefit that a strong ERA would generate is related to a more efficient 
use of existing resources, considering the economic turmoil which Europe has 
been facing for the past 5 years. In a recent evaluation of socio-economic benefits 
of the European Research Area, Mitsos et al (2012) argue that such efficiency is 
related to gains in economies of scale related to research efforts. The authors, 
however, highlight that the ERA does not aim at creating a centralized structure for 
RTD policy across Europe, but rather to provide a framework for coordination 
between regional, national and continental initiatives.         
In 2011, the European Commission has released the Horizon 2020 initiative, 
which is part of the Innovation Union flagship36. This particular policy guideline is 
one of centralizing EU’s innovation related activities, reducing wasteful duplication 
of efforts and building upon existing synergies in the bloc (for further details, see 
European Commission 2011a). It is expected that this centralization can minimize 
bureaucratic costs for research and innovation, thus providing innovation systems 
with more dynamic public responses.  
One important implication for international R&D cooperation in Europe is 
that the Framework Programme is going to be part of this initiative, indicating its 
possible interactions with other pan-European actions. Moreover, the Horizon 2020 
initiative is also explicit in highlighting the importance for the EU to develop closer 
ties with the international context (non-European nations), where economic 
approximation is understood as key to achieve competitiveness and to help 
developing connections with different innovation systems. This view is also shared 
by the EC in the definitions of the European Research Area (European 
Commission, 2007).  
The review of the abovementioned reports provide a perspective that EU’s 
innovation policy settings, as well as the promotion of the ERA, rest on a top-down 
                                                          
36 In order to assess the evolution of these proposals, the European Commission evaluates a group 
of relevant indicators through Innovation Union Scoreboards (including a “linkages & 
entrepreneurship” section, dedicated to R&D cooperation). 
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structure of incentives and conditions for Member States’ innovation systems to 
integrate into a continental-scale system that achieves higher performance in 
innovative capabilities. Nonetheless, it is important to highlight that such 
documents call for deeper private-side engagement in the new structural 
framework of the EU. It is a valid argument, since innovation will ultimately rely on 
their market exploitation37.  
But contributions of international cooperation in R&D, for as many benefits 
as they are expected to promote, must be addressed skeptically in terms of their 
actual assistance to innovation systems. While in impacts on individual firms 
contribute to a microeconomic understanding of these quasi-market relationships, 
more systemic (or macroeconomic) effects can be less prominent. Filippetti, Frenz 
and Ietto-Gillies (2009), for example, using recent data from the European 
Innovation Scoreboard and Community Innovation Survey, find no statistically 
significant relationship between internationalization and international collaboration 
constructs.  
Similar findings are presented by Frenz and Ietto-Gillies in a different 
assessment, where they add that international cooperation is likely to provide firms 
with lower levels of benefits than domestic linkages (Frenz & Ietto-Gillies, 2009). 
Together with the growing trends of such activities, we can analyze this outcome 
as potentially representing that international R&D cooperation benefits in terms of 
innovative capacity are still predominant in microeconomic levels, whereas more 
systemic spillovers are not satisfactory. Nonetheless, further integration between 
Member States’ economic (and innovation) systems can lead (in the long run) to a 
situation in which the terms “domestic” and “international” can merge within the 
European Union, thus maximizing the externalities of R&D alliances.   
 
                                                          
37 One main practical reason that hampers closer interaction between companies across different 
nations in the EU (international R&D collaboration) is the high costs of cross-country patenting in 
Europe.  
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3.1.2 Theoretical notes on the effects of domestic and international R&D 
collaboration on trade policy: outlines for the implementation of the 
European Research Area 
 
The increasing amount of international R&D networks is a phenomenon that 
also poses challenges for governmental intervention regarding industrial and trade 
policies. These aspects face a more complex landscape than that based solely on 
international R&D competition (often in an indirect basis) and which relies mainly 
on R&D subsidies for local companies - as international R&D cooperation of firms 
is not independent from commercial relationships between the involved countries 
(Zu et al, 2011). 
It seems legitimate to assume that, for the reasons depicted in section 2.1, 
(international) R&D cooperation policies foster the competitiveness of local firms in 
any given country that engages in such industrial strategy. For example, domestic 
governmental R&D incentives provide firms with similar strategic outcomes to 
those achieved through export subsidies, with the clear advantage of being 
accepted by trade regulations (Spencer & Brander, 1983), not to mention the 
likelihood of increased welfare levels in the home-market.  
If we transfer this rationale to the proposition of (international) R&D 
collaboration, outcomes would be similar, since they would indirectly reduce 
individual R&D costs for firms (Qiu & Tao, 1998; Zu et al, 2011). Nonetheless, 
considering the specific case of international networks, collusive agreements 
regarding agents’ local markets could distort competitive equilibrium, making the 
case for close regulation of such agreements38. The relevance of this proposition is 
                                                          
38 From the industrial economics perspective, Goyal and Moraga-González (2001) find that 
international R&D collaboration can offer firms with optimal profitability when these agents keep 
their activity in independent markets, suggesting that trade and FDI amongst collaborators’ 
countries could lead to decreasing returns (which would hold for both homogeneous and 
differentiated goods). 
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conditional upon the level of existing rivalry/concentration of industries involved (as 
suggested by Motta, 1996). 
Theoretical research regarding the role of international R&D cooperation in 
shaping countries’ trade policy does not reach conclusive results, where 
implications are highly dependent on the structure of payoff matrixes, as well as on  
the competitive approach undertaken (Cournot vs. Bertrand). Considering welfare 
effects (which should act as the main element in economic policy choices), Carlson 
(2008) finds that international R&D cooperation does not provide countries with 
jointly optimal results, even though “governments have an incentive to commit 
themselves to allowing cooperation in R&D” (Carlson, 2008, p. 363), because of 
individual gains for allowing cooperation. To achieve such conclusions, she bases 
her developments on price competition (Bertrand), where R&D cooperation would 
act as profit maximizing considering its effects on the reduction of production costs 
in differentiated goods, even though cooperation would cause incentives for 
opportunistic behavior in face of high levels of technological spillovers.  
On the other hand, Motta (1996), using a Cournot competition scheme finds 
that overall (domestic and foreign) welfare is improved when governments engage 
in international R&D cooperation initiatives. He also proposes that R&D 
cooperation policies foster firms’ competitiveness in foreign markets when 
economic integration takes place.   
However, the relationship between the promotion of international R&D 
cooperation and strategic trade policy seems to rely more on theoretical 
discussions than on empirical findings, considering worldwide trade laws that 
regulate free trade among countries, especially developed ones. This reduces 
governmental flexibility in defining “optimal” trade policies for domestic firms 
according to results found in literature. Especially in the EU, the existence of free 
flow of goods encompasses reduced levels of usefulness of such discussions.  
Nonetheless, Zu et al (2011) assume that their model settings are 
particularly relevant for this specific case, achieving results that suggest that 
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“bilateral trade liberalization may be detrimental to R&D collaboration” (Zu et al, 
2011, p. 337), a proposition that is based on the doubtful assumption that 
increased competition hampers incentives for R&D investments39. Clearly the 
managerial trends of establishing R&D networks within this bloc point in a different 
direction as outlined in section 3.1.140. The European Commission in its turn has 
recently published a communication which states that increased competition within 
the European Union is highly desirable for stronger innovative capabilities to arise 
in the continent (European Commission, 2012 – the same perspective is supported 
by Mitsos et al, 2012). In the same document, closer cooperation between firms, 
universities and research institutions is acclaimed as a fundamental tool to achieve 
more satisfactory results. We can find a similar position in the presentation of the 
Europe 2020 strategy (European Commission, 2010b), in the Green Paper about 
the European Research Area (European Commission, 2007), as well as in many 
other EC’s communications. Nonetheless, concerns about competitive dynamics 
exist (monopolies, collusive agreements, etc.), requiring industrial and market 
policies to be enforced (European Commission, 2008).  
But even if we would extend this discussion to other countries, we do not 
have many examples of nations functioning as autarkies (one of extreme 
conditions that authors usually apply in opposition to “free trade”). Neary and 
O’Sullivan find that adversarial R&D policies perform better for domestic welfare 
than internationally collaborative initiatives. These studies focus solely on 
horizontal cooperation, thus not considering the widespread use of (international) 
collaboration as a source of extending firms’ capabilities in a vertical manner. Katz 
(1986), for example, considers that vertical cooperation would be the most 
                                                          
39
 Motta (1996) states that risks of international R&D collaboration in markets with free trade 
agreements lie upon the possibility of collusive agreements, not on reduced incentives to individual 
R&D because of increased competition. This proposition seems to better fit the usual economic 
rationale. A similar rationale is provided by Georghiou et al (1999) in a strategic evaluation of 
Eureka’s relevance in Europe. 
40
 The European Commission (e.g., European Commission, 2009) recognizes the need for closer 
integration between countries as a mechanism not only of creating a larger market, but also to bring 
together a wider pool of competences, as well as to foster stronger competition within the bloc. 
Increased levels of trade would thus result in more incentives for firms to engage in activities that 
would grant them with higher levels of competitiveness.    
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beneficial in welfare terms (and it represents the bulk of Eureka’s projects 
according to the sample used in this research). 
 
3.2 How to achieve “optimal” RTD policy? The process of RTD policy 
evaluation 
 
Since R&D policies can be considered fundamental for long-term 
development and are subject to an ever-changing environment, there is a strong 
need to continuously evaluate their effectiveness (Bayona-Sáez & García-Marco, 
2010). Furthermore, as pointed out previously, emphasis should be given to policy 
trials and their evaluation, i.e., the process of adaptation may consist in trials and 
errors (Metcalfe & Georghiou, 1997). There is a continuous need for better 
understanding of innovation processes and policies aiming at its promotion 
(European Commission, 2002), especially because innovation is disruptive by 
nature, and it breaks established patterns of behavior, giving rise to unpredictable 
consequences” (Metcalfe, 1995). 
This assertion brings to light the fact that investment in new knowledge is 
not an exact science and will not necessarily provide firms with the anticipated 
returns in terms of competitiveness, which also indicates that these investments 
may not turn into commercialization of outcomes (Audretsch & Keilbach, 2008). 
Nonetheless, it is fundamental for market-oriented innovation policies to take into 
account not only technical aspects, but also potential and actual market impacts of 
projects (NIST, 2006).  
In order to cope with such aspects, technological policy evaluation provides 
a systematic and valuable way of adaptive learning based on the analysis of 
practical situations, thus representing a resource of great potential for policymakers 
(Georghiou, 2002; Malik & Cunningham, 2006; NIST, 2003). The process of 
analyzing and evaluating RTD policies represents the possibility of achieving 
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improvements in policymaking process, both in terms of policies’ suitability to a 
specific context and to achieve managerial progresses in existing programs.  
The structure of relationships within a system, knowledge flows, existing 
capabilities and market conditions also shape the context for an innovative 
environment to develop. This poses the relevance of innovation policy in fostering 
a mosaic of desirable characteristics and that might take some time to be 
implemented, which can only be accomplished through methodical and frequent 
evaluation (European Commission, 2006a).  
 In historical perspective, research evaluation has been taking place in 
OECD countries since the 1970´s with a noticeable increase in the 1980’s, when 
they were institutionalized in many different nations (Luukkonen, 2002; Langfeldt, 
2004; European Commission, 2006a). In the 1990’s, RTD evaluation has evolved 
towards a more formative activity in order to provide policymakers and other 
stakeholders with valuable insights and recommendations (European Commission, 
2002). It is worth mentioning that in Europe there is not a homogeneous RTD 
evaluation culture yet (European Commission, 2006a). This might represent some 
extra challenges for policymakers, since the promotion of bloc-wide policies must 
consider the idiosyncrasies of Member States in order to be fully effective.  
The European Research Area poses new opportunities for integration and 
evolution of the continent’s innovative capabilities, but it also represents higher 
levels of difficulty in designing, managing and evaluating its related policy 
instruments (PREST, 2002). An interesting recommendation from this same report 
tells that it may be needed the creation of a “European Evaluation Area” which 
could offer common methodologies for the assessment of RD policies within the 
ERA. 
 Evaluation provides measures for success, thus contributing to evolution 
and improvements of existing initiatives (NIST, 2003), which is dealt mainly with 
assessments on programs’ efficiency and efficacy, i.e., how well the initiative 
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worked, if achieved its goals or not, and its contribution to the overall policymaking 
arena (European Commission, 2006a; Georghiou & Keenan, 2006). Hence, 
evaluation activities consist basically in systematically and objectively determining 
the relevance, efficiency and effect of an activity considering its objectives, 
providing policymakers with feedbacks on the impacts of such initiatives and 
creating fundamental knowledge for the promotion of necessary adjustments for 
future policies’ formulation and implementation (Durieux & Fayl, 1997; European 
Commission, 2002). Besides making it possible for program managers to assess 
the benefits of a given initiative, and to identify opportunities for improvement, RTD 
policy evaluation allows the communication of program’s results to society (US 
Department of Energy, 2007). 
In addition to the capacity of providing feedback, a technological policy 
evaluation system must ensure the periodicity of analysis and guarantee the 
independence of evaluators (Georghiou, 1997). This implies the idea of permanent 
non-biased observation which in theory means the possibility of dynamic evolution 
of technological programs. Consequently, the significance of RTD evaluation lies 
on the assumption that better policymaking must be based upon knowledge and 
empirical evidence (European Commission, 2006a). 
Currently, the growing complexity involved in technological generation 
increase uncertainties on impacts from RTD policies (European Commission, 
2002). Moreover, policy instruments have become extremely diversified, thus 
implying a need of a more diverse and complete group of analytical tools. 
Accordingly, evaluation activities and the identification of policy “best practices” in 
OECD countries represent a complicated task given the myriad of technological 
initiatives that take place in these nations (ranging from basic research direct 
support to more indirect measures aimed at improving the capacity of firms to 
innovate and use new technologies) (Durieux & Fayl, 1997).  
The simple input-output analysis (the famous linear model) does not 
necessarily allow the evaluator or researcher to assess innovation impacts 
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thoroughly. For example, there is skepticism towards the validity of many 
evaluation measurements due to difficulties in attributing impact to particular 
initiatives (e.g., European Commission, 2002; Luukkonen, 2002; Gibbons & 
Georghiou, 198741) and issues with lags between the time in which a project was 
undertaken and the time when the results arise (e.g., Luukkonen, 2002; Georghiou, 
1999; Gibbons & Georghiou, 1987).  
Like science in general, technological policy evaluation might also be 
considered as a research and scientific matter (Georghiou, 1999). As a 
consequence, evaluation of technological policies faces an inevitable dualism 
between quantitative and qualitative approaches. The distinction is made 
depending on the objective planned for the analysis: quantitative methods are 
focused on measurement of socioeconomic impacts and qualitative ones regard 
the evaluation of strategic importance of activities (Luukkonen, 2002).  
Technically, the relationship between both approaches is complementary, 
providing a deeper understanding of a program’s characteristics, benefits, and 
shortcomings, emphasizing that there is no single method in RTD evaluation that 
can answer all of the relevant questions involved (Durieux & Fayl, 1997; US 
Department of Energy, 2007; European Commission, 2006a). Roessner (2000) 
and Gibbons and Georghiou (1987) point out that any proposed opposition 
between quantitative and qualitative evaluation methods is a fallacy: the adequate 
methodological design must consider the objectives of the evaluation, and not the 
other way around. A clear implication of this conclusion is that there is no optimal 
approach for the evaluation of technological policies (Georghiou & Keenan, 2006). 
This does not mean, however, that some approaches are not better suited to 
                                                          
41
 These authors suggest that direct evaluations using tangible indicators would not capture 
improvements in firms’ capabilities or an increased absorptive capacity.  This critique to the use of 
tangible indicators is also supported by the evaluation guide “Smart innovation: a practical guide to 
evaluating innovation programmes” published by the European Commission (2006a). This latter 
document also highlights the virtual impossibility of identifying additionality in social sciences, given 
the incapacity of researchers to perform purely experimental studies.    
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respond specific evaluation concerns than others, but, as state above, that 
evaluation methodologies must be defined according to research intentions42.  
Some of the most well-known methods for innovation policy evaluation 
consist of independent expert panels, interviews, use of questionnaires, surveys, 
core indicators, case studies and micro-level econometric analysis (Durieux & Fayl, 
1997; Grupp, 2000; European Commission, 2002)43. But any given evaluation 
method will at best provide partial answers to the numerous economic and societal 
goals of RTD policy (European Commission, 2006a). When framing such 
assessments in time, evaluation can be undertaken:  
a) Ex ante, before the implementation of the program and focusing 
on its structure and goals;  
b) During the course of the program, which can occur in the 
intermediate level, which analyzes the progress of the program, or 
in real-time, which follows the initiative in detail throughout its 
operation; and  
c) Ex post, evaluating the results of a given policy, corresponding to 
the bulk of evaluation activities, which is usually an efficient tool to 
assess intermediate and long-term impacts (European 
Commission, 2006a).  
Next, a set of examples (table 6) of evidences on policy evaluation drawn 
from some relevant sources (journals and reports) are provided, using the 
conceptual constructs shown in table 5, i.e. Market Failures, Innovation Systems, 
Behavioral change/Additionality and Adaptation of RTD policies. Also, on table 7, 
we offer an outline of the most relevant theoretical aspects gathered in this section.  
                                                          
42
 I would like to thank Prof. Vítor Simões for this contribution. 
43
 One specific methodology that has been widely used regarding the latter approach (micro-level 
econometrics) is that of counterfactual analysis, or quasi-experimental methods, which consist in 
assessing firms’ behavior with and without intervention, using two separate samples of very similar 
individuals (firms). We provide a discussion on this particular kind of evaluation in section 7.2 
Methodological Discussion. 
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Scope Findings Authors 
Market Failures 
European Institutions support firms which are not dependent on 
governmental help, leaving those that need it the most without financial or 
networking support.  
Barañano, 1995 
 
Incentives often do not reach the targeted population, since selection is not 
accurate enough.  
Blanes & Busom, 2004 
 
Econometric analyses show an inherent selection bias in firms participating 
in R&D initiatives 
Czarnitzki & Licht, 2006 
Adaptation of RTD 
Policy 
Frequent changes in RTD policy reduce its effectiveness Guellec & van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2000 
 
Success in a RTD program can come via: a) achievement of technical 
objectives; b) commercialization; c) patents; d) acquisition of new 
knowledge; and e) formation of networks. 
Dyer & Powell, 2002 
Behavioural 
change/additionality 
Applying a linear idea to evaluate the impacts of an initiative such as the 
Framework Programme might lead to an underestimation of its impacts 
because of its systemic contributions. 
Georghiou, 1994 
 
Formal R&D projects only capture part of firms’ efforts to innovate and that 
their activities start previously and end after their participation in a given 
project. 
Georghiou, 2002 
 
There is a large degree of additionality from public R&D support in both input 
(R&D expenditure) and output (patent applications) indicators. 
Czarnitzki and Licht, 2006 
 
The issue of “additionality vs. substitution” regarding R&D interventions 
remains blurry as many conflicting answers have been provided by literature 
(using evidence from sources over a period of 35 years).  
David, Hall & Toole, 2000 
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The Small Business Innovation Research in the US generates a substitution 
effect on R&D spending instead of the desired additionality.  
Wallsten (2000 
 There is additionality in R&D subsidies, but only for the case of small firms.  Loof and Heshmati (2005 
 
The Framework Programme has been successful in promoting linkages 
between researchers in different countries, but it has failed in generating 
long-lasting networks of institutions and firms.  
Grande & Peschke, 1999 
 
Technological policy effectiveness is usually assessed with a comparison of 
matching samples of companies, where researchers expect that the 
matched firm will behave in a similar way that the firm engaged in a 
technological program would without intervention, thus allowing an 
approximation of additionality measuring – nonetheless, the matching 
process raises doubts on assessing how similar firms can be.  
Georghiou, 2002 
Innovation Systems There is little integration in terms of RTD policy in the European context.  Malik & Cunningham, 2006 
 
In the European Union, until the 1990s, the complexity of research activities 
and knowledge creation preceding the introduction of an innovation as well 
as the interaction between suppliers and users were largely ignored.  
Pianta & Vaona, 2009 
 
It is difficult to attribute technological results to a specific technological 
policy, considering the array of variables playing a role in the process and 
that jointly influence outcomes.  
Georghiou, 2002 
 
Table 6. Examples of results on RTD policy evaluation   
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Aspect Main Theoretical Findings Main sources
Historical Perspective
a) Started in OECD countries in the 1970's w ith a noticeable increase in 1980's
b) In the 1990’s, RTD evaluation has evolved tow ards a more formative activity in order to provide policymakers and 
other stakeholders w ith valuable insights and recommendations 
Luukkonen, 2002; Langfeldt, 2004; European Commission, 2006a; European 
Commission, 2002
Concept and Approaches
a) Evaluation activities consist in systematically and objectively determining the relevance, eff iciency and effect of 
an activity considering its objectives, providing policymakers w ith feedbacks on the impacts of such initiatives and 
creating fundamental know ledge for the promotion of necessary adjustments for future policies’ formulation and 
implementation 
b) Dualism (complementarity) betw een quantitative and qualitative approaches
c) Some of the most w ell-know n methods for innovation policy evaluation consist of independent expert panels, 
interview s, use of questionnaires, surveys, core indicators, case studies and micro-level econometric analysis 
Durieux & Fayl, 1997; European Commission, 2002; Luukkonen, 2002; US 
Department of Energy, 2007; European Commission, 2006a; Roessner, 2000; 
Gibbons & Georghiou, 1987
Systemic Impacts
a) Skepticism tow ards the validity of many evaluation measurements due to diff iculties in attributing impact to 
particular initiatives and lags betw een the time in w hich a project w as undertaken and the time w hen the results 
arise
European Commission, 2002; Luukkonen, 2002; Gibbons & Georghiou, 1987
Market impacts
a) Uncertainty of results in terms of commercialization
b) Inherent need for market-oriented policies to assess potential and actual market impacts
Audretsch & Keilbach, 2008; NIST, 2006
RTD Evaluation in Europe
a) No homogeneous RTD evaluation culture
b) The European Research Area represents higher levels of complexity in designing, managing and evaluating its 
related policy instruments
c) Potential need for an European Evaluation Area
PREST, 2002; European Commission, 2006a
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7. Summary of findings on RTD policy evaluation 
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4. The Eureka Programme: an overview 
 
The Eureka Programme emerged as part of a concerted effort to bridge the 
widening technological gap observed since the 1960s between Europe and its 
global competitors: notably the USA and Japan (Eureka Secretariat, 2005). It was 
created in 1985 by a French initiative as a complementary structure for the 
Framework Programmes, aiming at enhancing collaboration between companies in 
a market oriented, non-bureaucratic, bottom-up approach promoting cooperative 
projects for national funding (León, 2006; Stubbs, 2001; Georghiou, 2001; Marín.& 
Siotis, 2008; Kuhlman & Edler, 2003).  
Eureka became a Europe-wide network that aims at increasing its 
participants’ competitiveness through the promotion of cross-border “market-
driven”' R&D projects in which firms may seek entry for any projects that meet the 
broad criterion of developing advanced technology with a market orientation 
(Georghiou & Roessner, 2000; Bayona-Sáez & García-Marco, 2010; Trabada, 
2000; Molero & Fonfría, 2008; Marín.& Siotis, 2008; Kuhlman & Edler, 2003). 
Eureka’s goals can be summarized in five items (PREST, 2002): 
a) Strengthen European competitiveness;  
b) Promote market-driven collaborative R&D;  
c) Bring together industries and research institutes across Europe;  
d) Foster the use of advanced technologies; and  
e) Achieve cost-effective products, processes and services.  
It is also important to highlight the relevance of the bottom-up approach of 
this initiative. Unlike programs that have clearly defined areas of interest for R&D 
projects, the nature and scope of proposals is defined by proponents. Bottom-up 
approaches give micro-agents the opportunity of contributing to technological 
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policies in a complementary way to that of predefining at the macro-level 
(governmental or supranational) specific areas of interest (Larédo, 1998). A 
methodological of this structure for this research is that it provides information on 
“natural” networking activities, i.e., those defined solely by firms’ interests, instead 
of directed efforts towards predefined areas of governmental focus. Results are 
then likely to provide measures that can be related to international R&D 
collaboration in general, not only to specific circumstances.  
Eureka is present in 38 countries and does not act through financial support, 
but by providing projects with a seal of approval that facilitates access to 
governmental funds in the national level (Molero, 2001; Stubbs, 2001; Georghiou & 
Roessner, 2000). Moreover, Eureka promotes and facilitates access to public and 
private investment in R&D through well established collaborative research 
networks and proximity to market (Eureka, 2006). 
Most operations are managed by national offices (NPCs), including the 
coordination of funding among participants’ countries of origin, where Eureka 
Member States play a central role in supporting (strategically and financially) 
coordination between Eureka projects and other related RTD initiatives at national 
and regional levels (Eureka, 2006a). The whole process is backed up by the 
Eureka Secretariat, which also is responsible for the continuous evaluation of 
individual projects44 (Eureka, 2001; Eureka, 2002a).  
Eureka has three categories of projects: individual, cluster and umbrella 
(Eureka, 2002): 
a) Individual projects form the core of Eureka and represent projects 
comprising agents from at least two of the Eureka Member States, aiming at 
generating a significant technological advance. These individual projects 
represent the bulk of Eureka’s actions, and also the sample under 
analysis in the empirical stage of our research.   
                                                          
44
 In Spain, this role is played by the Centro para el Desarrollo Tecnológico Industrial – CDTI, an 
agency of the Ministry of Economy.  
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b) Eureka cluster projects set a practical framework for cooperation, 
managed entirely by industry. These projects last longer than individual 
projects and work on generic technologies of high importance for European 
competitiveness.  
c) The umbrellas represent thematic networks focusing on specific 
technological areas. In this approach the bottom-up structure is not valid.   
 
4.1 The economic logic behind Eureka: signaling in a context of 
information asymmetry45 
 
The creation of innovative networks across Europe with market oriented 
projects can be regarded as the ultimate goal of Eureka, and it represents its core 
contribution to EU’s innovation system. Nonetheless, Eureka does not entitle firms 
to EU subsidies (it should be noticed that Eureka is not an EU program). The 
underlying incentive behind this initiative is based on its “seal of approval”, which 
should enhance firms’ ability to receive support from their respective national 
authorities (Marín & Siotis, 2008; Eureka, 2002). By conferring an objective seal of 
quality on a project, Eureka’s labeling greatly aids the process of negotiation with 
public sources of finance. Many member countries even accord preferential 
treatment to labeled proposals by giving access to specifically reserved funding 
(Eureka Secretariat, 2005).  
As basic microeconomic theory states, information asymmetry is a common 
feature of business and it means that the seller part of a transaction possesses 
more knowledge on the product being commercialized than the buyer does 
(Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 2009; Mankiw, 2008; Akerlof, 1970). In the case of Eureka, 
the R&D performing company uses the seal of approval in order to provide the 
                                                          
45 Besides the perspective shown in this section, it can also be attributed to Eureka the role of 
reducing transaction costs involved in establishing international R&D partnerships by providing 
agents with a “platform” that sets an interface between firms and regulatory bodies (Georghiou et al, 
1999). 
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market - especially the financial market – with information regarding its innovation 
project. In this context, Eureka’s seal works as a signaling mechanism which aims 
at reducing the information asymmetry and helping to overcome market failures (on 
the definition of market signals: Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 2009; Varian, 1996; 
Mansfield & Yohe, 2003; Mankiw, 2008; Spence, 1973).  
What brings special relevance to Eureka is that there is a high level of 
unpredictability of R&D projects and information on its potential is asymmetrically 
available between R&D performers (sellers) and investors (buyers) (Hoewer, 
Schmidt & Sofka, 2011). Edler (2007) also points out the importance of signaling 
policies regarding innovations. Several other authors analyze signaling strategies 
and adverse selection risks in the context of R&D and innovation funding (for 
examples see Beatty, Berger & Magliolo, 1995; Takalo & Tanayama, 2010; Plehn-
Dujowich, 2009; Janney & Folta, 2003; Bagella & Becchetti, 1998; Socorro, 2007). 
Nonetheless, Eureka faces problems in terms of funding amount and 
synchronization among partners as well as regarding the lack of private funding 
(Eureka, 2001a; Eureka, 2002). Also, the lack of funding harmonization between 
Member Countries hampers the effectiveness of Eureka (European Commission, 
2008). More coordination between Eureka and the Framework Programme might 
reduce disadvantageous competition (for funding) between them, thus increasing 
their synergies (Kanninen et al, 2006). In this regard, the Eurostars Programme 
has been created, combining strengths from Eureka and the 7th Framework 
Programme and focusing on international R&D collaboration performed by SMEs 
with high R&D intensity (10% of total turnover or more). 
 
4.2 General Requirements for Eureka’s Individual Projects 
 
Eureka’s focus is on improving European competitiveness and productivity 
through an enhanced cooperation between companies and research centers in 
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high-tech areas (Molero, 2001). Under Eureka, cooperation often consists of 
occasional meetings between firms at which information is shared (Fölster, 1995), 
but more formal ways of cooperation also take place. In general terms Eureka 
projects must (PREST, 2002): 
 Be high-tech, market-oriented R&D projects; 
 Involve partners from at least two Eureka Member States; 
 Aim to develop cutting-edge, civilian products, processes or services; 
 Be funded by partners with public financing from national governments. 
Furthermore, Eureka (2003a) launched a manual for firms to better 
understand the process of project evaluation. The central assessment criteria are 
grouped as follows (each group receives the same weight in the evaluation): 
a) Crucial Criteria – financial capacity and formal agreement between partners 
b) Basic Assessment Criteria - These criteria deal with the complete project set 
up and the capabilities of the partners in relation to their tasks in the project.  
c) Technology and Innovation Criteria 
d) Market and Competitiveness Criteria - contains 5 criteria of which 3 are 
related to market and profitability and 2 to competitive advantages 
 
4.3 Evaluation of Eureka in perspective  
 
Eureka carries out its own evaluation system through periodic reviews. In its 
first decade of existence, evaluations of projects were responsibility of the Member 
State holding the Chair for that year. In 1992-1993 Eureka had its first major 
evaluation, involving teams from 14 countries working together and conducting a 
survey with all of the participants (Georghiou & Roessner, 2000). Additionally, 
Eureka is the focus of several academic analyses. We offer some examples of 
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relevant results found in these evaluations (both external and internal evaluations 
from Eureka):  
 Bayona-Sáez and García-Marco (2010; 2007) demonstrate that participation in a 
Eureka Programme has a positive effect on firm’s corporate performance both 
in manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors with a 1-year lag between 
project completion and performance improvements (which is in accordance with 
Benfratello & Sembenelli, 2002’s results, who also highlight an increase in labor 
productivity and price-cost margins for participants);  
 Barañano (1995) suggests that Spanish Eureka participants see the 
improvement of the organization’s public image as one of the most important 
features of the program;  
 Marín and Siotis (2008) conclude that Eureka serves the purpose for which it 
was designed, namely to correct the market failures associated with the 
generation of economically valuable knowledge;  
 Fölster (1995) hypothesizes that, given that Eureka projects require cooperation 
but do not require result-sharing agreements, the likelihood of cooperation is 
not increased. They promote incentives to conduct R&D to the same extent as 
subsidies that do not require cooperation;  
 Georghiou (2001) affirms that Eureka started with major projects but a decline 
since then took part driven by its divergence with national innovation policies;  
 Kanninen et al (2006) find that Eureka is a beneficial and cost-effective tool 
for international R&D cooperation drawing results from a survey of Finnish 
companies. Also, the relevance of Eureka is influenced by the R&D 
activities of large companies. The authors suggest that its future 
importance might decrease in face of the Joint Technology Initiatives (JTI) 
which has a better structure for funding and implementation of larger integrated 
R&D projects involving international cooperation; 
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 A report from PREST (2002) concludes that Eureka’s impacts are often of a 
complex nature, being remote from its causes (spatially and temporally), and 
generating from small scale to broad network effects and market changes. Even 
though they are very difficult to measure economically, this is done and 
economic values are given to measurable results. This proposition highlights 
that evaluations of Eureka projects are sensitive to the timing of the 
evaluation, since innovations might take some time to take-off in markets; 
 The 2003/2004 annual report from Eureka shows that for innovative projects 
(mainly SMEs), joining Eureka provides a financial return of around €1 million 
(additional turnover) per participant, and that public funds invested are 
returned in less than two years after project completion (Eureka, 2004). 
This report also suggests strong evidence that for SMEs, participation in a 
Eureka project strengthens market position and facilitates access to new 
markets worldwide; 
 Over time, the rate of commercial achievements as perceived by 
companies participating in Eureka projects in their final reports has 
decreased, with a larger percentage of respondents viewing their commercial 
achievements as bad or nil (Eureka, 2002); 
 The 2005/2006 annual impact review of Eureka (Eureka, 2006) concludes that 
the initiative has been accomplishing its basic goals. This is gathered from 15 
case studies and a descriptive analysis of final reports – 678 participants, 328 
projects – between January, 2001 and December, 2005.  The report also shows 
that turnover benefits are highly concentrated, with 12% of projects 
representing 65% of additional turnover. This latter result is treated as expected 
given the nature of R&D activities. Additionally, the visibility of the Eureka 
label is seen is a relevant asset for SMEs: the Eureka seal facilitates access 
to funding opportunities and increases market image. Another relevant finding of 
this report is that successful projects were never peripheral to firms.  
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Such results offer some valuable information regarding our empirical 
assessment of the drivers of success in Eureka’s networks. First of all, as some of 
the analyses reported above have shown, the effects of international R&D 
collaboration are often of a systemic nature, with minor direct effects, thus causing 
long term structural changes in firms and, consequently, innovation systems. This 
hinders the appropriation of short term indicators as complete sources of 
information, such as the ones used in our analysis. Nonetheless, this perspective 
can be useful in evaluating statistical outputs of our approach.  
Furthermore, SMEs, contrary to our expectations based upon Absorptive 
Capacity literature, seem to receive more benefits from these projects than larger 
firms. Nonetheless, as Kanninen et al (2006) pointed out, networks are highly 
dependent on large companies that function as the core player of alliances. 
Therefore, some balance between the two kinds of firms seems to provide 
networks with the synergies required for increased performance.    
Also, a combination of different results is somewhat interesting. While 
Georghiou have stressed the declining levels of technological relevance in 
Eureka’s projects, Eureka itself (Eureka, 2002) has recognized an increasing level 
of commercial dissatisfaction from firms. Put together, both perspectives offer a 
complementary view of this phenomenon, where less relevant “innovations” will 
hardly provide economic agents with large commercial gains.   
As it can be noticed, Eureka is a relevant target of innovation policy 
evaluation. But it is important to take into account that even though presented 
results are mainly positive, continuous assessments and different research foci 
might not only identify weaknesses of the program, but also provide information 
necessary for adaptations and changes in the initiative’s characteristics. In table 8 
we conclude this section with an outline of the most important features regarding 
the Eureka initiative and its individual projects.    
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Aspect Main Theoretical Findings Main sources
Objectives
a) Enhance competitiveness throughout Europe
b) Provide a framew ork for market-oriented R&D collaboration based on international cooperation
c) Generate behavioral additionality regarding international innovation netw orks
León, 2006; Stubbs, 2001; Georghiou, 2001; Marín.& Siotis, 2008; Kuhlman & 
Edler, 2003; Georghiou & Roessner, 2000; Bayona-Sáez & García-Marco, 2010; 
Trabada, 2000; Molero & Fonfría, 2008; Marín.& Siotis, 2008; Kuhlman & Edler, 
2003; PREST, 2002
Economic Rationale
a) Information asymmetry reduction through market signals (Eureka label)
b) Integration of European NSI
c) Behavioral additionality
Marín & Siotis, 2008; Eureka, 2002; Hoewer, Schmidt & Sofka, 2011; León, 2006; 
Stubbs, 2001; Georghiou, 2001; Marín.& Siotis, 2008; Kuhlman & Edler, 2003
Characteristics
a) Bottom-up approach
b) Market-oriented projects
c) Decentralized
Georghiou & Roessner, 2000; Bayona-Sáez & García-Marco, 2010; Trabada, 
2000; Molero & Fonfría, 2008; Marín.& Siotis, 2008; Kuhlman & Edler, 2003; 
PREST, 2002
Overview of Evaluations on Eureka
a) Positive impact on corporate performance w ith a 1-year time-lag after project completion
b) Relevance of large companies' R&D activities in projects
c) Reduces information asymmetry through an improved image of companies/agents
d) Evaluations are sensitive to the timing of evaluation
e) Results may be of a complex nature
f) Enhances SMEs' market position both domestic and international
g) Turnover benefits are highly concentrated 
h) Successful projects are not peripheral in f irms' strategies
Barañano, 1995; Marín and Siotis, 2008; Kanninen et al, 2006; PREST, 2002; 
Eureka, 2004; Eureka, 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8. Summary of findings on the Eureka Program 
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5. A Brief Outline of the Spanish Relative Position 
 
 In this section we offer a restricted perspective on the Spanish Innovation 
System and some comparison with the benchmark countries of our analysis 
(Germany, France, UK, and Italy). It is not our intention to develop a thorough and 
exhaustive review on these aspects, but rather to offer enough contexts to base 
further analyses on, thus providing relevant knowledge for upcoming conclusions 
and implications.  
Spain has suffered drastic economic changes as a result of its inclusion in 
the Eurozone, since above normal inflation and rising wages depleted the country’s 
longstanding advantages in terms of international competition (Heijs, 2011). The 
construction of a modern and efficient innovation system is still a challenge for 
Spain. Even though, in the last decades, the country has experienced a 
modernization of its productive structure, which provided an improvement in 
economic and social indicators (MICINN, 2009), this situation did not reflect into a 
strong growth in technologically advanced sectors, keeping the country in a 
laggard position in comparison to other developed nations in terms of innovation 
(Molero, 2010; López, 2008).  
We can attribute such condition to a lack of R&D investment from firms in 
these sectors (as well as the productivity of such investments), as research 
highlights the expected – and somewhat obvious - role played by R&D investment 
as a core determinant for firms in achieving higher rates of growth (Segarra & 
Teruel, 2011). In fact, the productive structure of the Spanish economy is still a 
barrier for a more innovation-oriented society: product innovation in Spain is largely 
based on developments from SMEs, while the majority of innovations lie in large 
corporations (CDTI, 2009), especially multinational ones (Revilla-Diez, 2000). This 
situation indicates a rather concentrated and internationally dependent structure of 
the Spanish Innovation System. While this indicates an apparent weakness, it 
highlights the importance that initiatives promoting the creation of the European 
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Research Area through integration of the NISs of EU’s Member States (such as 
Eureka) can have in benefiting domestic firms in Spain. 
The problem is that there is a great deal of such SMEs focused on 
traditional sectors and a absolute lack of a critical mass of R&D intensive national 
and large corporations that can play a leading role in establishing networks of 
innovation (Heijs, 2009). Moreover, the Spanish Centre for Industrial Technological 
Development (CDTI) claims in a 2009 report that there is a need for companies 
from this country to invest in innovation in order to become more competitive, a 
perspective that is also supported by a 2007 report by COTEC (Spanish 
Foundation for Technological Innovation). In summary, the main factors hampering 
innovation in Spain are associated with (González, Jaumandreu & Pazó, 2005):  
a) A model of growth largely based in sectors with low innovative propensity; 
b) Unavailability of venture capital;  
c) Lack of coordination between the education system and companies’ needs;  
d) Rigidities in public administration; and  
e) R&D subsidies acting more as substitutes to private investment than they 
act as generators of additional R&D expenditure. 
However, it cannot be neglected that Spain’s internal market has lower 
levels of financial strength to absorb innovative products and services, thus 
creating an environment which does not provide enough incentives for firms to 
invest larger fractions of their turnovers in R&D. This situation has been increased 
by the 2008 financial crisis and its direct impacts on the Iberian economy, causing 
a demand turmoil, hampering all kinds of investments from private entities.  
From this context, it can be noticed that Spain suffers from endemic 
structural problems in terms of building efficient innovative capabilities. There is a 
great deal of disorganization playing a role in hindering a stronger NIS in this 
country. Even though financial investments are necessary, they will not be 
sufficient to tackle the situation in an optimal manner, since resources are prone to 
be ineffective in the current business and institutional configuration.    
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To support this perception, graphs 1, 2, and 3 offer both an input overview 
of the Spanish Innovation System, and an output approach, building a comparison 
with our benchmark countries (Germany, Italy, UK and France)46. Graph 1A shows 
a picture of Gross Expenditure in the Business Sector as a percentage of GDP, 
placing Spain and Italy with similar profiles, where both countries lag behind 
France and UK (in an intermediate position in this context), and Germany (the sole 
leader). Regarding innovation, this indicator summarizes the efforts firms dedicate 
toward structured R&D activities, thus comprising important information on the 
intensity devoted by companies in generating technological advancements. This 
picture supports the initial perspective that Spain plays a peripheral role in terms of 
innovation-driven economic development.     
In graph 1B the picture follows a very similar pattern as to the previous one, 
now analyzing Total R&D Personnel, except that the distance between Germany, 
France and UK is reduced, putting these countries in a similar level, whereas Spain 
and Italy still lag behind in terms of innovation input indicators. This complementary 
information to that outlined in graph 1A presents the confirmation of the fact that 
Spanish firms lag behind its peers (except for Italy) regarding economic orientation 
towards RTD activities.  
Concerning the information contained in graph 1C (Business enterprise 
R&D expenditure per manufacturing sectors according to technological content), 
Spanish firms clearly invest less than the benchmark countries in recent periods. 
What is more discomforting is that this difference is increased in sectors with 
higher technological content, possibly identifying an industrial structure not as 
intensive in innovative activities as the ones located in the other analyzed nations 
(as suggested by Heijs, 2009). For example, German firms invest ten times more 
than Spanish ones in High-Tech Manufacturing, whereas this difference drops to 
twice as much in traditional subsectors. Graph 1D confirms these same trends for 
human resources involved in R&D activities. This provides important information on 
                                                          
46
 Additional material can be found in Appendix I.  
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how fragile the Spanish Innovation System is in a context of developed countries. If 
Spain was in a similar level to that of Italy in graphs 1A and 1B, graphs 1C and 1D 
put them in different conditions, where the former lags behind the latter in these 
more specific indicators. This should be seen as a warning concerning the 
possibilities of Spain to achieve sustained growth over the long run.     
Turning to graph 2, we start to draw some lines along the perspective of 
innovation output indicators. Graph 2A brings information on the trade balance of 
High-Tech goods, where Spanish trade shows an increasing deficit trend until 
2009, when this situation is attenuated (though this can account for the reduced 
importing capacity of the Spanish economy after 2008). In similar positions are Italy 
and the UK, where the former follows a parallel pattern to that of Spain (consistent 
deficit) and the latter has experienced losses in its High-Tech trade balance from 
2002 on. France and Germany show a relatively stable situation of surplus 
throughout the series. This indicator makes it evident the lack of international 
competitiveness of the Spanish industrial structure over time.     
Graph 2B highlights a similar assessment, but related to the balance of 
Royalties and License fees, a usual indicator of a more soft side of knowledge-
intensive activities’ internationalization. The picture here is somewhat different to 
that of trade, at least for the cases of UK and Germany, since the first operates 
surpluses, while the second ran deficits (except for the very end of the series). On 
the other hand, France maintains a positive balance, whereas Italy and Spain 
sustain deficits again.   
In Graph 2C we analyze High-Tech patent applications to the European 
Patent Office. In this case, Spain lags behind all of the other countries, even 
though the difference to Italy is significantly less substantial (still, it represents 
about half of patent applications per million inhabitants in comparison to this 
nation). It is also worth noting a gradient reduction in applications across all 
countries under analysis. 
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Graph 1. Summary of input indicators on National Innovation Systems for selected countries 
Source: Eurostat, 2012 (A,B,C, D).  
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Graph 2. Summary of output indicators on National Innovation Systems for selected countries 
Source: OECD Stat, 2012 (A) World Development Indicators, 2012 (B), Eurostat, 2012 (C, D). 
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Graph 3. Structural business indicators of National Innovation Systems for selected countries 
Source: Eurostat, 2012. 
Notes: (i) Monetary data are expressed in millions of euro; (ii) Value added at factor cost is the gross income from operating activities after 
adjusting for operating subsidies and indirect taxes. It can be calculated from turnover, plus capitalised production, plus other operating income, 
plus or minus the changes in stocks, minus the purchases of goods and services, minus other taxes on products which are linked to turnover but 
not deductible, minus the duties and taxes linked to production. 
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 Up to this point, the Spanish Innovation System should be understood as 
consistently lagging behind France, United Kingdom, and Germany in terms of 
input and output indicators, standing next to the Italian Innovation System. 
However, Italy seems to be getting more from its inputs in terms of overall results, 
showing a picture that indicates a better organized (and more productive) 
Innovation System than that of Spain47. One other hypothesis that offers support 
for this aspect is that Italy is highly oriented towards non-R&D innovation (Potí & 
Reale, 2011), which would explain the lack of consistence between its input and 
output indicators (given that the former is assessed through R&D oriented 
indicators).  For the case of the leading nations, the UK appears behind France 
and Germany in most analyses. The relative stability of countries’ positions across 
indicators provides us with valuable information on the structure and conditions of 
their NISs, making it possible to classify them accordingly. 
 Moreover, in graph 3 we can notice aspects about the demography of 
enterprises in the left part and value added capacity in the right (for both 
manufacturing and services firms). What is remarkable in terms of composition of 
enterprises high-tech manufacturing is the Spanish astonishing growth from 2008 
to 2009, placing well above Italy and France in 2009, but still lagging behind 
Germany and UK. A similar situation happens for Medium-High Tech 
manufactures, except that in this case Spain, UK and Italy are in equivalent 
positions, while Germany plays a leading role.  
However, this picture must be considered in parallel to that of graph 1C, 
where it is shown that Spanish firms in these sectors perform a significantly lower 
level of R&D investments than its peers in our benchmark countries. This is largely 
supported by the analysis of Value Added at Factor Cost for manufacturing 
companies, where data for Spain puts this country in a laggard position across all 
levels of technological content of production, whereas Italy, France and UK are in 
an intermediate position while Germany plays a leading role. For the case of 
                                                          
47
 Even though it should be considered that Italy has a highly fragmented innovation policy context, 
where several measures take place without combining strengths (Potí & Reale, 2011). 
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Knowledge-Intensive Services (KIS), Spain also has the smallest share of High-
Tech services amongst all of its KIS in comparison to the other countries. When 
verifying the Value Added indicator, once again the picture puts Spain in a poor 
relative situation.  
This verification not only describes the situation contained in the tables, but 
it also highlights the abovementioned issue of Innovation Systems’ productivity, 
considering input and output perspectives (González, Jaumandreu & Pazó, 2005). 
In this sense, even though Spain occupies a laggard position in terms of the 
former, the appropriation of RTD investments is extremely low (considering our 
benchmarks). This situation can only be explained by an economic environment 
with deep institutional problems, where innovation does not seem to play a big role 
in the overall analysis of companies’ strategies. This can be attributed to two core 
features: lack of firms’ innovative capabilities and/or lack of market incentives for 
innovation-driven development. In both cases governmental intervention and long 
term strategy is mandatory for the Spanish NIS to become more competitive. In 
this context, this brief comparative overview of these National Innovation Systems 
contributes to understanding some idiosyncrasies of these countries in terms of 
innovative efforts, as well as helping identifying differences between them.  
However, RTD policies in Spain have faced an intensification in both 
quantitative and qualitative terms (Heijs, 2009), even though this picture changed 
dramatically after the 2008’s economic turmoil.  The country is in need of economic 
and industrial policies that reorganize its productive structure in order to cope with 
the current crisis (Segarra & Teruel, 2011). One step in this direction is that, 
despite the aforementioned lack of large companies to establish networks of 
innovation, RTD policies (at both national and regional levels) have a clear focus 
on stimulating firms to engage in closer interactions with other agents (Marzucchi, 
2011), building a framework that facilitates R&D collaboration with national and/or 
international counterparts.  
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In terms of cooperation, external sources of innovation (such as 
collaboration agreements and external R&D, among others) play an important role 
in Spanish innovation – especially for low and medium-tech firms - according to 
empirical evidence found by Santamaría, Nieto and Barges-Gil (2009). Where it 
could be expected that a process of catching-up to more developed capabilities 
existing abroad would occur, Barge-Gil (2010) finds that cooperation in innovation 
can be more effective if promotes networking at the national level48. This is a 
strong hint of a low level of absorptive capacity regarding advanced technologies 
and techniques which might be available through interaction with foreign 
partners49. However, this picture seems to be changing as an increasing proportion 
of Spanish firms devote R&D investment to adopt external technology instead of 
generate its own (Busom & Fernández-Ribas, 2008). While this may have 
desirable effects upon absorptive capacities, it highlights the general level of 
dependency that Spanish firms have.  
Perhaps, in this case, recognizing these weaknesses can be extremely 
beneficial in shaping the innovation policy-mix in Spain. If there are systemic 
difficulties in developing innovative capabilities in indigenous firms in the short run, 
promoting increased levels of cooperation with external partners can be a source 
of development over the long run, when a proper set of market incentives are in 
place and technological and managerial capabilities have been absorbed from 
foreign partners.     
 In this regard, empirical evidence shows that Spanish companies achieve 
improvements in technological capabilities following their participation in 
collaborative projects under the Framework Programme (analysis of years 1995-
2005), where expectations are that further results might unfold in longer periods of 
                                                          
48 Nonetheless, the Spanish economy lacks the existence of a critical mass of large domestic or 
multinational firms that can effectively promote the generation of RTD networks based in the Iberian 
country (Heijs, 2011). 
49 Heijs (2009) believes that this is partly due to the Spanish low level of English language skills, 
which hampers the opportunities for interaction with other members of the ERA and makes it more 
difficult to absorb knowledge generated abroad (Heijs, 2009).  
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time, depending on systemic and structural impacts on agents (Barajas, Huergo & 
Moreno, 2009).  As previously addressed, this represents an extra challenge in 
terms of measurement. The same authors in a later study (Barajas, Huergo & 
Moreno, 2012) using data of Spanish firms participating in the Sixth Framework 
Programme (2002-2006) further add that international cooperation results in 
positive impacts, not only technological, but also economic for the case of SMEs in 
Spain.  
With respect to the effectiveness of the RTD policymaking processes in 
Spain50, Busom and Fernández-Ribas (2008) find evidence that public support to 
R&D collaboration promotes the creation of the intended networks and also 
generates behavioral change in participants. On the other hand, Acosta and 
Mondrego (2001) point out that the financial incentives for R&D cooperation in 
Spain are not directed to those companies that actually need it (adverse selection) 
and also do not provide efficient incentives for actual collaboration (moral hazard) 
(Acosta & Mondrego, 2001). Such micro-based evidence supports the lack of 
efficient coordination within the Spanish Innovation System, where resources are 
not as productive as they could be under a more functional framework.   
Another shortcoming on this realm is that such engagements in 
collaborative projects show signs of instability regarding international interactions 
when compared to more developed economies of the EU (Segarra, 2011). We can 
relate this volatility to the orientation of Spanish cooperation. López (2008) finds 
that cost-sharing is the single most important determinant for Spanish 
manufacturing firms to engage in R&D cooperation – which the author relates to 
the lack of private financial resources for R&D projects in Spain. We can, thus, 
criticize overall participation of Spanish companies in international R&D networks if 
the conclusions of these authors hold true for this particular population. This is 
because, as pointed out in our literature review: a) several authors highlight the 
                                                          
50
  CDTI is the governmental office responsible for cooperative R&D policies, and also for promoting 
industrial exploitation of technologies developed by firms, enhancing collaboration between 
industries and research centers and managing Spanish firms’ participation in international R&D 
programs (Acosta & Modrego, 2001). 
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importance of network stability in shaping an environment of trust and improved 
management among partners (see, for example, Huggins, 2011; Rese & Baier, 
2011; Musiolik, Markard & Hekkert, 2012; Mitsuhashi, 2003); and b) cost-sharing 
motives for R&D collaboration are representative of poorer performance in the long 
run. On the other hand, even though the Spanish political discourse mentions the 
importance of domestic agents to engage in international R&D networks, only 
marginal funds are dedicated to it (Heijs, 2011). This approach to international 
R&D networks is not likely to guarantee long term relationships when compared to 
strategic-oriented linkages, aiming at continuous generation of knowledge, 
technology, and innovation.  
Analyzing the background of R&D cooperative settings in the remaining 
countries, dedicated policies are found in all of them, except for the case of the UK, 
which follows a different approach. In the case of Italy, the Ministry of University 
and Research gives strong emphasis to participation in European collaborative 
projects, such as ERA-NETs, Framework Programme’s projects and Joint 
Technological Initiatives, while he “Industria 2015” is an example of a national 
project in Italy that aims at fostering large cooperative projects (Potí & Reale, 
2011). 
Rammer (2011), in an assessment of Germany’s innovation system, points 
out that the achievement of improvements in the science-industry relationship is a 
key element of German innovation policies. Furthermore, RTD programs in this 
country are open to participants from other countries, setting the stage for 
incentives in terms of international R&D collaboration. Germany currently has over 
200 bilateral and multilateral agreements of technological and scientific exchange 
and cooperation (with stronger emphasis on the European context).    
In France, innovation policy is strongly oriented towards SMEs, while 
domestic collaboration aims at enforcing public-private linkages through cluster 
support (Zaparucha & Muths, 2011). The internationalization of this specific 
innovation system relies in governmental subsidies to local SMEs to engage in 
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international (mainly European) networks related to FP’s initiatives and other sorts 
of technological partnerships (though the latter is diffused across a myriad of 
programs, each receiving only marginal support when compared to FP activities).  
The British innovation policy framework follows a different pattern, where it 
does not address domestic RTD collaboration explicitly, and incentives to 
international cooperation seem limited to participation in European initiatives 
(Eureka, FP, ERA-NETs), characterizing a low level of intervention in this particular 
field (Cunningham, Sveinsdottir & Gok, 2011). UK innovation measures are also 
widely closed for foreign participation.  
In graph 4 we offer a summary of R&D cooperation for Spain and our 
benchmark countries51 using data from the Community Innovation Surveys (waves 
4, 5, and 6). As it can be noticed, Spanish innovative firms cooperate moderately in 
manufacturing, while this behavior plays a marginal role in services. French 
companies show a much more cooperative pattern in this regard, followed by its 
British counterparts. This picture is stable regarding the perception of cooperation 
at the National and European (at a smaller share for all countries) levels, while for 
cooperation with partners located elsewhere, Spain and Italy seem to be less 
prone to engage in collaborative arrangements. Especially in the case of 
cooperation in services, Spanish firms do not appear to be oriented to cooperative 
settings, even though this situation has been improving at a faster pace than for 
manufacturing. 
Such context leads us to the conclusion that Spain represents an interesting 
case of study for cooperative R&D, especially at the international level. For as 
much as Spain is one of the most dedicated participants in Eureka, it still shows a 
low level of R&D collaboration between agents, at the same time being historically 
dependent on foreign sources of technology and showing a low firm propensity to 
develop open innovation strategies (COTEC, 2007; Fernández, Junquera & 
Vázquez, 1996; Vega-Jurado, Gutiérrez-Gracia & Fernández-de-Lucio, 2008).  
                                                          
51
 In Appendix I we have the information contained in graph 4 divided by firm size.  
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CIS4 CIS5 CIS6 CIS4 CIS5 CIS6 CIS4 CIS5 CIS6 CIS4 CIS5 CIS6
Germany 19,2% 21,3% 22,9% 18,1% na 22,1% 6,6% na 7,3% 3,8% na 4,9%
Spain 18,6% 18,1% 18,8% 17,5% 16,8% 17,7% 4,6% 4,7% 4,8% 1,5% 1,7% 2,0%
France 38,8% 48,3% 43,9% 36,2% 43,8% 40,5% 17,5% 25,2% 17,9% 10,0% 13,5% 10,2%
Italy 11,0% 11,3% 13,6% 10,5% na 12,4% 2,3% na 3,5% 0,9% na 1,8%
UK 28,9% 30,8% na na na na na na na na na na
CIS4 CIS5 CIS6 CIS4 CIS5 CIS6 CIS4 CIS5 CIS6 CIS4 CIS5 CIS6
Germany na na na na na na na na na na na na
Spain 12,7% 11,6% 15,5% 12,1% 11,0% 15,0% 2,9% 2,3% 3,1% 0,6% 1,3% 1,6%
France 37,7% na 38,1% 35,8% na 36,0% 11,2% na 11,0% 7,6% na 8,5%
Italy 15,9% 13,3% 18,9% 15,6% na 17,6% 2,4% na 5,3% 1,1% na 2,5%
UK na na na na na na na na na na na na
SUMMARY OF COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR IN INNOVATIVE ACTIVITIES - MANUFACTURING
Cooperation in Innovation at the 
European Level (% of Innovative 
Firms) - excluding National 
cooperation
Cooperation in Innovation with 
Countries outside the European 
Region (% of Innovative Firms)
SUMMARY OF COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR IN INNOVATIVE ACTIVITIES - SERVICES
Total Cooperation in Innovation (% 
of Innovative Firms)
Cooperation in Innovation at the 
National Level (% of Innovative 
Firms)
Cooperation in Innovation at the 
European Level (% of Innovative 
Firms) - excluding National 
cooperation
Cooperation in Innovation with 
Countries outside the European 
Region (% of Innovative Firms)
Total Cooperation in Innovation (% 
of Innovative Firms)
Cooperation in Innovation at the 
National Level (% of Innovative 
Firms)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph 4. Summary of Cooperative Behavior in Innovative Activities (Community Innovation Survey – waves 4, 5, and 6) for selected 
countries. Manufactures and Services 
Source: Eurostat, 2012. 
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As it can be seen in figure 1, the profile of Spanish cooperation regarding 
Eureka individual projects initiated by Spanish agents (2001-2008) show firstly an 
orientation towards (dark blue territories) contiguous countries, i.e., Portugal and 
France. Also, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom have an extensive record of 
Eureka projects initiated by Spanish institutions and firms (being 4 of these our 
benchmark countries, namely Germany, France, Italy, and the UK). This profile 
indicates a moderate level of concentration for Spanish projects, where we can 
notice that there is a search not only for more developed economies (in general 
terms and in innovative capabilities), but also for countries that are located close to 
Spanish borders.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Countries participating in individual projects generated by Spain (2001-2008) 
Source: Eureka, 2008. 
 
We should also mention relatively high levels of cooperation with the Czech 
Republic, Greece, Hungary, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Austria. Playing a 
moderate role we have Israel, Poland, Norway, Finland, Poland, Sweden and 
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Slovenia, while Turkey, Ireland, Switzerland, Russia, Lithuania, Ukraine, Bulgaria, 
and Romania appear as marginal collaborators in projects started by Spanish 
companies in Eureka (2001-2008).    
The background offered in this chapter allows to contextualize the situation 
of the country which represents the focus of the analysis undertaken, i.e., Spain, as 
well as confronting the situation of its National Innovation Systems to those of Italy, 
Germany, France and UK, our benchmark countries. The relevance of such 
information lies on the need to frame the hypotheses described in the next chapter 
in terms of the theoretical and empirical literature organized in chapters 2 to 4, thus 
taking into consideration the characteristics of the respective economies.  
Spain faces some structural issues in terms of its innovative capacity, 
especially regarding its innovative output abilities. The country that seems to be in 
a closer situation is Italy, even though this nation seems to be achieving more from 
a relatively similar level of input. France, UK, and – mainly – Germany are in better 
position in terms of Innovation System development. Therefore, a natural 
classification for these countries arises, where: 
 Spain occupies a laggard position in comparison to other countries, 
considering the structural indicators of its National Innovation System 
outlined above.  
 Italy, UK and France represent an intermediate position. Italy is in a 
lower-intermediate level, France in an upper-intermediate condition 
and the UK lies in the middle.  
 Germany is a clear case of a leader NIS, taking into account the 
countries we have analyzed and the set of indicators used.  
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6. Putting literature in context: Research Hypotheses 
 
A first aspect to be included in this chapter is a clear reference to the 
Research Question, which guides the efforts towards analyzable and useful results 
from this investigation: 
What factors determine firms’ performance as a result of their 
participation in international R&D cooperation projects? 
The aim of this question is to identify the main drivers of innovative 
performance for these companies (our main goal as previously stated), in a 
process that offers both managerial information and policymaking evaluative 
analysis. Thus, our emphasis when proposing the hypotheses will lie upon three 
analytical dimensions:  
a) Microeconomic dimension - Aspects related to firms’ inherent 
characteristics as influential variables in their outcomes, using the 
foundations of R&D cooperation from chapter 2. It largely supports a 
Resource-Based View approach of collaboration, with emphasis on 
absorptive capacity of agents; 
b) Contextual dimension - Firms’ aspects related to their participation in 
cooperative settings (in this case, their participation in a Eureka 
individual project), as well as the institutional framework represented by 
RTD policy incentives, therefore considering the aspects highlighted in 
chapters 3 and 4. This dimension comprises aspects related to a 
Transaction Costs approach. 
c) Macroeconomic dimension - Representing the general features of the 
National Innovation Systems in which these cooperating firms are 
embedded, according to developments of chapter 5. This last dimension 
tests the validity of a NIS-oriented perspective.   
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This view does not imply a segmented approach of such dimensions or 
even the existence of independence among them. The macroeconomic dimension 
as we define it here is largely determined by microeconomic behavior, but it also 
exerts some level of influence upon firm related aspects. Similarly, the contextual 
dimension might be affected by both micro and macroeconomic situation. This 
arbitrary division is a simplification that allows a workable assessment of the 
phenomena under scrutiny in this research. Based on this perspective, the core 
hypothesis proposed rests on the interactions between these 3 dimensions, i.e.: 
 
Hcore: Firms´ performance as a result from their participation in 
international R&D cooperation projects is determined by the 
interaction of three influential dimensions: Microeconomic, 
Contextual, and Macroeconomic.  
 
We must remind that these dimensions are constructs in which hypotheses 
are developed rather than exhaustive proposals of such areas of economic studies. 
The analytical approach only captures glimpses of micro, macro and contextual 
aspects of firms. They were designed with the intention of situating the reader and, 
hence, should not mean that every aspect related to them are included in our 
analysis, which seeks only to contribute marginally to each one of them.  
In order to comply with the broad aspects raised by Hcore, we developed a 
set of testable propositions - our operational hypotheses - to be confronted with the 
empirical data. These hypotheses are developed with specific focus on the 
features of each dimension that integrates the core hypothesis, also considering 
data restraints from our datasets (for a further discussion on the data, see chapter 
7).  
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6.1 Microeconomic Dimension’s Hypothesis 
 
By providing firms with access to capabilities located abroad, international 
R&D cooperation requires the existence of a certain level of absorptive capacity in 
order to be effective. According to table 3 (chapter 2), some authors point out that 
the expected impact of R&D cooperation is larger for large corporations, which is 
supported by their perception that these firms are in a better position to capture 
benefits from R&D cooperation, which is linked to their higher absorptive capacities 
(as well as financial capabilities). On the other hand, the signaling characteristic of 
Eureka shall bring more relative benefits for SMEs, since large companies rely on 
other (stronger) forms of reducing information asymmetry for project funding. In this 
sense, when analyzing data from Eureka projects, we should also consider this 
perspective.  
Furthermore, another suitable approach is to take into account the 
innovative intensity of a given firm as a potential determinant of cooperative 
projects’ outcomes. We should put special emphasis on its effects upon the 
technological results (direct effect), more than on commercial achievements 
(indirect effect), which is expected because the concept of absorptive capacity as 
assessed in our research is technique-oriented, whereas market results shall be 
influenced by technological development, but not necessarily, since innovation is 
inherently a risky process, facing both technical and market challenges. 
H1: Absorptive capacity has a positive influence on 
organizational outcomes arising from firms’ participation in 
international R&D cooperation projects, being this effect more 
pronounced on technological than on commercial attainments.  
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H1a: Considering firm size as a proxy for absorptive capacity, large 
companies achieve better outcomes than SMEs
52
. 
H1b: Considering R&D intensity (measured as a percentage of 
turnover invested in R&D) as a proxy for absorptive capacity, more 
intensive firms achieve better outcomes, regardless of their size
53
.  
  
 6.2 Contextual Dimension’s Hypotheses 
 
The inherent complexity of international R&D cooperation stresses the 
importance of the quality of project management. Risks related to free riding, 
opportunism, and moral hazard issues, as well as different modus operandi of firms 
- provided their distinct cultural backgrounds - are present in any kind of 
cooperative engagement, highlighting the important role that transaction costs are 
likely to play in this context. However, when dealing with foreign partners, they are 
maximized, since cultural ties are likely to differ in a higher degree and monitoring 
costs of principal-agent relationships also rise significantly. In this sense, we 
developed the following proposition: 
H2: The management quality of a given cooperative R&D project 
undertaken at the international level will influence the ultimate 
corporative outcomes of such project, both at the technological 
and economic (commercial) levels.    
 
                                                          
52
 Under an empirical perspective, Georghiou (1994) found that initiatives carried out under the 
Framework Programme were likely to yield significant results only to a minority of SMEs, which 
provides further support for this hypothesis (even though he did not approach it via an “absorptive 
capacity” rationale).  
53
 Cohen and Levinthal (1990) and Lin et al (2012) are examples of authors who have approximated 
absorptive capacity using R&D intensity. Nonetheless, we recognize that If absorptive capacity is 
path dependent, using R&D intensity as a proxy for it can be tricky, since it does not highlight prior 
behavior in this regard. The additional use of firm size in this case can be helpful in order to 
overcome this shortcoming.  
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To this we must add the risks of critical knowledge spillovers, i.e., unwanted 
knowledge sharing to other firms/agents involved in the cooperative project. As 
stated in table 4 (chapter 2), empirical evidence suggests that vertical networks 
perform better than horizontal ones, suggesting that cooperative engagement 
between competitors might harm the potential outcomes from the relationship. 
Therefore: 
H3: R&D cooperation projects involving rival firms are likely to 
achieve worse overall results than networks formed by non-rival 
agents. 
   
A next step lies in considering the endogenous impacts of technological 
achievements on the commercial side of firms’ results (Rese & Baier, 2011). 
Technical outcomes per se do not lead to successful innovations, since the 
marketability of such attainments must be taken into account. Nevertheless, 
technology is a necessary condition in this process (though not sufficient).  
To this we should add that such impact might not be optimal in terms of its 
timing when considering a cooperative project’s duration, i.e., in some cases it 
might impact immediately after the project’s completion, while in others it might 
take a longer period of time.  
H4: Technological achievements in an international R&D 
cooperation project influence positively the commercial 
achievements of firms. 
H4a: Impacts of technological achievements shall be regarded not 
only as those that unfold by the end of a given project, but also as 
those being expected after the project’s completion.     
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6.3 Macroeconomic Dimension’s Hypothesis 
 
As previously described, this dimension makes exclusive reference to 
aspects related to National Innovation Systems. In no way we believe that other 
macroeconomic constructs do not play a role in shaping the environment that 
influences firms’ outcomes for innovative activities. However, the focus of this 
approach lies on the capabilities developed by countries in terms of some specific 
characteristics regarding their performance in terms of innovative input and output.  
Thus, we are also taking the dynamics of systems as exogenous for 
simplicity’s sake. To justify this action we must remind that the content of this 
research is microeconomic-oriented, whereas results shall also impact on 
innovation policy evaluation: the macroeconomic dimension in this case functions 
as an approximation of the macro environment in which firms are embedded as a 
control variable in our analysis. 
Table 3 (chapter 2) summarizes some influential aspects that National 
Innovation Systems are likely to play in the process of R&D cooperation at the 
international level. We must consider that the countries being analyzed are of 
relatively similar sizes, as well as of similar levels of development in a global 
perspective. Even though there is no reason to believe that any of the National 
Innovation Systems under scrutiny (Spain as the central focus, but also Germany, 
Italy, UK, and France) can be regarded as a “less-developed Innovation System”, 
they differ substantially in terms of the indicators presented in chapter 5. This 
validates the perception that their national environments in terms of innovation 
capabilities may affect their microeconomic structure, as well as represent some 
aggregated features of firms. In this sense, we agree with economic growth theory 
(e.g. Weil, 2006) and propose that firms located in laggard Innovation Systems can 
benefit more in comparative terms from R&D cooperation with foreign Innovation 
Systems.  
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H5: Firms located in relatively laggard Innovation Systems will 
achieve better outcomes from international R&D cooperation 
projects than those firms located in leading Innovation Systems, 
provided that such Systems are above a threshold of 
development.   
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7. Methodological Approach and Rationale 
 
In this chapter we outline the method used in our attempt to contribute in the 
process of evaluating international R&D cooperation with focus on the case of 
Spanish firms participating in such activities (using data from the Eureka Initiative). 
First we put forward some general aspects of the research, offering remarks 
regarding the framework of the intended assessment. In a second stage, the 
operational settings are developed, which consists in a relatively novel manner of 
combining statistical tools for economic analysis. A discussion on the choice of 
such method follows, building upon a criticism on technique-led evaluations. Lastly, 
the main shortcomings of the methodology are presented.   
 
7.1 Scope of Research 
 
 The developed methodology focuses in providing useful ways of complying 
with the proposed objectives and hypotheses of this research, thus building an 
approach that can offer helpful and reliable knowledge on processes related to 
international R&D cooperation, with central focus on the Spanish case (through 
data of Eureka’s individual projects).     
 The general scope of this assessment is based on ex post data gathered 
from Eureka’s Final Reports, which offer a rich and practical source of relevant 
information on projects and firms’ characteristics. For such characteristics, this 
study can be considered as an economic analysis of international R&D cooperation 
in its broad sense, as well as an evaluation of an innovation policy initiative, given 
the specific aspect of data being analyzed.  
 Besides answering to the proposed inquiries, this methodology is built as an 
alternative form of attaining positive and normative results. This attempt is in 
consonance with the proposition that more structured data and proxies are needed 
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for a better understanding of R&D productivity (Mairesse & Mohnen, 2002). Such 
statement justifies the use of combinations of statistical tools for the generation of a 
more complete capacity of understanding and tackling economic events related to 
innovation.   
 
7.2 Operational Aspects54 
 7.2.1 Data  
 
Data for this research comes almost exclusively from Eureka individual 
projects’ dataset of final reports55, which was provided by the Eureka Secretariat. 
Such reports are structured as questionnaires, containing several questions on 
different aspects. For the purposes of this particular assessment, the information is 
rich in terms of what we defined as the Contextual Dimension (for a description of 
the primary variables included in our estimations, please refer to table 9). This sort 
of survey method, by collecting data from individuals, allows a thorough analysis of 
relationships, and comparison of groups (US Department of Energy, 2007), thus 
being an adequate tool to comply with the objectives and hypotheses of this study.   
The timeframe used is based on two different periods: 2000-2005 and 2006-
2008 (dates of projects’ conclusion). These datasets are analyzed separately for 
some simple operational aspects. The instrument of data collection suffered 
changes in between these periods, altering aspects such as the existence of 
certain variables of interest, as well different sorts of measurement scales. The first 
issue is relevant for the variables COMPETITOR and FUNCTIONING (refer to 
table 9, 10 and 11 for codes and descriptions of variables), which are present in 
the 2000-2005 datasets, but not for 2006-2008. This is unfortunate, given the 
contribution of these aspects in order to confront hypotheses H2 and H3 with the 
                                                          
54
 I would like to thank Daniela Benzano for her patience and valuable insights on the statistics of 
this research. 
55
 Exception is the data used in the ANOVA tests described below for the analysis of Spanish firms’ 
results arising after project completion, Return on Total Assets.    
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Structure
2000-2005 2006-2008
TOT_COST
Total cost of project(s) carried 
out by f irms. Source: Eureka
Millions of euros Millions of euros
DURATION
Duration of project(s). Source: 
Eureka. 
Months Months
ORG_TYPE Firm size. Source: Eureka
1 = Large company
0 = SME
1 = Large company
0 = SME
NIS*
Consists of countries' 
categories to w hich f irms 
belong, i.e., Spain, Germany, 
France, UK, and Italy. It 
functions as a proxy for 
National Innovation Systems' 
characteristics. 
1 = Spain
2 = Italy; United Kingdom; 
France (Intermediate)
3 = Germany (Leader)
1 = Spain
2 = Italy; United Kingdom; 
France (Intermediate)
3 = Germany (Leader)
RATIO_RD
Ratio betw een R&D 
expenditure and total turnover. 
Source: Eureka
1 = <2%
2 = 2 to 10%
3 = >10%
1 = <2%
2 = 2 to 10%
3 = >10%
COMPETITOR
Existence of at least one 
competitor among participants 
of the project. Source: Eureka
1 = Yes
0 = No
Not included
IND_EXP
Industrial exploitation of results 
by the company at the end of 
the project. Source: Eureka
1 = Yes
0 = No
1 = Yes
0 = No
FUNCTIONING**
Evaluation of functioning's 
quality of project's participants. 
Source: Eureka
1 = Excellent
2 = Good
3 = Weak/Bad
Not included
DescriptionCode
results of the empirical work. In order to merge both datasets, we would either 
have to drop such variables from the analysis, or work with a significant number of 
missing cases. The solution was to assess these hypotheses through 2000-2005 
data, keeping datasets separate.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9. Independent Primary variables of analysis 
*  Methodological note I: Countries’ codes are assigned according to their relative position in terms 
of the stage of development of their National Innovation Systems. The higher the rank, the more 
developed. Furthermore, they were grouped in three categories, where Spain is referred to as a 
laggard Innovation System and it is analyzed alone, provided that it is the core country of our 
analysis; Italy, UK and France are classified as intermediate Innovation Systems (including, thus, 
lower intermediate, Italy, intermediate, UK, and upper intermediate, France); and Germany is 
regarded as the leading nation in terms of IS capacities. This procedure was undertaken in order to 
provide each group with a significant number of observations for the regression assessments. Such 
classification followed suggestions from the analysis made in chapter 5. This structure is also 
relatively compatible with that shown in the Innovation Union Scoreboard 2011, where Germany 
appears as an Innovation Leader, France and UK as Innovation Followers, while Italy and Spain are 
classified as Moderate Innovators. Nonetheless, Italy’s innovation level is above that of Spain, 
suggesting that our relative classification is representative of the current context of these Innovation 
Systems.   
** Methodological note II: Categories 3 and 4 (Weak and Bad Functioning, respectively) were 
merged in order to have analyzable data, since information for category 4 was scarce.  
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2000-2005 2006-2008
TECHACHIEV*
Evaluation of Overall technological achievements in the project. 
Source: Eureka 
1 = Excellent/Good
0 = Weak/Bad
1 = Excellent/Good
0 = Weak/Bad
COMMACHIEV*
Evaluation of commercial achievements as a results of the project. 
Source: Eureka
1 = Excellent/Good
0 = Weak/Bad/Nil 
1 = 2-5 times RTD 
investment/+-10 times RTD 
inv./<100 times RTD 
inv./More
0 = Very low /< or = RTD 
investment
EXP_IMPACT* Expected future impact of results from the project. Source: Eureka
1 = Very Large/Large
0 = Medium/Small/Nil
1 = 2-5 times RTD 
investment/+-10 times RTD 
inv./<100 times RTD 
inv./More
0 = Very low /< or = RTD 
investment
Code Description
Structure
 
However, estimations could be made for both periods altogether in terms of 
the remaining variables, but this is where the problem with measurement scales 
arise. Both COMMACHIEV and EXP_IMPACT (table 10), which deal with market 
impacts of collaborative projects on firms, have their scale changed from a purely 
subjective evaluation scale to a objective-oriented one: while in the 2000-2005 
questionnaires they were classified as Excellent, Good, Weak, etc., in the 2006-
2008 form, their situation is focused less on perception and more on a R&D 
investment comparison basis. To build a correspondence scheme between such 
scales would provide interpretative alterations to the dataset. This could potentially 
cause undesirable effects on firms’ perceptions. For this reason, we kept distinct 
datasets, allowing a comparison between different periods. As a result, 2006-2008 
functions as a robustness check sample.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 10. Dependent Primary variables of analysis 
*  Methodological note I: The original categories of these variables were dichotomized in order to 
produce significant numbers of observations for categories. The underlying rationale in this 
procedure is one of grouping positive perceptions on the one hand, and negative perceptions on the 
other. As it will be further discussed in chapter 8, the high concentration of positive results in 
TECHACHIEV generated some problems for statistical analyses.  
 
Furthermore, data is available for Spanish firms, as well as for 4 countries 
which we take as elements of contrast (benchmark countries) in our analysis: 
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Germany, France, UK, and Italy. Together, these five countries can be regarded as 
highly representative of the European situation, gathering data for the largest 
economies and which face different stages of development in terms of their 
innovation systems. Rates of response for Spanish projects were 24.7% (91 
reports in 2000-2005), and 26.9% (50 reports in 2006-2008). Data for non-
responded reports regarding the benchmark countries was not provided.  
It is important to notice that such observations referred to finished projects, 
while our analyses used firm-level data. This is justified by the fact that by using 
data of projects we would inflate the influence of variables related to companies, 
i.e., variables related to the Microeconomic Dimension, such as firm size, since 
some companies – especially large corporations – were involved in more than one 
project. Thus, we merged data for such companies. The resulting structures of 
datasets were the following: 
a) 2000-2005 -   77 Spanish firms; 60 German firms; 34 French firms; 27 
Italian firms; 17 British firms. N = 215.  
b) 2006-2008 – 36 Spanish firms; 52 German firms; 19 French firms; 6 
Italian firms; 2 British firms. N = 115.  
Data from Universities, Research Centers and other institutions were 
dropped. As the scope of this analysis deals with innovation and its impacts on 
agents’ success in terms of marketability of results from international R&D 
cooperation, dealing with other sorts of organizations would distort our 
assessment, while also driving us away from our focus: companies represent the 
core of economic systems in terms of innovation (Molero, 2010). Unfortunately, 
sectoral data (NACE classification) was not available in the database. As 
companies’ names were censored for confidentiality issues, any attempt to 
overcome this matter was not feasible. 
While such samples are not quantitatively meaningful in the broad 
environment of international R&D cooperation, they provide important qualitative 
information on projects’ development. To use such information through statistical 
120 
 
2000-2005 2006-2008
PROD_INNO
Companies that achieved product innovation (new  product or 
improved products). Source: Eureka
1 = Yes
0 = No
1 = Yes
0 = No
PROC_INNO
Companies that achieved process innovation (new  process or 
improved processes). Source: Eureka
1 = Yes
0 = No
1 = Yes
0 = No
SERV_INNO
Companies that achieved service innovation (new  services). 
Source: Eureka
1 = Yes
0 = No
1 = Yes
0 = No
STRAT_ALL
Companies that achieved strategic industrial alliances (new  or 
improved). Source: Eureka
1 = Yes
0 = No
1 = Yes
0 = No
Code Description
Structure
techniques shall contribute to the subject of analysis on suggestive terms, rather 
providing consistent conclusions. Therefore, definitions of impacts and 
characteristics of relationships are to be analyzed not through precise estimation of 
statistical coefficients, but via relevant indications they shall supply.  
Another approach undertaken was an ad hoc exploration of datasets. This 
step aims at examining additional elements of datasets which are not directly 
relevant for the presented hypotheses. However, they generate further 
comprehension of firms’ (and projects’) features, allowing a deeper appreciation of 
the phenomena under investigation. Variables involved in this assessment are 
described in table 11. Descriptive statistics of variables are presented together with 
the evaluation of results. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 11. Secondary variables of analysis 
 
7.2.2 Binary Logistic (Logit) models 
 
This section describes the regression models applied in identifying 
determinants of success at both technological and market levels as results from 
firms’ participation in international R&D cooperation. Here we present the binary 
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logit models built according to data contained in Eureka’s datasets for periods 
2000-2005 and 2006-2008 in Spain (the core of our analysis) Germany, France, 
UK, and Italy (Benchmark countries).  
Even though the original structures of the dependent variables to be 
analyzed (TECHACHIEV, COMMACHIEV, EXP_IMPACT) are multinomial (table 
9), the number of observations per category represented a risk for models’ 
stabilities. As preliminary assessments revealed, the use of Multinomial (or 
Ordinal) Logit Models could potentially lead to interpretation issues in regressions’ 
validity (such assessments suggested a need for merging categories). Therefore, 
in order to achieve statistically representative results, we resorted to data 
transformation in order to run the binary models.  
For the purposes of this research, the required data transformation (detailed 
below) did not affect the logical arrangement of statistical analyses performed. 
Such transformations basically consisted in grouping responses in: (i) success, 
which represents technological or market results (and expectations) that are 
perceived as positive by companies (regardless of level); and (ii) failure, 
corresponding to technological or market results (and expectations) that were 
regarded as negative by respondents (regardless of level). This procedure also 
helps reducing disturbances caused by subjectivity of answers, since what firm A 
considers an excellent result, firm B might classify a similar achievement as good, 
where factual attainments are hardly likely to be interpreted as negative. This 
approximation results in a workable outcome for policy and managerial analyses.    
In order to verify associations between variables, we applied chi-square 
tests, odds ratio analyses, and Spearman’s rho for the exploration of associations 
between pairs of variables (which might also lead to the verification of latent 
collinearity amongst categorical independent variables). As a byproduct of this 
approach, both methods help to enrich the robustness of the analysis, providing 
statistical support for determining influent factors on the innovative process through 
international R&D cooperation.        
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The binary logit models function as regressions for dummy dependent 
variables (Hair et al, 2005; Gujarati, 2002). As already stated, this research aims at 
exploring the described datasets in order to attain a body of evidence regarding 
influential factors on technological and market success arising from firms’ 
participation in cooperative R&D settings at the international level. These 
approaches are built for 2000-2005 and 2006-2008 datasets.  
The broad model from which the operational equations shall derive takes 
into account the perspective offered by the hypotheses described previously. 
Hence, its structure is largely based on theoretical and empirical findings regarding 
economics of innovation - as well as innovation policy – literature. It should also be 
reminded that the described equations were assessed through binary logit 
regressions.  
ACHIEVEMENTSi = MICi + CXTij + MACi + ε 
Equation 1 
Where:  
ACHIEVEMENTSi: Technological, commercial, and expected success of firm “i”. It 
takes the value 1 if the firm’s participation in international R&D cooperation was 
classified as successful and 0 otherwise (see next equations’ definitions of success 
for clarification).  
MICi: Corresponds to the Microeconomic Dimension of firm “i”.  
CXTi: Corresponds to the Contextual Dimension of firm “i” and project(s)
56 “j”.  
MACi: Corresponds to the Macroeconomic Dimension in which firm “i” is 
embedded.  
ε: Error term.   
                                                          
56
 It is worth reminding that some firms were engaged in more than 1 cooperative project.  
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A first operational assessment considers TECHACHIEV, i.e., companies’ 
perception of overall technological achievements, as the dependent variable (2000-
2005 and 2006-2008). It can be noticed (table 10) that this variable is structured in 
categories that range from 1 (excellent) to 4 (bad). In order to build effective binary 
models, we propose the following intuitive classification: 
a) Success (1) – contains responses that rated technological achievements 
as excellent and as good.  
b) Failure or Absence of Success (0) – contains responses that rated 
technological achievements as weak and as bad.  
 The resulting equation for technological achievements will, thus, assume the 
structure defined by equation 2 (definitions of variables can be found in table 9): 
TECHACHIEVi =β1 + β2ORG_TYPEi + β3RATIO_RDi + β4COMPETITORj + 
β5FUNCTIONINGj + β6TOT_COSTj + β7COUNTRYi + ε 
Equation 2 
Where: 
- “i" refers to variables inherently related to firms.  
- “j” refers to variables related to cooperative projects.  
- β1 is the intercept.  
- MICi is represented by ORG_TYPE and RATIO_RD; 
- CXTi: is represented by COMPETITOR and FUNCTIONING; TOT_COST is 
added as a proxy for project size in terms of R&D invested in project “j”.   
- MACi: is represented by COUNTRY. 
 This assessment, as it can be noticed, produces estimates for the 
parameters of variables that represent the hypotheses proposed above, while 
overall composite results shall provide an initial appraisal of the main goal of this 
research regarding technological results arising from R&D cooperation. 
Nonetheless, even technological innovation cannot be regarded by only technical 
outcomes. Technological advancements might not qualify as innovation per se if 
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they provide no economic impacts on firms. For this reason, we complement the 
approach described in Equation 2 with a market-oriented perspective, both 
achieved and expected described in Equations 3 and 4.     
Beforehand, the following approaches consider COMMACHIEV and 
EXP_IMPACT, i.e., companies’ perception of actual commercial achievements and 
of potential future corporate achievements, as the dependent variables. Both 
variables are depicted in table 10 and it can be noticed that they range from 1 
(excellent/very large) to 5 (nil) in the 2000-2005 dataset; and from 1 (very low) to 6 
(more than 100 times the RTD investment) for 2006-2008 data. In order to build 
effective binary models, we propose the following intuitive: 
a) Success/Expected Success (1) – contains responses that rated commercial 
achievements as excellent and good, and expected impacts as very large, 
large, and medium in the 2000-2005 dataset. For 2006-2008 projects, we 
define in this category projects that were rated as 2-5 times RTD investment 
or more.  
b) Failure or Absence of Success (0) – contains responses that rated 
commercial achievements as weak, bad, or nil, and expected impacts as 
small, or nil the 2000-2005 dataset. For 2006-2008 projects, we define in 
this category projects that were rated as having Very Low impacts, and 
impacts that are smaller or equal to RTD investment.   
 
In Equation 2 we have the structure of the commercial achievements’ 
evaluation 
COMMACHIEVi =β1 + β2ORG_TYPEi + β3COMPETITORj + β4TECHACHIEVi + 
β5IND_EXPi + β6FUNCTIONINGJ + β7DURATIONJ + β8COUNTRYi + ε 
Equation 3 
Where: 
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- “i" refers to variables inherently related to firms.  
- “j” refers to variables related to cooperative projects.  
- β1 is the intercept.  
- MICi is represented by ORG_TYPE. RATIO_RD was dropped in this analysis, 
given its technical characteristic: while it is expected that it might lead to better 
technological outcomes, we do not foresee a direct relationship with 
commercial achievements; 
- CXTi: is represented by COMPETITOR, FUNCTIONING, TECHACHIEV, and 
IND_EXP. In this case, it should be noticed that TECHACHIEV performs the 
role of independent variable, since technical outcomes from innovation projects 
are expected to influence the market dimension. DURATION of project “j” was 
added as a control variable, where its expected influence regards the idea that 
the longer a project is, the more likely it is to produce marketable outcomes 
before it comes to an end;  
- MACi: is represented by COUNTRY. 
 
Next, we present Equation 4, which works with the idea of future 
developments resulting from firms’ participation in international R&D cooperation. 
This is a rough approximation of outcomes that might arise after a projects’ 
completion, since it is based on expectations rather than on objective facts. 
Nonetheless, it is assumed that such prospects shall be based not only on 
confidence (or lack of it), but that they may reveal the existence or not of 
achievements that are on their way to reach markets (if they will ultimately succeed 
or not cannot be identified, given the inherent risk of innovative activities).     
EXP_IMPACTi =β1 + β2ORG_TYPEi + β3COMPETITORj + β4TECHACHIEVi + 
β5FUNCTIONINGJ + β6COUNTRYi + ε 
Equation 4 
Where: 
- “i" refers to variables inherently related to firms.  
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- “j” refers to variables related to cooperative projects.  
- β1 is the intercept.  
- MICi is represented by ORG_TYPE;  
- CXTi: is represented by COMPETITOR, FUNCTIONING, TECHACHIEV. As 
IND_EXP represents the existence of industrial exploitation of results by the 
end of the project, its impacts on future developments are not necessarily 
related, therefore the variable was dropped from this model. 
- MACi: is represented by COUNTRY. 
 
7.2.3 Complementary ad hoc analyses 
   
 The ad hoc approach described in this section develops a complementary 
assessment of datasets and which are not directly related to the objectives and 
hypotheses of this research, thus not relying on theoretical or empirical support 
contained in our framework of assessment. Nonetheless, such approach shall shed 
light on supplementary considerations on influential matters. Such perspective 
aims at improving the managerial and policymaking aspects of international R&D 
networks through the use of workable indicators with potential latent effects on 
networks’ achievements.   
 The applied procedures consist of an additional set of equations (Equations 
5 – 8) based on similar settings to those outlined above. Before we describe each 
model, it is worth pointing out that they follow the basic structure of Equations 2 to 
4, except that they include those theoretically grounded predictors that are 
statistically significant, plus an additional set of variables (table 12). These ad hoc 
assessments were designed to provide insights for a better discussion of 
outcomes. Related procedures are similar to those outlined for previous models, 
such as contingency tables, chi-square, and correspondence analysis. 
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TECHACHIEV
- ORG_TYPE
- RATIO_RD
- COMPETITOR*
- FUNCTIONING*
- TOT_COST
- COUNTRY
- PROD_INNO
- PROC_INNO
- SERV_INNO
This ad hoc  estimation investigates types of innovations´effects on technological achievements. The goal is to 
provide information on the influence of projects' innovative character in terms of their capacity of generating 
successful results. 
COMMACHIEV
- ORG_TYPE
- COMPETITOR*
- FUNCTIONING*
- TECHACHIEV
- IND_EXP
- DURATION
- COUNTRY
- PROD_INNO
- PROC_INNO
- SERV_INNO
The underlying rationale behind this assessment is similar to that described for technological achievements. 
Nonetheless, this estimation searches for market impacts resulting from different types of innovation being 
explored by f irms. 
EXP_IMPACT
- ORG_TYPE
- COMPETITOR*
- FUNCTIONING*
- TECHACHIEV
- COUNTRY
- PROD_INNO
- PROC_INNO
- SERV_INNO
- STRAT_ALL
In addition to the effects that different sorts of innovation may have, this approach also looks to the generation 
of longer term relationships betw een companies involved in the netw orks analyzed as a potential determinant of 
future achievements. 
STRAT_ALL -
- ORG_TYPE
- FUNCTIONING
- COMPETITOR
- TOT_COST
- TECHACHIEV
- COMMACHIEV
This last ad hoc  approach brings a new  dependent variable, w hich is the generation of lasting relationships 
betw een companies involved in international cooperative R&D netw orks. Even though this structure is not 
contained in the hypotheses of this research, it may help in exploring the idea of the formation of long lasting 
netw orks w ithin Europe, a relevant goal of Eureka. 
Dependent 
Variable
Theoretically 
Grounded Predictors
Ad Hoc 
Predictors
Rationale 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 12. Relationships of interest between primary and secondary variables of analysis 
*These variables are available only for 2000-2005 data.  
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The first ad hoc equation uses the dependent variable TECHACHIEV. The 
additional secondary variables represent the sort of innovation that was in fact 
achieved by firms during their participation in a Eureka individual project. In this 
regard, this first supplementary model aims at identifying the impacts of the area of 
innovation in which firms are involved (or areas, since firms can have the three 
types of innovation simultaneously).       
It is important to notice that there is no theoretical or empirical support for 
any expectation for this set of complementary variables. While one might argue 
about relative impacts of different kinds of innovation on firms’ technological 
capabilities, it must be highlighted that such achievements are evaluated by 
respondents according to organizational objectives that were set a priori. 
Therefore, related impacts should be in accordance to companies’ objectives, not 
to their absolute value. The model’s structure is the following: 
TECHACHIEVi =β1 + (β2X1 … + βkXk)+ βk+1PROD_INNOi + βk+2PROC_INNOi + 
βk+3SERV_INNOi + ε 
Equation 5 
Where: 
- “i" refers to variables inherently related to firms.  
- β1 is the intercept. 
- The term (β2X1 … + βkXk) represents the theoretically grounded predictors 
which are added to the model according to their significance as per results of 
previous models. This procedure is undertaken in order to maintain a relative 
parsimony in regressions, given the number of observations (N = 215 and 115 
for 2000-2005 and 2006-2008, respectively).    
 
The following model provides an analogous approach for the case of 
commercial impacts, adding the secondary variables related to types of innovation 
that were achieved: 
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COMMACHIEVi =β1 + (β2X1 … + βkXk)+ βk+1PROD_INNOi + βk+2PROC_INNOi + 
βk+3SERV_INNOi + ε 
Equation 6 
Where: 
- “i" refers to variables inherently related to firms.  
- β1 is the intercept. 
- The term (β2X1 … + βkXk) represents the theoretically grounded predictors 
which are added to the model according to their significance as per results of 
previous models. This procedure is undertaken in order to maintain a relative 
parsimony in regressions, given the number of observations (N = 215 and 115 
for 2000-2005 and 2006-2008, respectively).    
 
Equation 7 describes the ad hoc complementary approach for 
EXP_IMPACT.  
EXP_IMPACTi = β1 + (β2X1 … + βkXk)+ βk+1PROD_INNOi + βk+2PROC_INNOi + 
βk+3SERV_INNOi + ε 
Equation 7 
Where: 
- “i" refers to variables inherently related to firms.  
- β1 is the intercept. 
- The term (β2X1 … + βkXk) represents the theoretically grounded predictors 
which are added to the model according to their significance as per results of 
previous models. This procedure is undertaken in order to maintain a relative 
parsimony in regressions, given the number of observations (N = 215 and 115 
for 2000-2005 and 2006-2008, respectively).   
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The last of the ad hoc complementary models does not correspond to any 
original, theoretically grounded, approach. Its structure is based on the predictors 
of companies’ achievements of long term strategic alliances (new or improved 
ones, measured by STRAT_ALL). Our interest in this variable is related to the 
inherent features of the Eureka Initiative, which is to provide incentives to build a 
more integrated R&D context within Europe. While this variable does not 
necessarily correspond to behavioral change or additionality, it is capable of 
providing hints on the systemic impacts of international R&D cooperation. It 
consists of an exploratory approach and follows the structure outlined in Equation 
8:  
STRAT_ALLi =β1 + β2ORG_TYPEi + β3COMPETITORj + β4TECHACHIEVi + 
β5FUNCTIONINGJ + β6TOT_COSTJ + β7COMMACHIEVi + β8COUNTRYi + 
β9EXP_IMPACTi + ε 
Equation 8 
Where: 
- “i" refers to variables inherently related to firms.  
- “j” refers to variables related to cooperative projects.  
- β1 is the intercept.  
- ORG_TYPE is set in order to check the influence of firm size on the propensity 
to engage in longer term strategic alliances in R&D activities.  
- COMPETITOR is expected to be negative, since networks formed by rival firms 
are less likely to succeed (according to empirical findings previously stated in 
this research).  
- TECHACHIEV, COMMACHIEV and EXP_IMPACT are expected to be 
positively related to the formation of more stable networks, based on the 
success that has already been achieved by firms, as well as the expected 
outcomes. A similar expectation is related to managerial aspects as 
approximated by FUNCTIONING. 
- TOT_COST is an approximation of project “size” in financial terms. We expect 
that “larger” projects indicate a higher propensity of engaging in longer term 
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relationships. Ideally, this variable should be stated in relative terms (regarding 
firms’ turnover). However, this information is not consistently available for firms 
and it is not available for networks’ partners.  
- COUNTRY refers to the home/host nation of the company under scrutiny, 
where this aspect tries to gather information on the NIS influence on the 
propensity of firms to engage in long-lasting R&D networks.    
 
After analyzing results from the 7 operational equations described above, 
the relevant determinants of international R&D cooperation outcomes are likely to 
become clear, thus generating answers for our research question and evidence 
concerning our hypotheses. Nonetheless, another step is taken: we developed a 
taxonomical approximation based on the outcome variables (TECHACHIEV, 
COMMACHIEV, and EXP_IMPACT) through clustering techniques, which 
corresponds to the content of the next section.  
 
 7.2.4 Clusters 
 
 Based on the outcome aspects of projects, we proceeded to a 
categorization of the firms being analyzed for both periods under study (2000-2005 
and 2006-2008). For this approach, the TwoStep Cluster (SPSS) method was 
used. This method is an exploratory tool designed to reveal natural clusters in the 
dataset according to the parameters indicated, offering the possibility of suggesting 
latent taxonomies (Hair et al, 2005). Also, we used Log-likelihood distances to build 
the clusters, since this procedure allows the use of categorical variables, which is 
not possible with Euclidean estimations (SPSS TwoStep Cluster’s algorithms are 
detailed in Appendix II).  
 Outcome variables, i.e., TECHACHIEV, COMMACHIEV and EXP_IMPACT 
were included in the procedure according to their original categorical structures, 
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2000-2005 2006-2008
TECHACHIEV*
Evaluation of Overall technological achievements in the project. 
Source: Eureka 
1 = Excellent
2 = Good
3 = Weak
4 = Bad
1 = Excellent
2 = Good
3 = Weak
4 = Bad
COMMACHIEV*
Evaluation of commercial achievements as a results of the project. 
Source: Eureka
1 = Excellent
2 = Good
3 = Weak
4 = Bad
5 = Nil 
3 = 2-5 times RTD investment
4 = +-10 times RTD inv.
5 = <100 times RTD inv.
6 = More
1 = Very low
2 = < or = RTD investment
EXP_IMPACT* Expected future impact of results from the project. Source: Eureka
1 = Very Large
2 = Large
3 = Medium
4 = Small
5 = Nil
3 = 2-5 times RTD investment
4 = +-10 times RTD inv.
5 = <100 times RTD inv.
6 = More
1 = Very low
2 = < or = RTD investment
Code Description
Structure
instead of the dichotomized ones used in the regression analysis. This allowed a 
better interpretation of results, which did not face the statistical constraints pointed 
out for the logit equations (table 13).      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 13. Outcome variables’ structure for cluster analysis 
 
To establish the optimal number of clusters we developed on the structure 
proposed by Fischer and Molero (2012). Thus, we shall test for the consistency of 
3 clusters. It was proposed the following categorization of firms in an exploratory 
assessment of Spanish firms in Eureka 2000-2005: 
 
1. Risky Innovators - companies included in this cluster had the best 
technical outcomes out of the three clusters, but only partially they can 
obtain satisfactory market results.   
 
2. Inventors - These companies were classified as inventors for showing 
fair technical results without taking advantage of it in the market – which 
does not allow us to define them as innovators per se. 
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3. Consistent Innovators - These companies had poorer technical results 
than risky innovators, but they consistently achieve positive commercial 
results.  
 
In operational terms, the clusters were calculated for: 
a) All firms – this procedure aimed at generating clusters of firms from all 
countries included (Spain, Germany, France, UK, and Italy), checking for 
robustness over time through the comparison of cluster structure 
between 2000-2005 and 2006-2008 datasets. The goal here is to provide 
a consistent perspective of behavioral patterns of agents, according to 
their projects’ outcomes, thus identifying further relationships among 
variables in our analysis, creating an element of comparison with the 
regression models outlined above. 
 
b) Spanish firms 2000-2005 – in this step the clusters are built exclusively 
for Spanish participants. This approach allows an examination of 
Spanish firms’ results that unfold before and after project completion 
using ANOVA tests, i.e., verifying differences between groups in terms of 
overall corporate performance (Return on Total Assets data from the 
SABI database – Bureau van Dijk). Using this method we might identify 
how such clusters evolve over time, since longer-term results according 
to clusters might be a hint of structural change. The timeframe for ROA 
analysis is relative, i.e., they comprise firms’ results from year -3 until 
year +3, where year 0 (zero) is the year of projects’ completion (2000-
2005). With this procedure (ex ante and ex post evaluation), we can 
avoid interferences of pre-existent characteristics in the evaluation, as 
well as erratic fluctuations. Furthermore, this approach complements the 
evaluation of Eureka projects’ impacts on firms’ overall performance.      
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Furthermore, we tested for differences between clusters in terms of some 
variables of interest, namely: TOT_COST, DURATION (via parametric tests, i.e., 
ANOVA), RATIO_RD, FUNCTIONING, and COUNTRY (via non-parametric tests, 
using Mann-Whitney U statistics, provided that these variables are ordinal). This 
assessment allows a deeper comprehension of clusters, as well as a 
complementary approach to relationships between variables that can indicate 
some form of association which can be regarded as an influential cause of success 
in international R&D cooperation projects.  
The use of clustering algorithms can be regarded as an interesting tool for 
policy monitoring and post hoc evaluation, since it offers a dynamic view of the 
interaction between influential variables in the determination of agents’ relative 
position in the process.  
 
  
7.2 Methodological Discussion 
 
 The methodological approach used in this assessment relies on a set of 
statistical techniques that are well-known, but to our knowledge have not been 
used jointly in an attempt of building an evaluation of firms’ participation in 
innovation related policy initiatives. This can potentially add relevant information on 
the debate on international R&D cooperation as well as serve as a starting point for 
alternative appraisals of similar economic phenomena.  
 What we tried to cope with was a manner of extracting valuable insights and 
conclusions from the data available, thus avoiding any kind of “obsession” with 
some specific method and then trying to adapt reality to a preexistent mindset. We 
understand that this is a weakness that many policy and scientific evaluations face: 
being purely led by technique or method (European Commission, 2002). In fact, 
there is a broad diversity of methods that can be applied in RTD policy evaluation, 
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suggesting that there are many dimensions of analysis existing in this context 
(European Commission, 2002). Our objective here is to contribute by making use 
of such a myriad of tools.  
 For some decades now, there has been great concern in analyzing if a RTD 
program can be defined as successful or not, and the widespread approach in the 
economic realm is that of quasi-experimental methodologies. For the case of 
Eureka, Bayona-Sáez and García-Marco (2010) have recently provided interesting 
results using this methodology through econometric regressions. The goal in such 
sort of research is to emulate a control group using companies under “treatment” 
(that have participated in a policy initiative) and other companies that have similar 
profiles and which did not receive any support (did not participate in such 
initiatives) (NIST, 2006). Results are likely to identify the effects of “treatment” 
being administered to these “patients”, since differences between similar 
companies should be attributed to the event being analyzed, i.e., the policy 
intervention. Therefore, this approach is regarded as an effective way of dealing 
with self-selection bias. 
A problem with such assessments concerns the impacts of innovation policy 
on firms’ results. Analysis that use corporate performance data (such as ROA) as 
dependent variables in econometric models, checking for impacts of a specific 
initiative without proper control variables can often be found in literature. Even an 
optimistic policymaker would not expect such a direct relationship that omits 
market oriented dimensions from the investigation (e.g., demand growth in 
particular sectors, firms’ rate of investment, industrial structure).  
This is more pronounced for Eureka individual projects, given its 
decentralized structured. This means that assessing projects’ results as 
homogeneous (even to a small extent) might lead to spurious results. Here, we 
understand homogeneity as the perspective that participation in Eureka is 
beneficial, regardless of actual achievements, as demonstrated in the work of 
Bayona-Sáez and García-Marco (2010). A simple exercise proves the validity of 
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Independent 
Variable
Year of 
Completion
Completion +1 Completion +2 Completion +3
TECHACHIEV
.208
(.093)
-.007
(.959)
-.132
(.305)
.097
(.455)
COM M ACHIEV
.099
(.805)
.056
(.684)
.046
(.730)
.020
(.884)
EXP_IM PACT -
.076
(.560)
.060
(.642)
.031
(.811)
R sq. .066 .012 .022 .012
Model Sig. .095 .853 .674 .849
Durbin Watson 2.057 2.138 1.952 1.788
Dependent variable: Return on Total Assets
Standardized Coefficients - Sig. in parentheses
such concern. We regressed 77 Spanish companies’ achievements 
(TECHACHIEV, COMMACHIEV, and EXP_IMPACT) on firms’ Return on Total 
Assets at the time of project completion (ranging from 2000 to 2005 for each firm) 
and on years +1, +2, and +3 to check for relationships (table 14)57.  
One would expect a positive relationship between independent and 
dependent variables if Eureka projects were to impact on firms’ overall corporate 
performance. However, as it can be noticed, this is not the case for any period. 
This assessment, together with quasi-experimental findings, suggests that 
companies differ in aspects other than those included in conventional models. 
Furthermore, it gives a strong hint in the direction of understanding that those 
companies that already outperform their “similar peers” are more prone to engage 
in such activities as those supported by Eureka. Perhaps the matching-samples do 
not match the “treated” sample as well as intended.  
        
 
 
  
 
 
 
Table 14. Regressions of Spanish firms’ outcomes from Eureka projects (2000-2005) on their 
overall corporate performance (Return on Total Assets for year of project completion, year 
+1, +2, +3) 
 
                                                          
57
 The variable EXP_IMPACT was not regressed for the year of project completion, since it is not 
likely to impact immediately on firms´ performance. This aspect is gathered by COMMACHIEV.   
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Are quasi-experimental methodologies a useful approach for RTD policy or 
any other kind of policy evaluation? Yes. Are they optimal? Not at all. Professor 
Giovanni Dosi in the opening speech of DIME’s Final Conference held in 
Maastricht, 2010, criticized the economic perspective that firms are equal, or 
possibly similar to some extent. Firms are different, he stated. It seems obvious, 
but for the sake of “good econometrics” this is often omitted. Quasi-experimental 
forms of analyzing firm behavior are bound to fail in capturing such differences, for 
one of its premises is to rely on the aforementioned “control group”.  
Moreover, it creates an aggregated figure of the situation, identifying if the 
initiative was or was not successful in terms of the relevant indicators under 
examination. This means that such approach does neither provide consistent 
answers on the heterogeneity of firms participating in a given program, nor 
information on the influential characteristics of such program on companies’ results 
(this view is also supported by Lepori, 2006).  
We recognize that there is a lack of approaches that aim at understanding 
quantitatively how such programs perform. Ultimately, it is not a program that 
succeeds or not, but agents. Programs might provide incentives for these agents, 
but their capabilities combined with market and other contextual contingencies that 
will determine economic (and also technological) performance. It is important to 
consider that in order to translate new scientific knowledge into commercial 
innovation is a process that involves obstacles and bottlenecks (Balconi, Brusoni & 
Orsenigo, 2010). Verifying factors other than just “better or worse than without the 
initiative” is fundamental for moving forward in RTD evaluation – thus avoiding a 
methodological lock-in.  
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7.4 Methodological Shortcomings 
 
 Our methods of choice offer some alternatives in explaining the 
phenomenon of R&D cooperation at the international level, covering some aspects 
that are usually neglected by the most usual econometric approaches. 
Nonetheless, this also represents that we had to incur in some tradeoffs, as well as 
in relevant shortcomings that deserve to be mentioned.  
 First of all, we recognize that, by using exclusively data from Eureka 
participants, self-selection issues arise (Branstetter & Sakakibara, 2002; Colombo 
& Garrone, 1996). As our goal is process oriented, i.e., it focuses on influential 
aspects on firms determinants of success (rather than in identifying if the initiative 
as a whole is effective or not), there is no reason to believe that such issue can be 
considered as significantly relevant. For obvious reasons, results should be 
regarded carefully for R&D cooperation that takes place outside of the Eureka 
framework, since such spurious inference might lead to misleading conclusions, 
even though outlined results can shed some light on these events.  
In this regard we must also understand that there is a variability of motives 
behind the engagement in R&D cooperation, which are hard to identify, but 
certainly influence the outcomes from collaboration. While some collaborative 
projects on R&D may signal only the limited internal capabilities of firms, others 
might be related to a more strategic sourcing of knowledge. Therefore, the 
comparison between different partnerships is complicated (Srholec, 2011a). 
 On a different subject, the approach used fails in providing answers to a 
systemic perspective of innovative outcomes. For as we tried to take into account 
results that unfold after the project completion, we deal with a limited timeframe, 
while the impact of RTD policy usually takes years to be fully visible (European 
Commission, 2006a). Furthermore, the demonstration of cause-effect relationships 
in innovation systems is often a problem for technological policy evaluation (Edler 
& Flanagan, 2011). Also, our analysis can deal with firm-level data only, where 
139 
 
analyzing firms participating in the Eureka initiative individually does not provide an 
assessment of the whole picture: an ideal approach would be to verify the 
performance dynamics of the consortia (Bayona-Sáez & García-Marco, 2010).  
This is an important feature to be considered and possibly tackled by future 
research, since international R&D cooperation, and especially the case of Eureka, 
is expected to have deep structural impacts that take a relatively long time span to 
create the desired outcomes, and even then, it can be an arduous – if possible – 
task to define causality. In this sense, there is currently a lack of indicators that can 
properly measure impacts of internationalized R&D activities (Edler & Flanagan, 
2011). In order to provide our conclusions, we cannot deal optimally with such 
matters, thus resorting to a simplification of facts in which a linear approach is used 
aiming at creating an analysis that is organized and structured in a workable 
manner (European Commission, 2002; Balconi, Brusoni & Orsenigo, 2010).   
 As we understand it, a good form of partially overcoming this situation is by 
applying social network analysis. Network analysis is a methodology of increasing 
interest in the evaluation of the dynamics of RTD programs’ evaluation (NIST, 
2006). It provides information regarding a network’s characteristics by using data 
on its size, density and knowledge flows, thus helping to predict and improve the 
quality of the network itself (US Department of Energy, 2007). This approach can 
be very useful in future developments of Eureka evaluation, especially because it 
provides information on behavioral patterns. But in order for such sort of 
assessment to take place, data must be properly gathered and structured. For this 
particular research, such “network data” was not available, thus our focus is solely 
directed to individual agents.  
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8. Results 
 
 In this chapter the results of analyses are presented. Initially, we provide an 
overview of data composition, i.e., descriptive statistics of variables. In a second 
moment we turn to the outcomes of each logistic equation, where lastly we provide 
a summary of findings that confront hypotheses with results from the empirical 
assessment. In the last part, clusters are developed, as well as statistically 
analyzed against a set of variables of interest, thus building a framework for the 
comprehension of firms’ profiles when engaging in international R&D cooperation.   
 
8.1 Sample Description 
 
  Descriptive statistics of data used in our analyses are presented in table 15. 
Composition of groups are provided considering: a) All countries (Spain, Italy, 
France, UK, and Germany); b) Benchmark countries (Italy, France, UK, and 
Germany); and c) Spain. This assessment is available for the 2000-2005 and 
2006-2008 datasets.  
As previously stated, it can be noticed that there are some changes in 
variables’ structures between these two periods of analysis. First of all, 
COMPETITOR and FUNCTIONING are not available for 2006-2008 data. Also, 
COMMACHIEV and EXP_IMPACT follow different categorical compositions 
regarding the form of assessment. TECHACHIEV, COMMACHIEV, and 
EXP_IMPACT are reported according to their original arrangements (not 
dichotomized), but their binary equivalent can be easily obtained through the 
replication of the simple procedure described in the methodology chapter (grouping 
of levels). Not all variables’ percentages sum up to 100% due to missing data.  
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All 
Countries
Benchmark 
Countries
Spain
All 
Countries
Benchmark 
Countries
Spain
SMEs 60.9% 60.1% 62.3% SMEs 70.4% 69.6% 72.2%
Large Companies 39.1% 39.9% 37.7% Large Companies 29.6% 30.4% 27.8%
<2% 15.3% 8.7% 27.3% <2% 16.5% 16.5% 17.6%
2 to 10% 45.6% 50.7% 36.4% 2 to 10% 41.7% 44.3% 36.1%
>10% 22.3% 28.3% 11.7% >10% 35.7% 32.9% 41.7%
COMPETITOR Yes 24.2% 24.6% 23.4%
Excellent 27.4% 28.3% 26.0%
Good 63.7% 65.2% 61.0%
Weak/Bad 7.9% 6.5% 10.4%
Laggard IS 35.8% - - Laggard IS 31.3% - -
Intermediate IS 36.3% 56.5% - Intermediate IS 23.5% 34.2% -
Leader IS 27.9% 43.5% - Leader IS 45.2% 65.8% -
PROD_INNO Yes 63.7% 60.9% 68.8% PROD_INNO Yes 63.5% 58.2% 75.0%
PROC_INNO Yes 50.2% 47.1% 55.8% PROC_INNO Yes 37.4% 35.4% 41.7%
SERV_INNO Yes 14.0% 11.6% 18.2% SERV_INNO Yes 22.6% 20.3% 27.8%
IND_EXP Yes 82.3% 82.6% 81.8% IND_EXP Yes 68.7% 64.6% 77.8%
STRAT_ALL Yes 17.7% 21.0% 11.7% STRAT_ALL Yes 29.6% 25.3% 38.9%
Excellent 25.1% 25.4% 24.7% Excellent 32.2% 26.6% 44.4%
Good 66.0% 65.2% 67.5% Good 55.7% 57.0% 52.8%
Weak 7.0% 6.5% 7.8% Weak 8.7% 12.7% -
Bad 1.9% 2.9% - Bad 3.5% 3.8% 2.8%
Excellent 8.8% 7.2% 11.7% 1 = Very low 52.2% 55.7% 44.4%
Good 43.3% 44.2% 41.6% < or = RTD investment 26.1% 22.8% 33.3%
Weak 21.9% 23.2% 37.7% 2-5 times RTD investment 16.5% 15.2% 19.4%
Bad 3.3% 3.6% 24.7% +-10 times RTD inv. 4.3% 5.1% 2.8%
<100 times RTD inv. - - -
More 0.9% 1.3% -
Very Large 5.1% 5.1% 5.2% 1 = Very low 15.7% 20.3% 5.6%
Large  20.5% 18.1% 24.7% < or = RTD investment 18.3% 20.3% 13.9%
Medium 36.7% 36.2% 37.7% 2-5 times RTD investment 38.3% 36.7% 41.7%
Small 25.1% 25.4% 24.7% +-10 times RTD inv. 25.2% 19.0% 38.9%
<100 times RTD inv. 1.7% 2.5% -
More 0.9% 1.0% -
All 
Countries
Benchmark 
Countries
Spain
All 
Countries
Benchmark 
Countries
Spain
TOT_COST
5.973
(14.521)
7.300
(17.422)
3.595
(6.138)
TOT_COST
2.615
(4.886)
2.736
(4.534)
2.350
(5.643)
DURATION
42.81
(21.195)
43.72
(21.413)
41.18
(20.839)
DURATION
34.30
(14.217)
35.24
(14.525)
32.22
(13.480)
7.8%12.6%
21.7%
15.2%
EXP_IMPACT
Percentage
2000-2005 2006-2008
Variable
M ean (Std. Dev. In parentheses)
Variable
M ean (Std. Dev. In parentheses)
TECHACHIEV
EXP_IMPACT
COMMACHIEV
Nil
Nil
ORG_TYPE
RATIO_RD
COUNTRY
2006-2008
CategoriesVariable
TECHACHIEV
COMMACHIEV
Percentage
2000-2005
CategoriesVariable
22.8% 7.8%
ORG_TYPE
RATIO_RD
FUNCTIONING
COUNTRY
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 15. Data description 
 
Categorical variables are described in terms of percentages in terms of the 
composition of datasets. At the bottom of table 15 we present a brief description of 
scale variables, i.e., TOT_COST and DURATION. 
The importance of this perspective lies in a primary observation of trends 
and characteristics of data which are applied in statistical models with inferential 
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content. Furthermore, some insights can be drawn for better interpretation of 
further assessments. 
In the Microeconomic Dimension, there is a predominance of SMEs over 
Large companies, with no clear distinction between subjects (all countries, 
benchmark countries, and Spain), showing a relatively stable trend, which 
increases by roughly 10% from the 2000-2005 period to 2006-2008. On the other 
hand, RATIO_RD puts Spain as a participant with low R&D intensity firms in 2000-
2005, whereas in 2006-2008 projects, such firms present a higher level of R&D 
investments in comparison to benchmark countries, especially regarding the 
highest level of R&D intensity (>10% of turnover). In general terms, the bulk of 
participants can be considered on the higher levels of innovative intensity (ranging 
from 2% to more than 10% of R&D expenditures in terms of its ratio with 
companies’ turnovers).  
Regarding the Contextual Dimension, Spain presents slightly worse results 
in terms of project functioning (FUNCTIONING) than the benchmark countries. 
Overall results point towards fair perceptions of such interactions (Excellent and 
Good classifications). The presence of competitors in cooperative projects 
(COMPETITORS) happens in about one quarter of cases. The mean of projects’ 
costs (TOT_COST) is a weak indicator, considering the high dispersion of results. 
A similar situation happens for projects’ duration (DURATION). Nonetheless, 
Spanish firms seem to engage in projects that cost less than those in which 
benchmark countries’ firms are involved, even though they have similar durations.  
The Macroeconomic Dimension which is approximated by the variable 
COUNTRY puts the laggard Innovation System (IS), i.e., Spain, with nearly one 
third of analyzed companies in both timeframes. In 2006-2008 the Leader IS 
(Germany) has a significant increase in terms of participation at the expense of 
Intermediate IS’ (France, Italy, and UK) firms, which decrease in contribution. 
The evaluation of types of achieved innovations (PROD_INNO, 
PROC_INNO, and SERV_INNO) suggests a higher level of the three kinds of 
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achievements for Spanish firms in comparison to the benchmark countries for both 
periods (which is in accordance with H5). The overall picture implies a strong 
orientation towards product innovation in Eureka projects, where process 
innovation plays a secondary role, and service innovation has a marginal 
significance. Results are also largely exploited by the end of projects (IND_EXP). 
In terms of the generation of strategic alliances (STRAT_ALL), this outcome varies 
between periods, and Spanish firms seem to have increased their relative position 
in terms of the generation of long-lasting international R&D networks.   
On the subject of general achievements, three variables are considered: 
TECHACHIEV, COMMACHIEV, and EXP_IMPACT. TECHACHIEV highlights the 
high rate of technological/technical success of Eureka projects, and Spanish firms 
again plays a leading role in terms of successful results (combination of Excellent 
and Good technological achievements), which provides another support for H5. 
Nonetheless, this high concentration of positive results in technological aspects of 
cooperation indicates statistical constraints for logistic models. Furthermore, even 
though this aspect emerges as a positive situation at first, it might also indicate the 
precision of Georghiou’s (2001) criticism of diminishing quality of Eureka’s 
innovation projects, where “safer” intentions might lead to better outcomes. 
However, this consistency of successful results vanishes when analyzing 
market outcomes, as well as future expected impacts. Positive COMMACHIEV 
results (considered as those rated as Excellent and Good in the 2000-2005 
dataset, and those that exceed the R&D investment in at least twice its amount for 
2006-2008 data) represent roughly 50% of cases in the 2000-2005 period across 
groups (All countries, Benchmark countries, and Spain), and about 20% for the 
2006-2008 timeframe. However, in both cases, Spanish firms perform somewhat 
better than those from benchmark nations. For the EXP_IMPACT variable, results 
vary between datasets, where for 2006-2008 projects, future impacts seem to be 
more significant. Again, there is an indication that Spanish firms achieve better 
outcomes.                
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8.2 Analysis of Logistic Regressions 
 
In this part of the analysis of results, focus will be directed to logistic 
regressions. Each section contains the respective approaches for 2000-2005 and 
2006-2008 estimations. Also, results are presented jointly for theoretically 
grounded equations (2-4) and the correspondent ad hoc assessments (5-7). 
Exception is made for Equation 8, which does not contain a correspondent 
approach based on theory.  
For a thorough examination of relationships between variables and their 
statistical validity, preliminary assessments are provided before actual estimations’ 
reports. This was done through the analysis of crude odds-ratio results, i.e., a 
bivariate estimation of logistic association between each predictor and dependent 
variables. Also, non-parametric correlations (Spearman’s rho coefficients) are 
presented.  
The last part of the analysis of logistic regressions brings a summary of 
results of the set of equations (Equations 2, 3, and 4) which test the hypotheses of 
this research. Findings are confronted with expected results according to each 
hypothesis, thus allowing a comprehension of empirical implications for 
investigation on international R&D cooperation.  
 
 
8.2.1 Equations 2 and 5 
 
 This section presents the results of analyses undertaken for equations 2 and 
5 in periods 2000-2005 and 2006-2008.  Such estimations consider the variable 
TECHACHIEV as the dependent element of regressions, where results take the 
value of 0 whenever they were regarded as “failures” (Weak and Bad 
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Technological Outcomes), and the value of 1 when they were perceived as 
“successes” (Excellent and Good Technological Outcomes). A first shortcoming of 
these equations is represented by the general feature of this variable: as reported 
in the description of datasets, “success” represent a high proportion of results 
(around 90% of cases), thus interfering with statistical prowess to provide relevant 
results for identification of determinants.  
 In the 2000-2005 estimations, preliminary assessments show significant 
values for crude odds-ratio regarding the variables FUNCTIONING, PROD_INNO, 
and PROC_INNO. Such relationships are also supported by significant non-
parametric correlations (table 16). Results indicate that better rates of projects’ 
functioning are associated with success in the achievement of positive 
technological results. The same is true for the attainment of product and process 
innovations, but not for service innovations, which can be related to the intangible 
character of innovations in this latter aspect (even though SERV_INNO is 
significantly correlated with PROD_INNO in this case). Microeconomic dimension’s 
variables, as well as Macroeconomic, do not receive statistical support concerning 
their influence on technological achievements. 
 Some further exploration of preliminary results shows a higher propensity of 
Large Companies in achieving positive technological outcomes, provided that its 
crude odds-ratio exceeds the benchmark of 1 designated for SMEs, even though 
this indication is not statistically significant. Similarly, higher rates of R&D intensity 
are related to better technological results (not significantly). However, TOT_COST 
(p = .379) suggests that higher levels of investment are related to worse 
technological results.  
 On the macroeconomic dimension, levels of significance are well above 
common thresholds of statistical relevance for relationships with TECHACHIEV, 
but it is interesting to notice a correlation coefficient that indicates higher R&D 
intensities (RATIO_RD) in firms belonging to more developed Innovation Systems. 
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Dimension Independent Variable D.V. Description
TECHACHIEV 
SUCCESS (1) 
Crude Odds Ratio - 
Exp (B)
Confidence Interval 
(95%)
Sig. 
Large Company (1) 88.1% 1.832 .711 - 4.716 .210
SME (0) 93.1% 1 - -
<2% (1) 90.9% .667 .126 - 3.526 .633
2-10% (2) 89.8% .587 .154 - 2.239 .435
>10% (3 - Ref. Cat.) 93.8% 1 - -
Yes (1) 92.3% 1.216 .385 - 3.841 .739
No (0) 90.8% 1 - -
Excellent (1) 94.9% 7.778 1.632 - 37.059 .010
Good (2) 92% 4.773 1.421 - 16.032 .011
Weak/Bad (3 - Ref. Cat.) 70.6% 1 - -
Spain (1) 92.2% 1.038 .301 - 3.576 .953
Intermediate ISs (2) 89.5% .746 .231 - 2.406 .623
Leader IS (3 - Ref. Cat.) 91.9% 1 - -
Yes (1) 97.1% 7.917 2.524 - 24.827 .000
No (0) 80.8% 1 - -
Yes (1) 99.1% 21.640 2.833 - 165.302 .003
No (0) 83.2% 1 - -
Yes (1) 96.7% 3.126 .402 -  24.327 .276
No (0) 90.3% 1 - -
.379
PROC_INNO
SERV_INNO
.967 - 1.013.990TOT_COST M. Euro -
Macroeconomic COUNTRY
PROD_INNO
COMPETITOR
FUNCTIONING
Microeconomic
ORG_TYPE
RATIO_RD
Ad hoc
Contextual
TECHACHIEV ORG_TYPE FUNCTIONING COUNTRY COM PETITOR TOT_COST RATIO_RD PROD_INNO PROC_INNO SERV_INNO
TECHACHIEV 1
ORG_TYPE -.087 1
FUNCTIONING -.156* .017 1
COUNTRY -.008 .045 -.073 1
COM PETITOR .023 .037 -.094 .112 1
TOT_COST .110 .246** .055 .124 .118 1
RATIO_RD .041 -.364** -.025 .227** .064 -.066 1
PROD_INNO .276** -.149* -.082 -.101 -.093 .003 .008 1
PROC_INNO .280** -.080 -.113 -0.65 .041 .035 -.093 .158* 1
SERV_INNO .078 -.157* .025 -.036 .023 -.027 .077 .220** .025 1
* Correlation is signif icant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
** Correlation is signif icant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 16. Equations 2 and 5 (2000-2005): Crude Odds-Ratio and Non-Parametric (Spearman) Correlations 
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Table 17. Equations 2 and 5 (2000-2005): Logistic regressions’ results 
 
 In table 17, results for the multivariate binary logistic regressions 
corresponding to equations 2 and 5 (2000-2005) perform consistently with 
preliminary statistics. Equation 2 is significant as a whole, according to the 
Hosmer-Lemeshow Test for goodness-of-fit, indicating that the model adequately 
fits the data. However, both Nagelkerke R2 and the evaluation of the model’s 
correct predictions in comparison to an intercept only assessment show a weak 
explanatory power. Similar conclusions can be made for the ad hoc equation 
Independent Variable
Equation 2 Equation 5
Large Company (1)
.696
(.555)
-
SME (0) - -
Yes (1)
1.412
(.667)
-
No (0) - -
Excellent (1)
5.634
(.063)
7.403
(.030)
Good (2)
3.616
(.105)
5.261
(.028)
Weak/Bad (3 - Ref. Cat.) - -
<2% (1)
.745
(.764)
-
2-10% (2)
.726
(.670)
-
>10% (3 - Ref. Cat.) - -
Spain (1)
.597
(.511)
-
Intermediate ISs (2)
.593
(484)
-
Leader IS (3 - Ref. Cat.) - -
Yes (1) -
7.330
(.002)
No (0) - -
Yes (1) -
16.757
(.007)
No (0) - -
Yes (1) -
1.664
(.649)
No (0) - -
.980 .672
.077 .362
91% 91.1%
91% 91.5%% of Correct Predictions
COMPETITOR
FUNCTIONING
Adjusted Odds Ratio - Exp (B)
Sig. in parentheses
% of Correct Predictions (Intercept Only)
.987
(.335)
-
PROD_INNO
PROC_INNO
SERV_INNO
Hosmer-Lemeshow  Test
Nagelkerke R sq.
ORG_TYPE
RATIO_RD
COUNTRY
TOT_COST Million Euro
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(Equation 5), even though there is an increase in regression’s fit. This can be 
explained by the inclusion of PROD_INNO and PROC_INNO, variables which were 
identified as having potential influence over TECHACHIEV.   
 Even though FUNCTIONING is not significant at 5% in Equation 2, an 
Excellent rate of functioning has an Adjusted Odds-Ratio that represents a positive 
influence on technological attainments at a level of significance of 10%. On the 
other hand, this does not hold for Good functioning in Equation 2 (it is slightly 
above 10%). Nevertheless this provides an indication of the importance of such 
aspect in determining technical outcomes in international R&D projects, controlling 
for the set of theoretically grounded variables included in this equation. 
 In the ad hoc approach, FUNCTIONING was kept in the analysis, provided 
its statistical significance and the three possible types of innovation were added. 
Coefficients and relevance of variables indicate that better technological outcomes 
are related to PROC_INNO more than to any other variable of this model. The 
existence of Excellent levels of projects’ functioning and the achievement of 
product innovations have similar impacts on technical outcomes, where Good 
project functioning also is statistically relevant as a predictor of technological 
success. The case of SERV_INNO indicates a positive relationship with the 
dependent variable, but this cannot be regarded as statistically representative.  
 When we turn to the 2006-2008 dataset (Equations 2 and 5, tables 18 and 
19) some relevant differences with the 2000-2005 period can be noticed. First of 
all, we remind that the variable FUNCTIONING, which turned out to be a significant 
determinant of technological achievements, is not available in this case. However, 
using the crude odds-ratio table and the Spearman’s rho correlation coefficients in 
a direct comparison with the 2000-2005 application of Equations 2 and 5, 
PROD_INNO, and PROC_INNO keep their validity as ad hoc predictors for 
technical success in international R&D cooperation, whereas SERV_INNO does 
not show statistical relevance.  
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TECHACHIEV ORG_TYPE COUNTRY TOT_COST RATIO_RD PROD_INNO PROC_INNO SERV_INNO
TECHACHIEV 1
ORG_TYPE -.050 1
COUNTRY -.183 .003 1
TOT_COST -.139 .212* -.191* 1
RATIO_RD -.100 -.265** -.047 -0.16 1
PROD_INNO .380** -.142 -.100 -.152 -.010 1
PROC_INNO .233* .090 -.015 .026 -.064 .176 1
SERV_INNO .138 -.122 -.139 .089 -.173 .108 .227* 1
** Correlation is signif icant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
* Correlation is signif icant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 18. Equations 2 and 5 (2006-2008): Crude Odds-Ratio and Non-Parametric (Spearman) Correlations 
Dimension Independent Variable D.V. Description
TECHACHIEV 
SUCCESS (1) 
Crude Odds Ratio - 
Exp (B)
Confidence Interval 
(95%)
Sig. 
Large Company (1) 85.3% .725 .224 - 2.348 .592
SME (0) 88.9% 1 - -
<2% (1) 89.5% 1.750 .328 - 9.351 .513
2-10% (2) 91.7% 2.265 .613 - 8.372 .220
>10% (3 - Ref. Cat.) 82.9% 1 - -
Spain (1) 97.2% 7.326 .885 - 60.642 .065
Intermediate ISs (2) 85.2% 1.203 .334 - 4.337 .777
Leader IS (3 - Ref. Cat.) 82.7% 1 - -
Yes (1) 97.3% 14.200 2.994 - 67.346 .001
No (0) 71.4% 1 - -
Yes (1) 97.7% 9.254 1.165 - 73.491 .035
No (0) 81.9% 1 - -
Yes (1) 96.2% 4.276 .532 - 34.351 .172
No (0) 85.4% 1 - -
Contextual TOT_COST M. Euro
Ad hoc
Macroeconomic
PROD_INNO
PROC_INNO
SERV_INNO
COUNTRY
Microeconomic
ORG_TYPE
RATIO_RD
- 1.007 .891 - 1.138 .911
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  Furthermore, in this preliminary assessment, it should be noticed that 
Spanish firms show significant better technological outcomes than firms from 
intermediate (Italy, UK, and France) and leading (Germany) Innovation Systems 
(this result did not hold for the equivalent estimation for period 2000-2005). In the 
microeconomic dimension, neither RATIO_RD nor ORG_TYPE contribute to the 
analysis. Nonetheless, coefficients suggest that companies with intermediate R&D 
intensity are those that benefit more from projects in technical terms (followed by 
companies with low R&D intensity). This could be interpreted using the concepts of 
absorptive capacity and distance from technological frontier, i.e., those companies 
above a threshold of available knowledge will perform better than the technological 
leaders from cooperative projects.  
As this situation is not consistent with the previous (2000-2005) analysis, 
this interpretation cannot be regarded as consistent (similar variability happens for 
the variable ORG_TYPE, where analogous interpretations and considerations 
apply). It should also be pointed out that the distribution structure of ultimate 
technical outcomes is strongly biased towards successful projects. This statistical 
shortcoming may explain the inconsistencies between periods of analysis. A 
confirmation of this shortcoming in equations 2 and 5 can be seen in the model´s 
overall indicators for the period 2006-2008 (which are somewhat similar to those 
found in the 2000-2005 approach). Even though the Hosmer-Lemeshow test (table 
19) validates the significance of the group of predictors, Nagelkerke’s R2 is 
particularly small for Equation 2, and the classification capacity of models (both 
equations) does not increase with predictors in a direct comparison to the model 
based only on the intercept.  
The evaluation of variables’ features in the multivariate binary logistic 
regression performs as expected, according to the preliminary tables. The only 
significant variable in equation 2 is COUNTRY for the case of Spanish firms, with 
an adjusted odds-ratio that exceeds those of intermediate ISs and Leader 
(Reference Category).  
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Table 19. Equations 2 and 5 (2006-2008): Logistic regressions’ results 
 
 However, when controlling for the ad hoc variables, COUNTRY/Spanish 
firms loses ground in terms of statistical significance, where PROD_INNO stands 
as the main determinant of technical success in Eureka’s projects. PROC_INNO 
also should be regarded as an important aspect in this case. If we confront these 
results with those of the 2000-2005 analysis, we find a robust evidence that 
tangible innovations are more likely to be related to successful projects (in 
technical terms) than service innovations (which are largely intangible). This is not 
surprising when thinking that such results apply for international RD cooperation, 
Independent Variable
Equation 2 Equation 5
Large Company (1)
.584
(.472)
-
SME (0) - -
<2% (1)
2.447
(.342)
-
2-10% (2)
2.954
(.123)
-
>10% (3 - Ref. Cat.) - -
Spain (1)
7.242
(.070)
5.715
(.126)
Intermediate ISs (2)
.984
(.981)
1.714
(.474)
Leader IS (3 - Ref. Cat.) - -
1.037
(.633)
-
Yes (1) -
10.572
(.004)
No (0) - -
Yes (1) -
6.442
(.095)
No (0) - -
Yes (1) -
2.235
(.490)
No (0) - -
.270 .786
.130 .380
88% 87.8%
88% 87.8%
Hosmer-Lemeshow  Test
Nagelkerke R sq.
% of Correct Predictions
% of Correct Predictions (intercept only)
SERV_INNO
PROD_INNO
PROC_INNO
COUNTRY
TOT_COST
ORG_TYPE
RATIO_RD
Million Euro 
Adjusted Odds Ratio - Exp (B)
Sig. in parentheses
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being Research and Development strongly oriented towards product and process 
innovation.  
 
8.2.2  Equations 3 and 6 
 
 This step takes into account a market oriented perspective as the 
dependent variable in the analysis: COMMACHIEV. As previously stated, 
evaluation of results between periods can be rather sensitive to alterations in 
scales and structures of measurements. Please, refer to table 10 and notes on the 
methodological sections for a discussion on this regard. Furthermore, descriptive 
statistics (table 15), highlight homogeneous groups in terms of what we classify as 
commercial “success” and “failure” in comparison to the variable TECHACHIEV. A 
priori, this represents a better statistical fit for binary logistic regressions.  
 Starting with the preliminary statistics (crude odds-ratio and Spearman’s rho 
correlation coefficients) for the 2000-2005 dataset, some interesting insights arise. 
FUNCTIONING is significant at both Excellent and Good levels, since both exceed 
the value assigned to the Reference Category (Weak/Bad). This is in accordance 
to results found for Equations 2 and 5 (2000-2005), supporting the idea that 
partners’ capacity of properly managing an international R&D cooperation project is 
a relevant determinant of ultimate success (in both technical and commercial 
dimensions). Also, technological achievements (TECHACHIEV) appear as an 
important predictor of market success, which puts this feature as a necessary 
condition for appropriation of innovations in the economic realm.  
 The capacity of having industrial exploitation of results (IND_EXP) by the 
end of projects is also a significant factor of success. But if we turn to descriptive 
statistics, we can find that the occurrence of such activity (industrial exploitation) 
exceeds that of commercial success, indicating an approximation of a “rate of 
commercial failure”, i.e., projects that reached practical application but did not 
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result in beneficial commercial impacts, which is an expected phenomenon in the 
study of innovation economics and management (representing commercialization 
risks). An additional aspect related to IND_EXP is its significant correlation with 
TECHACHIEV, which provides further support for the expectation that technical 
aspects are a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for market performance. 
Results also indicate an acceptable level of significance for PROD_INNO and 
PROC_INNO, designating a consistent pattern in terms of supporting a relationship 
between projects’ success and tangibility of innovative attainments.  
 In this case, the Macroeconomic Dimension of the equation can be 
disregarded as an influential factor. Not only its related instruments are not 
significant, but values are close to the benchmark set for the Reference Category, 
thus not indicating any relevant information for the model. For the Microeconomic 
dimension, represented in these equations by the variable ORG_TYPE, results are 
not significant in this preliminary assessment, even though the coefficient suggests 
a weak relationship between SMEs and better commercial achievements.  In the 
Contextual dimension, besides TECHACHIEV, IND_EXP, and FUNCTIONING, the 
existence of rival firms in the network (COMPETITOR) and its duration 
(DURATION) did not show any evidence of statistical significance.  
 Outcomes of the multivariate binary logistic estimation for Equation 3 are 
shown in table 21 and they basically confirm the perceptions brought by the 
bivariate estimations form crude odds-ratio analysis, as well as the non-parametric 
correlation matrix. Model’s overall estimates for this particular equation provide 
information that allows confirming its adequate fit. Hosmer-Lemeshow exceeds the 
statistical threshold at 1%, 5%, and 10% of model’s validity, while Nagelkerke’s R2 
and the difference between the percentages of correct predictions with predictors 
versus the intercept only estimation indicate an acceptable explanatory capacity of 
this regression.    
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Dimension Independent Variable D.V. Description
COMMACHIEV 
SUCCESS (1) 
Crude Odds Ratio - 
Exp (B)
Confidence Interval 
(95%)
Sig. 
Large Company (1) 46.4% .689 .397 - 1.194 .184
SME (0) 55.7% 1 - -
Yes (1) 62.1% 29.552 6.891 - 126.732 .000
No (0) 5.3% 1 - -
Yes (1) 52.8% .895 .479 - 1.672 .729
No (0) 50% 1 - -
Success (1) 56.6% 23.506 3.077 - 179.584 .002
Failure (0) 5.3% 1 - -
Excellent (1) 62.7% 26.909 3.335 - 217.136 .002
Good (2) 54% 18.794 2.424 - 145.700 .005
Weak/Bad (3 - Ref. Cat.) 5.9% 1 - -
Spain (1) 53.2% 1.068 .547 - 2.086 .848
Intermediate ISs (2) 51.3% .988 .505 - 1.933 .972
Leader IS (3 - Ref. Cat.) 51.6% 1 - -
Yes (1) 60.6% 2.597 1.464 - 4.606 .001
No (0) 37.2% 1 - -
Yes (1) 60.2% 1.930 1.122 - 3.319 .018
No (0) 43.9% 1 - -
Yes (1) 63.3% 1.709 .770 - 3.790 .187
No (0) 50.3% 1 - -
Ad hoc
Contextual DURATION Months - 1.001 .989 - 1.014 .847
COUNTRYMacroeconomic
TECHACHIEV
PROD_INNO
PROC_INNO
SERV_INNO
ORG_TYPE
COMPETITOR
FUNCTIONING
IND_EXP
Microeconomic
COM M ACHIEV TECHACHIEV ORG_TYPE FUNCTIONING COUNTRY COM PETITOR DURATION IND_EXP PROD_INNO PROC_INNO SERV_INNO
COM M ACHIEV 1
TECHACHIEV .292** 1
ORG_TYPE -.091 -.087 1
FUNCTIONING -.235** -.156* .017 1
COUNTRY -.014 -.008 .045 -.073 1
COM PETITOR -.024 .023 .037 -.094 .112 1
DURATION -.007 .015 .208** .078 .117 .121 1
IND_EXP .434** .371** -.154* -.190** .049 .091 .038 1
PROD_INNO .225** .276** -.149* -.082 -.101 -.093 -.006 .259** 1
PROC_INNO .163* .280** -.080 -.113 -.065 .041 .082 .222** .158* 1
SERV_INNO .091 .078 -.157* .025 -.036 .023 -.024 .081 .220** .025 1
* Correlation is signif icant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
** Correlation is signif icant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 20. Equations 3 and 6 (2000-2005): Crude Odds-Ratio and Non-Parametric (Spearman) Correlations 
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Table 21. Equations 3 and 6 (2000-2005): Logistic regressions’ results 
 
In Equation 6, the lack of individual significance for the variables 
TECHACHIEV, PROD_INNO, and PROC_INNO is in conflict with the preliminary 
indicators, suggesting the existence of collinearity effects among these variables 
(which is supported by their significant correlation coefficients). Nonetheless, the 
general features of the model remain relatively stable in a direct comparison to 
Independent Variable
Equation 3 Equation 6
Large Company (1)
.910
(.780)
-
SME (0) - -
Yes (1)
.626
(.215)
-
No (0) - -
Excellent (1)
18.455
(.009)
18.800
(.008)
Good (2)
12.921
(.019)
14.494
(.014)
Weak/Bad (3 - Ref. Cat.) - -
Success (1)
8.329
(.007)
3.323
(.165)
Failure (0) - -
Yes (1)
13.828
(.000)
12.146
(.000)
No (0) - -
Spain (1)
1.296
(.515)
-
Intermediate ISs (2)
1.067
(.871)
-
Leader IS (3 - Ref. Cat.) - -
Yes (1) -
1.752
(.106)
No (0) - -
Yes (1) -
1.163
(.643)
No (0) - -
Yes (1) -
1.324
(.548)
No (0) - -
.636 .902
.326 .333
52.6% 52.6%
73.2% 73.2%
Hosmer-Lemeshow  Test
Nagelkerke R sq.
% of Correct Predictions (Intercept only)
% of Correct Predictions
1.002
(.828)
SERV_INNO
PROD_INNO
PROC_INNO
COUNTRY
DURATION Months
Adjusted Odds Ratio - Exp (B)
Sig. in parentheses
ORG_TYPE
COMPETITOR
FUNCTIONING
-
TECHACHIEV
IND_EXP
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those of Equation 3, indicating a strong influence of FUNCTIONING and IND_EXP 
as core determinants of ultimate commercial achievements.  
It is interesting to remind that projects’ functioning already performed 
significantly in the TECHACHIEV model (especially for the Excellent Functioning 
instrument). This contextual feature of projects seems to lie at the heart of 
networks’ success, providing H2 with robust support from empirical data. 
Unfortunately, for the 2006-2008 approach (tables 22 and 23), 
FUNCTIONING is not available for analysis, thus making it difficult the comparison 
between datasets, provided that this element has been proven useful in 
determining firms’ outcomes from international collaborative R&D projects. The 
bivariate estimations for crude odds-ratio and correlations between pairs of 
variables indicate the maintenance of IND_EXP validity (at 10%), while 
TECHACHIEV is (somewhat surprisingly) not relevant in this case. On the 
Microeconomic Dimension, ORG_TYPE suggests that Large Companies 
experience better commercial achievements, but without statistical relevance.  
Spain, or Spanish firms (as an instrument of COUNTRY), which resulted 
significant in Equation 2 (2006-2008), becomes irrelevant when considering the 
market perspective. DURATION slightly exceeds the 10% threshold of significance, 
but its odds-ratio suggests the opposite of the logical expectation, where projects 
with shorter durations are related to better market results. One possible 
explanation for this is related to the hypothesis that the capacity of firms generating 
marketable products in successful conditions is related to a shorter time-to-market 
period. However, this is only speculation, since the 2000-2005 dataset does not 
provide any support for such conclusion (statistical measurements of relevance 
also do not comply with this trend). 
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Table 22. Equations 3 and 6 (2006-2008): Crude Odds-Ratio and Non-Parametric (Spearman) Correlations 
Dimension Independent Variable D.V. Description
COMMACHIEV 
SUCCESS (1) 
Crude Odds Ratio - 
Exp (B)
Confidence Interval 
(95%)
Sig. 
Large Company (1) 26.5% 1.462 .572 - 3.736 .427
SME (0) 19.8% 1 - -
Yes (1) 26.6% 2.897 .914 - 9.176 .071
No (0) 11.1% 1 - -
Success (1) 23.8% 4.052 .504 - 32.594 .188
Failure (0) 7.1% 1 - -
Spain (1) 22.2% 1.065 .380 - 2.982 .905
Intermediate ISs (2) 22.2% 1.065 .346 - 3281 .913
Leader IS (3 - Ref. Cat.) 21.2% 1 - -
Yes (1) 30.1% 5.608 1.565 - 20.095 .008
No (0) 7.1% 1 - -
Yes (1) 30.2% 2.167 .882 - 5.322 .092
No (0) 16.7% 1 - -
Yes (1) 42.3% 3.929 1.497 - 10.310 .005
No (0) 15.7% 1 - -
Ad hoc
PROD_INNO
Contextual DURATION Months -
PROC_INNO
SERV_INNO
Microeconomic ORG_TYPE
IND_EXP
TECHACHIEV
.939 - 1.008 .129
Macroeconomic COUNTRY
.973
COM M ACHIEV TECHACHIEV ORG_TYPE COUNTRY DURATION IND_EXP PROD_INNO PROC_INNO SERV_INNO
COM M ACHIEV 1
TECHACHIEV .132 1
ORG_TYPE .074 -.050 1
COUNTRY -.012 -.183 .003 1
DURATION -.190* -.099 .133 -.004 1
IND_EXP .174 .207* -.056 -.128 -.139 1
PROD_INNO .268** .380** -.142 -.100 -.172 .189* 1
PROC_INNO .159 .233* .090 -.015 .056 .057 .176 1
SERV_INNO .270** .138 -.122 -.139 -.021 .096 .108 .227* 1
** Correlation is signif icant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
* Correlation is signif icant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
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Furthermore, ad hoc variables (PROD_INNO, PROC_INNO, SERV_INNO) 
are all statistically significant and their presence is related to better market 
performance of projects’ results. In this case, SERV_INNO presents an interesting 
statistical merit within this group of predictors. This can be interpreted as an 
indication of the relevance of such variable, even when it does not correspond to 
technical aspects of projects. 
In the multivariate estimations (table 23 below), results provide rather blurry 
information on the determinants of commercial achievements for the period under 
scrutiny.  
 
 
Table 23. Equations 3 and 6 (2006-2008): Logistic regressions’ results 
 
 
Independent Variable
Equation 3 Equation 6
Large Company (1)
1.862
(.226)
SME (0) - -
Success (1)
3.410
(.267)
Failure (0) - -
Yes (1)
2.550
(.125)
2.518
(.146)
No (0) - -
Spain (1)
.764
(.633)
Intermediate ISs (2)
1.217
(.747)
Leader IS (3 - Ref. Cat.) - -
Yes (1) -
4.879
(.019)
No (0) - -
Yes (1) -
1.567
(.372)
No (0) - -
Yes (1) -
3.379
(.021)
No (0) - -
.772 .847
.114 .232
78.3% 78.3%
78.3% 78.3%
SERV_INNO
Hosmer-Lemeshow  Test
Nagelkerke R sq.
PROC_INNO
PROD_INNO
% of Correct Predictions (Intercept only)
% of Correct Predictions
.971
(.127)
Adjusted Odds Ratio - Exp (B)
Sig. in parentheses
ORG_TYPE
TECHACHIEV
IND_EXP
COUNTRY
DURATION Months
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 Whereas the model as a whole is significant, it neither contributes 
importantly to the classification of cases, nor presents predictors with individual 
significance (Equation 3). IND_EXP, which was perceived as significant in the 
bivariate procedures, becomes statistically irrelevant. This highlights a possible 
case of collinearity between this variable and TECHACHIEV, according to 
correlation coefficients. Nonetheless, we keep this variable in Equation 6, given 
that TECHACHIEV is not present in this case and considering its original 
relevance.  
 In Equation 6, there is an increase in Nagelkerke’s R2, but the capacity of 
correctly classifying cases is not incremented with the predictors in comparison to 
the estimation using only the intercept, indicating a structural weakness of such 
assessment. Again, IND_EXP indicates a positive influence on market outcomes, 
but without statistical significance. This can possibly be in function of this particular 
variable’s relationship with PROD_INNO (see table 22 for correlation coefficients). 
PROD_INNO, and SERV_INNO come out as the main aspects influencing such 
results for companies in the 2006-2008 period, where it is worth noticing the 
presence of a relatively high correlation between the latter and PROC_INNO.  
 Such results are partially in accordance with estimations for 2000-2005, 
especially when considering the directions of influence (positive or negative) for the 
variables TECHACHIEV, IND_EXP, DURATION, PROD_INNO, PROC_INNO, and 
SERV_INNO. On the other hand, these aspects lack statistical significance, being 
rather suggestive, not conclusive.  
 
8.2.3 Equations 4 and 7 
 
 This section approaches results for Equations 4 and 7, which deal with the 
variable EXP_IMPACT as the dependent element in regressions. This particular 
item deals with relatively higher levels of subjectivity, since it is based on 
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perceptions of future returns arising from international R&D cooperation projects. 
Nonetheless, expectations are known to play a decisive role in economics, shaping 
today’s behavior in face of envisaged scenarios. Considering this logic, such 
results can be considered as valid instruments for such evaluation. Furthermore, 
future impacts (or expected future impacts) represent an important feature of 
innovative projects, since time-to-market for products, process, or services is not 
immediate.  
 Table 24 brings results for the preliminary assessments on models’ 
characteristics (2000-2005). In this case, TECHACHIEV does not come out as a 
relevant determinant of future success. This gives a hint on the systemic role 
played by Eureka in increasing firms’ competitiveness in the longer run, even if by 
the end of projects, expected technical results were not achieved. Thus, such 
projects might actually increase participants’ competitiveness, even when they are 
not regarded as “successful” by the time of their completion. Nonetheless, this is a 
suggestion, not a conclusive statement, since statistical evidence provides no 
robust information in this case.  
 On its turn, the instrument “Excellent” from the variable FUNCTIONING is 
also significant, and its crude-odds ratio indicates that projects having an 
outstanding level of coordination are more likely to be related to positive future 
returns. However, projects with Good functioning do not perform in the same 
direction, since this instrument is not significant, and its coefficient indicates a 
lower probability of future success than the reference category (Weak/Bad 
functioning). Nonetheless, the non-parametric correlation coefficient indicates a 
significant and relatively high connection between FUNCTIONING and 
EXP_IMPACT, thus pointing towards a moderate association between these 
variables.  
 On the Microeconomic dimension, it is valid to affirm that SMEs expect 
better outcomes in the future (arising as a result of their participation in such 
projects) than Large Companies. This leads us towards the expectation that such 
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firms increase their absorptive capacity through participation in international R&D 
networks, thus benefitting from these activities in the long run, while results for 
Large Firms are not expected to have such a relevant impact. COMPETITOR is not 
significant in this analysis, maintaining its characteristic of being a weak predictor 
of success in international R&D collaboration.   
 On the Macroeconomic dimension, instruments of the variable COUNTRY 
perform significantly, and according to theoretical expectations (further discussions 
on the relationships between empirical results and theoretically grounded 
hypotheses are offered below). Spanish firms are more likely than those from 
intermediate Innovation Systems to foresee positive outcomes, whereas those 
from intermediate ISs are more likely than those from the Leader IS to expect good 
results in the future. This indicates some level of convergence in the long run, 
where firms from relatively laggard systems benefit more from international R&D 
networks than those firms from Innovation Systems that are in a relatively better 
position (based on our limited sample). This is especially true for Spain, since its 
Eureka’s projects are largely connected with organizations from more advanced 
economies (apart from Portugal). Nonetheless, this can be contingent upon 
expectation levels.  
 In terms of the ad hoc variables, only PROD_INNO results as a significant 
predictor in this bivariate analysis (crude odds-ratio), where firms with product 
innovation seem to have twice the probability of those which are not involved with 
such kind of innovation when considering their expectations of future 
achievements.  
 In the multivariate estimations (table 25), the overall statistics of the model 
are reasonable. There is a small increase in the classification capacity with the use 
of predictors (for both Equations 4 and 7). Nagelkerke’s R2 is acceptable, and the 
general estimations are significant (Hosmer-Lemeshow tests). Individual variables’ 
characteristics remain similar to those of preliminary assessments, thus providing a 
relatively accurate diagnosis of models’ stability.  
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Table 24. Equations 4 and 7 (2000-2005): Crude Odds-Ratio and Non-Parametric (Spearman) Correlations 
Dimension Independent Variable D.V. Description
POSITIVE 
EXP_IMPACT (1) 
Crude Odds Ratio - 
Exp (B)
Confidence Interval 
(95%)
Sig. 
Large Company (1) 16.7% .439 .222 - .869 .018
SME (0) 31.3% 1 - -
Yes (1) 23.1% .837 .402 - 1.743 .635
No (0) 26.4% 1 - -
Excellent (1) 50.8% 4.828 1.255 - 18.573 .022
Good (2) 16.1% .893 .237 - 3.368 .867
Weak/Bad (3 - Ref. Cat.) 17.6% 1 - -
Success (1) 26.5% 1.926 .539 - 6.880 .313
Failure (0) 15.8% 1 - -
Spain (1) 29.9% 2.414 1.021 - 5.706 .045
Intermediate ISs (2) 29.5% 2.320 1.003 - 5.598 .049
Leader IS (3 - Ref. Cat.) 15% 1 - -
Yes (1) 30.7% 2.211 1.100 - 4.440 .026
No (0) 16.7% 1 - -
Yes (1) 28.7% 1.392 .752 - 2.579 .293
No (0) 22.4% 1 - -
Yes (1) 33.3% 1.556 .678 - 3.568 .297
No (0) 24.3% 1 - -
Contextual FUNCTIONING
TECHACHIEV
Ad hoc
PROD_INNO
PROC_INNO
SERV_INNO
Macroeconomic COUNTRY
Microeconomic ORG_TYPE
COMPETITOR
EXP_IM PACT TECHACHIEV ORG_TYPE COUNTRY FUNCTIONING COM PETITOR PROD_INNO PROC_INNO SERV_INNO
EXP_IM PACT 1
TECHACHIEV .070 1
ORG_TYPE -.164* -.087 1
COUNTRY -.127 -.012 .054 1
FUNCTIONING -.321** -.156* .017 -.068 1
COM PETITOR -.032 .023 .037 .118 -.094 1
PROD_INNO .154* .276** -.149* -.099 -.082 -.093 1
PROC_INNO .072 .280** -.080 -.066 -.113 .041 .158* 1
SERV_INNO .072 .078 -.157* -.062 .025 .023 .220* .025 1
** Correlation is signif icant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
* Correlation is signif icant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
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Table 25. Equations 4 and 7 (2000-2005): Logistic regressions’ results 
 
In Equation 4, determinants of EXP_IMPACT are strongly related to the 
instrument Excellent of the variable FUNCTIONING. Also, firms from Spain and 
Intermediate Innovation Systems (COUNTRY) represent significant and strong 
predictors of such future results. ORG_TYPE follows the pattern described above, 
where Large Companies are less likely to perceive future impacts as positive in 
comparison to SMEs.  
In Equation 7 we keep these significant predictors in the model, adding the 
ad hoc variables. In this case, all theoretically grounded predictors remain relatively 
Independent Variable
Equation 4 Equation 7
Large Company (1)
.432
(.028)
.466
(.050)
SME (0) - -
Success (1)
1.449
(.602)
-
Failure (0) - -
Yes (1)
.955
(.915)
-
No (0) - -
Spain (1)
3.209
(.019)
3.147
(.021)
Intermediate ISs (2)
3.023
(.027)
3.316
(.016)
Leader IS (3 - Ref. Cat.) - -
Excellent (1)
6.544
(.011)
6.614
(.010)
Good (2)
1.072
(.922)
1.063
(.931)
Weak/Bad (3 - Ref. Cat.) - -
Yes (1) -
1.759
(.165)
No (0) - -
Yes (1) -
1.139
(.719)
No (0) - -
Yes (1) -
1.521
(.388)
No (0) - -
.231 .137
.243 .263
74.2% 74.2%
75.1% 75.1%% of Correct Predictions
FUNCTIONING
PROD_INNO
PROC_INNO
SERV_INNO
Hosmer-Lemeshow  Test
Nagelkerke R sq.
% of Correct Predictions (Intercept only)
Adjusted Odds Ratio - Exp (B)
Sig. in parentheses
ORG_TYPE
TECHACHIEV
COMPETITOR
COUNTRY
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stable, where PROD_INNO, which was the only ad hoc variable to show an 
acceptable level of significance in the preliminary assessments, turns out as non-
significant. A potential explanation for this situation is related to its significant 
correlation to the ORG_TYPE predictor, which might add collinearity issues to the 
estimation, thus influencing the behavior of this particular element.  
 The analyses for Equations 4 and 7 considering projects finished in the 
period 2006-2008 are presented in tables 26 and 27. Similarly to previous 
comparisons between datasets, results are somewhat distinct to those found for 
projects completed within the 2000-2005 timeframe. In this case, however, 
differences are more related to statistical significance than to odds-ratio values, 
i.e., suggestions arising from this approach help building a clearer picture for the 
determinants of projects’ expected outcomes.  
 The preliminary bivariate assessment does not provide statistical 
significance for ORG_TYPE, but the crude odds-ratio suggests a relationship 
between SMEs and more positive expectations of impacts occurring as a 
consequence of Eureka projects. TECHACHIEV, which resulted as a non-
significant determinant for the 2000-2005 analysis, is significant in this case and it 
influences positively firms’ perceptions for the EXP_IMPACT dependent variable.  
 The Macroeconomic dimension of analysis puts the laggard Innovation 
System (Spain) in a position in which its firms are positively associated with better 
expected outcomes. However, unlike findings for 2000-2005, this does not hold for 
intermediate Innovation Systems, and these are more associated with poorer 
expected impacts than the Leader IS. Nonetheless, this latter relationship is not 
statistically supported. 
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Table 26. Equations 4 and 7 (2006-2008): Crude Odds-Ratio and Non-Parametric (Spearman) Correlations 
 
Dimension Independent Variable D.V. Description
POSITIVE 
EXP_IMPACT (1) 
Crude Odds Ratio - 
Exp (B)
Confidence Interval 
(95%)
Sig. 
Large Company (1) 61.8% .764 .332 - 1.759 .526
SME (0) 67.9% 1 - -
Success (1) 71.3% 6.207 1.801 - 21.386 .004
Failure (0) 28.6% 1 - -
Spain (1) 80.6% 2.806 1.039 - 7.583 .042
Intermediate ISs (2) 59.3% .985 .382 - 2.539 .976
Leader IS (3 - Ref. Cat.) 59.6% 1 - -
Yes (1) 74% 2.584 1.161 - 5.750 .020
No (0) 52.4% 1 - -
Yes (1) 74.4% 1.851 .805 - 4.258 .147
No (0) 61.1% 1 - -
Yes (1) 61.5% .773 .313 - 1.913 .578
No (0) 67.4% 1 - -
Contextual
Macroeconomic COUNTRY
Ad hoc
PROD_INNO
PROC_INNO
SERV_INNO
Microeconomic ORG_TYPE
TECHACHIEV
EXP_IM PACT TECHACHIEV ORG_TYPE COUNTRY PROD_INNO PROC_INNO SERV_INNO
EXP_IM PACT 1
TECHACHIEV .295** 1
ORG_TYPE -.059 -.050 1
COUNTRY -.177 -.183 .003 1
PROD_INNO .220* .380** -.142 -.100 1
PROC_INNO .136 .233* .090 -.015 .176 1
SERV_INNO -.052 .138 -.122 -.139 .108 .227* 1
** Correlation is signif icant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
* Correlation is signif icant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
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 Results for the ad hoc variables are similar to those previously found. Only 
PROD_INNO is significant, showing a positive influence on future outcomes. The 
stability of this variable across different estimations supports the idea that projects 
involving product innovations achieve more consistent results, whatever the 
measure applied (in this case, technological, commercial, and expected/future 
impacts).  
 
 
 
 
Table 27. Equations 4 and 7 (2006-2008): Logistic regressions’ results 
 
 
 In the multivariate estimation for Equation 4 and 7 (2006-2008), overall 
aspects of the models support the significance of predictors (Hosmer-Lemeshow), 
even though its accuracy in terms of classifying cases is not particularly strong in a 
direct comparison with the estimation using only the intercept. Nagelkerke R2 can 
also be regarded as relatively low for both cases.  
Independent Variable
Equation 4 Equation 7
Large Company (1)
.810
(.642)
SME (0) - -
Success (1)
5.120
(.011)
3.957
(.050)
Failure (0) - -
Spain (1)
2.244
(.123)
2.400
(.102)
Intermediate ISs (2)
.952
(.923)
1.171
(.764)
Leader IS (3 - Ref. Cat.) - -
Yes (1) -
1.711
(.249)
No (0) - -
Yes (1) -
1.555
(.351)
No (0) - -
Yes (1) -
.475
(.156)
No (0) - -
.814 .208
.145 .182
66.1% 66.1%
71.3% 72.2%% of Correct Predictions
PROD_INNO
PROC_INNO
SERV_INNO
Hosmer-Lemeshow  Test
Nagelkerke R sq.
% of Correct Predictions (Intercept only)
Adjusted Odds Ratio - Exp (B)
Sig. in parentheses
ORG_TYPE
TECHACHIEV
COUNTRY
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Analyzing variables individually, the instrument Spain (variable COUNTRY) 
is not significant, unlike noticed for the bivariate relationships. We chose to keep 
this variable in Equation 7 because of its identified relevance in the preliminary 
assessments. As a result, Spain is slightly above the 10% threshold, indicating a 
potential effect on EXP_IMPACT that should not be neglected.  
TECHACHIEV is significant and the most influent aspect in both equations. 
Nonetheless, it probably exerts some influence on results for PROD_INNO, given 
the relatively high non-parametric correlation between these variables. Unlike 
results for the 2000-2005 period, technological achievements seem to play more 
than a “necessary, but not sufficient” role, since it is highly related to firms’ 
expectations of impacts unfolding in the future.  
A possible explanation for such finding may lie on a simple analysis of 
correlation coefficients. For 2000-2005 projects, TECHACHIEV and 
COMMACHIEV have a .292 Spearman coefficient which is significant at 1%. 
However, the same bivariate correlation for 2006-2008 projects is of only .132, and 
it is not statistically significant. On the other hand, Spearman’s coefficient for 
TECHACHIEV and EXP_IMPACT is of .070 (not significant) in 2000-2005, while it 
has the value of .295 (significant at 1%) for 2006-2008 projects.  
If we refer to the overall structure of projects’ durations, we can see that 
projects finished within 2000-2005 last roughly 8 months (42.81 months) more than 
those that were completed within 2006-2008 (34.30 months). Hence, firms from the 
second dataset may be more likely to achieve desirable market effects after project 
completion, while those in the 2000-2005 dataset may attain similar outcomes by 
the time the project ends. Considering this rationale as valid, TECHACHIEV gains 
ground as an important determinant of market success for firms engaged in Eureka 
projects.   
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8.2.4 Equation 8     
 
The last part of the binary logistic regressions analysis points towards 
understanding the systemic role involved in the formation of long lasting R&D 
networks across Europe as a result of companies’ participation in Eureka projects. 
Therefore, the dependent variable of interest is STRAT_ALL, which highlights the 
formation or improvement of strategic R&D alliances between members of 
organizational arrangements oriented toward innovation.   
Tables 28 and 29 present results for estimations regarding projects 
completed in the period 2000-2005, according to same structure set for previous 
equations. From the preliminary analysis we gather the inexistence of statistically 
significant coefficients of defined predictors and STRAT_ALL (which holds for both 
non-parametric correlations and crude odds-ratio analysis). 
Nonetheless, some abnormal results (at least as to what one would expect 
based on economic theory and empirical evidence) come to mind when verifying 
these results closely. The first one regards the statistical irrelevance of 
FUNCTIONING. Even though odds-ratio coefficient indicates a relationship that 
favors the creation of strategic alliances (for both Excellent and Good instruments 
this coefficient exceeds that of the Reference Category), this association is much 
weaker than previously noticed in Equations 2 to 7. One would expect that such 
situation would hold in this case, but according to the set of predictors, factors that 
escape from Eureka’s Final Reports seem to play a decisive role here. Not 
surprisingly, the same situation also takes place when verifying COMMACHIEV, 
TECHACHIEV, and EXP_IMPACT. This is expected considering the relevant 
associations between these variables and FUNCTIONING.  
 
169 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 28. Equation 8 (2000-2005): Crude Odds-Ratio and Non-Parametric (Spearman) Correlations 
 
Dimension Independent Variable D.V. Description
POSITIVE 
STRAT_ALL (1) 
Crude Odds Ratio - 
Exp (B)
Confidence Interval 
(95%)
Sig. 
Large Company (1) 17.9% 1.021 .498 - 2.091 .955
SME (0) 17.6% 1 - -
Success (1) 21.4% 1.734 .842 - 3.569 .135
Failure (0) 13.6% 1 - -
TOT_COST M. Euro - .992 .962 - 1.024 .633
Positive (1) 21.8% 1.438 .669 - 3.092 .352
Negative (0) 16.2% 1 - -
Excellent (1) 22% 2.120 .428 - 10.485 .357
Good (2) 16.8% 1.513 .324 - 7.072 .599
Weak/Bad (3 - Ref. Cat.) 11.8% 1 - -
Yes (1) 25% 1.840 .862 - 3.929 .115
No (0) 15.3% 1 - -
Success (1) 18.9% 4.189 .542 - 32.382 .170
Failure (0) 5.3% 1 - -
Spain (1) 11.7% .529 .207 - 1.355 .185
Intermediate ISs (2) 21.8% 1.115 .486 - 2.557 .798
Leader IS (3 - Ref. Cat.) 20% 1 - -
Macroeconomic COUNTRY
Microeconomic ORG_TYPE
COMMACHIEV
TECHACHIEV
FUNCTIONING
COMPETITOR
Contextual
EXP_IMPACT
STRAT_ALL EXP_IM PACT TECHACHIEV ORG_TYPE COUNTRY TOT_COST COM PETITOR FUNCTIONING COM M ACHIEV
STRAT_ALL 1
EXP_IM PACT .064 1
TECHACHIEV .101 .070 1
ORG_TYPE .004 -.164* -.087 1
COUNTRY .095 -.127 -.012 .054 1
TOT_COST .126 -.084 .110 .246** .120 1
COM PETITOR .108 -.032 .023 .037 .118 .118 1
FUNCTIONING -.076 -.321** -.156* -.156* -.068 .055 -.094 1
COM M ACHIEV .103 .328** .292** -.091 -.025 .104 -.024 -.235** 1
* Correlation is signif icant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
** Correlation is signif icant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
170 
 
Furthermore, COMPETITOR, even though without statistical significance, 
points towards a positive association between the existence of rival firms and the 
generation of such strategic agreements. This is an interesting indication of 
stronger ties between firms from similar sectors, from different European countries, 
joining in R&D development. This perspective is in accordance with the idea that 
such kind of relationship involves a greater amount of risk, thus requiring stronger 
means of coordination (leading to more stable connections).   
 
 
 
 
 
Table 29. Equation 8 (2000-2005): Logistic regressions’ results  
Independent Variable
Adjusted Odds Ratio - 
Exp (B)
Sig. in parentheses
Equation 8
Large Company (1)
1.291
(.521)
SME (0) -
Yes (1)
2.432
(.039)
No (0) -
Success (1)
3.441
(.253)
Failure (0) -
Excellent (1)
1.006
(.995)
Good (2)
.841
(.840)
Weak/Bad (3 - Ref. Cat.) -
Spain (1)
.551
(.235)
Intermediate ISs (2)
1.451
(.423)
Leader IS (3 - Ref. Cat.) -
Positive (1)
1.129
(.796)
Negative (0) -
Success (1)
1.688
(.221)
Failure (0) -
.274
.096
82.2%
82.2%
.977
(.269)
Hosmer-Lemeshow  Test
Nagelkerke R sq.
COUNTRY
EXP_IMPACT
COMMACHIEV
% of Correct Predictions
FUNCTIONING
ORG_TYPE
TECHACHIEV
COMPETITOR
% of Correct Predictions (Intercept only)
TOT_COST M. Euro
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 For the variable COUNTRY, indications are that Spanish firms are less likely 
to engage in more stable international R&D strategic alliances. This is in conflict 
with the positive results achieved by these firms in comparison to those attained by 
companies from the benchmark countries, whereas firms from Intermediate 
Innovation Systems and from the Leader IS have a similar probability of engaging 
in long lasting relationships. 
 Results for the multivariate estimation are provided in table 29 (above) and 
confirm the projections from the preliminary statistics. The model as a whole is 
significant (Hosmer-Lemeshow), but Nagelkerke’s R2 shows that its prediction 
power is rather weak, which can be confirmed by the comparison between the 
model with and without the established predictors.  
For the case of projects finished during the years 2006-2008, the situation  
is analogous to that examined above for some particular variables, but some 
remarkable changes deserve to be noticed. First of all, COMMACHIEV and 
TECHACHIEV are significantly related to STRAT_ALL, where better outcomes 
indicate a higher propensity for firms to maintain their relationship after the 
particular Eureka project is finished. Therefore, the indication is similar to that 
found for the 2000-2005 dataset, but with an increased relevance for practical 
analysis. However, EXP_IMPACT does not show any particular trend in this case.  
 Two important differences arise when comparing the presently discussed 
results with those found for the 2000-2005 dataset. The first one regards the 
probability of Large Companies engaging in strategic R&D alliances (variable 
ORG_TYPE). While the odds-ratio coefficient previously found for this case 
showed a value that basically matched that of SMEs, 2006-2008’s empirical results 
imply (significantly) that Large Companies are actually less likely than SMEs to 
develop long lasting R&D relationships with partners located abroad.  
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Table 30. Equation 8 (2006-2008): Crude Odds-Ratio and Non-Parametric (Spearman) Correlations 
 
Dimension Independent Variable D.V. Description
POSITIVE 
STRAT_ALL (1) 
Crude Odds Ratio - 
Exp (B)
Confidence Interval 
(95%)
Sig. 
Large Company (1) 14.7% .309 .108 - .885 .029
SME (0) 35.8% 1 - -
Success (1) 44% 2.289 .911 - 5.748 .078
Failure (0) 25.6% 1 - -
TOT_COST M. Euro - 1.024 .949 - 1.106 .537
Positive (1) 30.3% 1.105 .471 - 2.590 .819
Negative (0) 28.2% 1 - -
Success (1) 32.7% 6.309 .791 - 50.298 .082
Failure (0) 7.1% 1 - -
Spain (1) 38.9% 1.727 .697 - 4.283 .238
Intermediate ISs (2) 22.2% .776 .259 - 2.318 .649
Leader IS (3 - Ref. Cat.) 26.9% 1 - -
Contextual
Microeconomic ORG_TYPE
TECHACHIEV
Macroeconomic COUNTRY
COMMACHIEV
EXP_IMPACT
STRAT_ALL EXP_IM PACT TECHACHIEV ORG_TYPE COUNTRY TOT_COST COM M ACHIEV
STRAT_ALL 1
EXP_IM PACT .021 1
TECHACHIEV .183 .295** 1
ORG_TYPE -.211* -.059 -.050 1
COUNTRY -.099 -.177 -.183 .003 1
TOT_COST .115 -.006 -.139 .212* -.191* 1
COM M ACHIEV .167 .333** .132 .074 -.012 .024 1
* Correlation is signif icant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
** Correlation is signif icant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
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 The second main inconsistency regards data for the variable COUNTRY 
and its instruments. Even though coefficients remain non significant, Spain now 
shows a higher odds-ratio than those of the benchmark countries in terms of 
participating in strategic alliances, while those companies located in intermediate 
Innovation Systems have the lower probability of doing so.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 31. Equation 8 (2006-2008): Logistic regressions’ results 
 
 
 As a result of this better statistical adequacy of variables in the bivariate 
evaluation, multivariate estimations represent a more robust outcome for the 
model’s overall aspects. This can be noticed via Nagelkerke’s R2, which is higher 
than that of the estimations for the 2000-2005 period, and the increase in the 
Independent Variable
Adjusted Odds Ratio - 
Exp (B)
Sig. in parentheses
Equation 8
Large Company (1)
.228
(.013)
SME (0) -
Success (1)
6.271
(.098)
Failure (0) -
Spain (1)
1.708
(.288)
Intermediate ISs (2)
.601
(.424)
Leader IS (3 - Ref. Cat.) -
Positive (1)
.502
(.192)
Negative (0) -
Success (1)
3.455
(.025)
Failure (0) -
.787
.210
70.4%
71.3%
Hosmer-Lemeshow  Test
Nagelkerke R sq.
% of Correct Predictions (Intercept only)
% of Correct Predictions
1.064
(.204)
M. Euro
ORG_TYPE
TECHACHIEV
COUNTRY
COMMACHIEV
TOT_COST
EXP_IMPACT
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classification power of the model when considering the comparison with the 
intercept only estimation (even though such increase is minimal).  
 TECHACHIEV (at 10%), COMMACHIEV (at 5%), and ORG_TYPE (at 5%) 
are statistically significant, where technological achievements seem to be the most 
important elements in influencing the probability of firms in achieving strategic 
alliances. Support for this situation is also given by adjusted odds-ratio in 2000-
2005 projects, even though they lack statistical significance.  
 
8.5 Summary of Results: Verification of Research Hypotheses 
 
 In this section we bring an overall evaluation of results from the theoretically 
grounded equations (Equations 2, 3, and 4), comparing achieved results with the 
hypotheses of this research, thus providing a structured perspective of our 
expectations’ validity based on the specialized literature. Given the scope of the ad 
hoc equations (Equations 5, 6, 7, and, 8), such appraisal is not provided for them 
(as there are no hypotheses in this text to compare them with, being their purpose 
to complement the core propositions of this analysis). It is also important to notice 
that not all variables are included in this summary. This procedure makes 
reference to those variables of theoretically predicted influence on outcomes. The 
set of outcomes per se is explained for each approach in the previous sections. 
 Thus, Table 32 consists in a report of such relationships, assessing the 
empirical findings of this research in face of the set of hypotheses that are 
described in chapter 6. For each variable, one corresponding hypothesis is listed, 
as well as the conclusion on its empirical relevance according to our datasets. 
Findings are described according to theoretical expectations, and to results from 
2000-2005 and 2006-2008 datasets. Coefficients correspond to adjusted odds-ratio 
for each variable, i.e., the coefficient from multivariate estimations for each model. 
Thus, when the influence is expected to be positive, this is represented by an 
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odds-ratio above the level of 1 (>1), and below this level if otherwise (in opposition 
to coefficients which range from negative to positive values). For the case of 
Reference Categories, the exact value of 1 is assigned, so other categories are 
actually compared to these. In the case of dichotomous variables, the Reference 
Category is implicit, being related to the value 0 (absence) of the observation (e.g., 
0 is the Reference Category for COMPETITOR, thus indicating that rival firms are 
not part of the network). 
 Results are primarily evaluated based on their statistical merit and direction 
of influence (positive or negative), but we recognize that samples are not large 
enough as to provide the analysis with conclusive statements. Since we refer to 
this set of outcomes as suggestive indications, we must also focus on the 
information about trends in the sample (even if they are not significant). This 
course of action allows us to optimize the use of information available from 
datasets, as we are also aware of its limitations.  
 The order of variables follows that of dimensions under scrutiny, i.e., 
Microeconomic (ORG_TYPE; RATIO_RD), Contextual (COMPETITOR; 
FUNCTIONING; TECHACHIEV; TOT_COST; IND_EXP; DURATION), and 
Macroeconomic (COUNTRY). We shall follow the same order for further 
discussions. 
 COMPETITOR is a variable that is directly related to hypothesis H1a, which 
predicts that Large Companies are capable of achieving better results than 
SMEs thanks to their higher absorptive capacity in terms of R&D. This is 
expected to be relevant in technical (TECHACHIEV, Equation 2) and economic 
aspects (COMMACHIEV, Equation 3; EXP_IMPACT, Equation 4). However, with 
the exception of 2006-2008 results for Equation 3 (non significant), the set of 
outcomes points in the opposite direction, and this is statistically significant for the 
case of Equation 4 (2000-2005), which deals with future commercial impacts 
arising from firms’ participation in Eureka projects (controlling for R&D intensity, as 
suggested by López, 2008). Therefore, H1a is rejected.  
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The rejection of hypothesis H1a can imply that that SMEs are likely to 
benefit more than Large Companies from cooperative R&D agreements at the 
international level or that are no relevant differences between their results. A 
possible explanation for this situation lies in the argument made by Bayona, 
Corredor and Santamaría (2006) and Chun and Mun (2012), where they state that 
firms can increase their individual R&D investment capacity through participation in 
networks. In this case, SMEs would suffer a higher impact from such connections, 
thus multiplying their R&D expenditure to a more significant level in comparison to 
the impacts that such combination of resources would have in larger corporations. 
This is especially true for the case of microeconomic analysis, since we are 
considering perceptions of individual firms, where SMEs would achieve this result 
regardless of the fact that they are engaging in a relationship with companies of 
similar sizes or not.  
  The following analysis seeks to assess the role played by R&D intensity 
in firms’ ultimate technological and commercial outcomes arising from their 
participation in international R&D cooperation.  H1b is approached as a 
microeconomic hypothesis, but its assessment occurs through the use of three 
variables, namely: RATIO_RD (Microeconomic Dimension), TOT_COST 
(Contextual Dimension), and DURATION (Contextual Dimension). The use of the 
two latter variables functions as a complementary way of understanding firm 
behavior through project-specific engagement, thus the use of projects’ costs and 
their respective duration. Such aspects help verifying (approximately) the 
innovative intensity of firms in specific projects.     
 As it can be gathered from table 32, these three variables perform erratically 
across datasets. The two variables used in the technological achievements 
approach (Equation 2) are inconsistent: RATIO_RD seems to matter for 2006-2008 
companies, but not for 2000-2005, and such relationship is not significant in both 
cases. TOT_COST has a similar pattern, even though both variables are actually 
not significantly correlated with each other (and the sign of the association is 
negative: -.066). For the case of DURATION, its behavior is also inconsistent, but 
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in the opposite direction from the other two variables used in the assessment of 
H1b (and this particular variable is applied for the commercial achievements’ 
approach, Equation 3). Longer projects in 2000-2005 are associated with better 
outcomes, while for 2006-2008, shorter projects are associated with superior 
outcomes. Nonetheless, these associations are not statistically significant. 
Therefore, H1b is also rejected.  
 The relationship between these variables, not only their impacts on 
analyzed outcomes, deserves some further discussion. Non-parametric 
correlations are useful in this regard. First of all, Large Companies have 
significantly higher investments in projects (TOT_COST; Spearman correlation 
coefficient for 2000-2005 is .246 and significant at 1%, and .212 and significant at 
5% for 2006-2008). However, these firms are less R&D intensive than SMEs 
(RATIO_RD; Spearman correlation coefficient for 2000-2005 is -.364 and 
significant at 1% and -.265 and significant at 1% for 2006-2008). This implies that 
Large Companies’ are endowed with a higher absolute investment capacity, but a 
less innovative profile than SMEs for the scrutinized samples. Such aspects must 
be kept in mind when considering that absorptive capacities in this case may 
actually be higher in SMEs, provided they are likely to spend more (relatively) in 
innovative activities.   
 After analyzing hypothesis H1 (a and b), the conclusion is that the 
Microeconomic Dimension from Hcore is not relevant for this particular sample, 
considering the variables we have used to approximate this result. There are two 
aspects to be considered here. The first one regards the limitation of instruments to 
make operational the complexity represented by firms. In this case we are 
approaching the microeconomic dimension through an extremely simplified version 
of what a firm is.  
Nonetheless, and introducing the second aspect, firm behavior is filled with 
contingencies, where no firm is in reality equal to another. Hence, firms’ generic 
characteristics, such as size or R&D intensity, may not be representative of 
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impacts since the perception of such influence is likely to vary among a sample of 
companies. In this case, firms’ static features can actually be expected not to be 
related to their tactical and strategic goals, which are deemed to be case-specific. 
In this case, it is not as surprising to achieve results that correspond to the 
rejection of H1. 
The second hypothesis to be verified already falls entirely under the 
Contextual Dimension, and makes reference to the management quality of 
cooperative R&D projects as a determinant of technical and commercial 
outcomes (H2). The assessment of this hypothesis is done via FUNCTIONING, 
which unfortunately is only available for 2000-2005 projects, thus not allowing its 
robustness test via assessments of the 2006-2008 dataset. Nevertheless, this 
variable shows a stable and significant influence on firms’ results for all levels of 
analysis, i.e., technological (Equation 2), commercial (at the end of the project, 
Equation 3), and expected future impacts (Equation 4). This is true especially for 
commercial impacts, since instruments (Excellent, and Good, plus the Reference 
Category: Weak/Bad) in this case are all positive (above 1 as expected) and 
significant. The predictive strength found in this variable allows us to accept H2.  
On the other hand, some comments must be made on this outcome. As 
data analyzed can be regarded as subjective, the relationship between better rates 
of functioning and firms’ successful results can also indicate a biased perception of 
Final Reports’ respondents. Since results were positively achieved, or maybe even 
exceeded prior expectations, problems in conducting the collaboration between 
partners tend to be minimized. Since this aspect is hardly observable in objective 
terms, this result offers rich insights in terms of policy coordination and network 
management, but it should also be regarded cautiously.    
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Variable Expected Expected Expected
Corresponding 
Hypotheses
Confirmation
00-05 06-08 00-05 06-08 00-05 06-08
ORG_TYPE >1 .696 .584 >1 .910 1.862 >1 .432** .810 H1a
No. Results point in the opposite direction of 
the hypothesis, w here SMEs seem to 
achieve better outcomes. 
<2% (1) <1 .745 2.447
2-10% (2) <1 .726 2.954
>10% (3 - Ref. Cat.) Ref. Cat.
COM PETITOR <1 1.412 NA <1 .626 NA <1 .955 NA H3
No. It seems to be related to commercial 
achievements w ithout statistical 
signif icance. 
Excellent (1) >1 5.634* NA >1 18.455*** NA >1 6.544** NA
Good (2) >1 3.616 NA >1 12.921** NA >1 1.072 NA
Weak/Bad (3 - Ref. Cat.) Ref. Cat. NA Ref. Cat. NA Ref. Cat. NA
TECHACHIEV >1 8.329*** 3.410 >1 1.449 5.120** H4
Yes. Technical outcomes are positively 
related to market (immediate and future) 
achievements. 
TOT_COST >1 .987 1.037 H1b
No. Results are inconsistent betw een 
periods.
DURATION >1 1.002 .971 H1b
No. Results are inconsistent betw een 
periods.
Spain (1) >1 .597 7.242* >1 1.296 .764 >1 3.209** 2.244
Intermediate ISs (2) >1 .593 .984 >1 1.067 1.217 >1 3.023** .952
Leader IS (3 - Ref. Cat.) Ref. Cat. Ref. Cat. Ref. Cat.
Partially. Its results point in the direction of 
greater commercial results (immediate and 
future) for the laggard innovation system 
(Spain). 
Yes. Better outcomes are influenced by the 
quality of projects' functioning. 
RATIO_RD H1b
No. Results are inconsistent betw een 
periods. 
* Signif icant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed)
** Signif icant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
*** Signif icant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
H2
COUNTRY H5
Verified
FUNCTIONING
Summary of Adjusted Odds-Ratio
Equation
4
Verified Verified
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Table 32. Summary of equations’ results and confrontation with research hypotheses. Results are reported for the theoretically 
grounded equations, i.e., Equations 2, 3, and 4 
  
 The third hypothesis to be confronted with empirical data from regression 
estimations makes reference to the absence of competing firms in a network as 
a relevant factor in determining its success - H3. This approach also belongs to 
the Contextual Dimension of analysis and is centered on the variable 
COMPETITOR. As in the case of H2, such measurement is only available for 
2000-2005 projects, thus a robustness contrast across datasets is not possible. 
Regarding statistical merits, COMPETITOR is not significantly related to any of the 
three dependent variables in the abovementioned equations (TECHACHIEV, 
COMMACHIEV, and EXP_IMPACT). Furthermore, this variable, as it can be 
gathered from correlation matrices, does not show significant association with any 
of the other variables of interest.  
 Nonetheless, it is important to remind that resorting solely to statistical 
significance shall provide a narrow view of the phenomena, especially considering 
the size of the sample. It is important to notice that around 25% of companies were 
involved in projects with competitors, which is by itself a valuable information. This 
can be influenced by a non-direct form of competition, since this analysis deals 
with R&D cooperation between firms from different nations, thus rivalry risks are 
likely to be somewhat minimized. This is reflected in the positive (non significant) 
association of the presence of rival firms and successful technological 
achievements. However, when we turn to commercial achievements, a more 
sensitive area of innovation when it comes to projects involving competitors, there 
is an indication of a negative association with better results. However, this result 
does not allow us to accept H3 based on statistical merits of the sample. 
Therefore, H3 is rejected.  
The following proposition is that technological achievements arising from 
firms’ participation in international R&D cooperation projects represent a 
necessary condition (but not sufficient) in determining market outcomes 
(achieved and expected) - H4 and H4b. To make this aspect operational, we 
used the variable TECHACHIEV, which is a dependent variable in Equation 2, and 
also a predictor in Equations 3 and 4. In this sense, results consistently point 
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towards the hypotheses’ relevance, where they are always positive (above 1), and 
significant for commercial achievements (2000-2005), and expected impacts 
(2006-2008). As previously discussed, this structure of statistical significance might 
be related to longer projects in the 2000-2005 datasets, where innovation results 
are more likely to be captured within projects’ lifecycle (the adjusted odds-ratio for 
DURATION indicates that). In face of these estimates, H4 and H4b are accepted.  
 The last hypothesis to be tested represents an approximation of the effects 
that National Innovation Systems might have as a determinant of firms’ 
results in international R&D networks (H5). Obviously, this is a rough estimate 
of impacts that macroeconomic conditions might play in this realm, with all of its 
inherent complexities and multiple facets. Our classification of countries as 
laggard, intermediate, or leader Innovation Systems is based on the presumptions 
made in chapter 5, where these classifications should be regarded as relative 
positions, not absolute. According to our prior expectations, a catching-up process 
was expected, with special strength in Spanish firms (laggard IS).  
 Empirical results are somewhat controversial. For the technological 
dimension, 2000-2005 projects from laggard and intermediate ISs are actually 
outperformed by those projects in which German firms were involved58. For Spain, 
this situation is largely (and significantly) reversed in the analogous assessment for 
2006-2008 projects, while this does not hold for intermediate ISs’ firms.  
In the evaluation of commercial achievements, adjusted odds-ratio vary 
between periods for the Spanish case, while they hold constantly positive (above 
1) for intermediate ISs’ firms. However, such results are not only non-significant, 
but they also range near the reference value of 1. Therefore, it is not safe to 
assume that such values are representative of valid trends in samples.  
                                                          
58
 It is important to remind that such projects involved firms from multiple countries, but 
questionnaires represented each firm’s perception on results. Thus, we are not ruling out the fact 
that, for example,  German companies are involved with organizations from less advanced 
innovation systems, but that impacts as they were captured are inherently individual (and do not 
necessarily represent the perception of other participants in the network). 
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In Equation 4, however, the picture is clearer for the Spanish case, where 
results are well above the benchmark threshold (and they are significant for 2000-
2005 projects). The situation of intermediate innovation systems is a bit distinct, 
since they represent the expected behavior in 2000-2005 (above 1, significant, and 
below Spain), but this does not hold for 2006-2008 projects. The conclusion in this 
case is in favor of a partial acceptance of H5, with special emphasis on the case 
of the laggard innovation system, i.e., Spain, where its firms seem to benefit more 
from international R&D networks than its peers in more developed innovation 
systems.   
The next stage of this research consists in an assessment of firms’ profiles 
according to the characteristics of samples, testing for differences in terms of 
results via the construction of clusters based on log-likelihood distances. 
Furthermore, clusters’ features are tested against a set of variables, providing 
further consistency in the evaluation of determinants of success in R&D 
collaboration at the international level. 
 
 
8.6 Cluster Analyses 
 
 
 This section contains three estimations of clusters. The first one represents 
clusters for 2000-2005 firms according to their outcomes (technological, 
commercial, and expected). These results are confronted with those found by 
Fischer and Molero (2012)59 in an exploratory assessment of Eureka’s projects in 
                                                          
59
 Fischer and Molero (2011) use a dataset consisting of Spanish companies only, similar to that 
used in the third part of the cluster analysis developed in this research. However, criteria for groups 
are refined in this present work, since focus is given on firms’ outcomes. Evaluation between groups 
characteristics regarding other aspects of microeconomic, contextual, and macroeconomic 
dimensions are tested statistically through parametric (ANOVA) and non-parametric (Mann-
Whitney) approaches. This procedure makes possible a stronger internal consistency within 
clusters, while statistical tests provide more robust perceptions on their differences regarding other 
variables of interest. 
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Spanish firms. This suggested taxonomy is applied to clustering structures, and 
similarities, as well as differences, are discussed. In order to further exploit the 
usefulness of achieved clusters we test for differences between groups according 
to variables which correspond to Microeconomic (RATIO_RD), Contextual 
(FUNCTIONING, TOT_COST, DURATION), and Macroeconomic (COUNTRY) 
dimensions. For this, ANOVA estimations and non-parametric (Mann-Whitney) 
statistics are applied. A second stage contains a similar assessment for 2006-2008 
data. 
 The last part of this analysis provides cluster estimates for Spanish firms 
only in the period 2000-2005 (77 firms). With this subsample we could gather 
Return Over Total Assets (ROTA) data for three periods before projects’ 
completion, period of project completion, and three periods after projects’ 
completion. With such information we can assess the existence or not of 
differences between clusters before and after Eureka projects were finished, 
considering the structure of outcomes of each cluster. Such assessment gives the 
opportunity of approximating the actual impacts of Eureka at the corporate level of 
participants (and its evolution over time), while also confronting perceptual 
variables (those gathered via Eureka’s Final Reports) and an objective indicator 
(ROTA) with the control of previous periods’ results.    
 
 
8.6.1 2000-2005 (All Countries) 
 
 This first part of our cluster analyses considers results for companies with 
Eureka projects ending within the period 2000-2005. Results regarding clusters’ 
structures are provided in table 33. Distribution of cases is mainly concentrated in 
cluster 1, while clusters 2 and 3 are of similar sizes. Variables used in this analysis 
turned out to be statistically significant separators of the three obtained groups. In 
a first moment, we verify clusters’ features in order to observe the main trends in 
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terms of outcomes (technological, commercial, and expected) and then we 
confront these findings with the taxonomy proposed by Fischer and Molero (2012).  
 
 
 
Table 33. 2000-2005 Clusters 
 
 
 Cluster 1 has a strong orientation towards fair (but not exceptional) 
achievements. This cluster is characterized by firms achieving Good Technological 
results. Furthermore, commercial achievements are positive, even though there is 
a relevant presence of firms with Weak attainments in this regard. Lastly, expected 
impacts for cluster 1 are also positive, but not outstanding, where Medium and 
Small impacts are predominant. Cluster 1, thus, can be pointed as analogous to 
the Consistent Innovators group, where firms have good technological results (but 
poorer to those attained by cluster 3, as we shall discuss below) and consistent 
market outcomes (achieved and expected).  
Cluster 
Distribution
Correspondence to Fischer 
and M olero's (2011) 
Classification
Cluster 1 116 (54.2% Consistent Innovators
Cluster 2 46 (21.5%) Inventors
Cluster 3 52 (24.3%) Risky Innovators
Missing 1 (.5%)
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3
TECHACHIEV
Good Technological 
Achievements (94%)*
Good Technological 
Achievements (71.7%)*
Excellent Technological 
Achievements (98.1%)*
COM M ACHIEV
Good (58.6%), and Weak 
(36.2%) Commercial 
Achievements*
Nil Commercial Achievements 
(89.1%)*
Excellent (26.9%), and Good 
(48.1%) Commercial 
Achievements. Also, 13.5% of 
Nil Commercial Achievements*
EXP_IM PACT
Large (22.4%), Medium (42.2%), 
and Small (30.2%) Expected 
Impacts*
Medium (19.6%), Small (32.6%), 
and Nil (45.7%) Expected 
Impacts*
Very Large (19.2%), Large 
(32.7%), and Medium (40.4%) 
Expected Impacts*
*Clusterw ise Importance (chi-square at 95% confid.) 
Percentages correspond to w ithin cluster data. 
Cluster Profiles and Main Trends
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Such firms represent the bulk of this particular dataset, where innovation is 
likely to take place, and competitiveness of companies shall be maintained (or 
even increased). Nonetheless, it is not likely that such outcomes will have the 
broad impact that can be expected from groundbreaking innovations. We find 
support to this result in Georghiou’s (2001) criticism on the declining impacts of 
Eureka projects in general, where risks are not being fully taken by agents. 
Cluster 2 is similar to cluster 1 in terms of technological results, where they 
are largely rated as Good. Nonetheless, perceptions on market impacts point in a 
different direction, where Nil Commercial achievements are predominant. If this 
could indicate that such firms may have a longer time-to-market period, the 
analysis of EXP_IMPACT shows that in reality these agents also do not expect 
further results to unfold over time.  
The relative position of cluster 2 is the worst out of the three clusters in 
terms of market appropriation of results (and expectations regarding future 
outcomes). There is a strong correspondence between this particular group of 
firms and the Inventors classification, where the technological part of projects is 
fair, but market results are disappointing, indicating that little economic impact 
arose from participation in an international R&D cooperation project. Nonetheless, 
such activity might have played a role in enhancing firms’ absorptive capacities and 
technological capabilities, thus contributing to its overall performance in structural 
terms.       
Cluster 3 shows a strong participation of firms with Excellent technological 
results, thus rating this particular cluster in a better position than the other two. In 
commercial terms, this cluster also contains companies with the best results, even 
though there is a higher level of variability in this regard that is not observed in the 
other clusters. For cluster 3, Excellent commercial results are reported, but also Nil 
commercial results. Nonetheless, future results are expected to be better than 
those perceived by respondents of the other groups.  
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The correspondence of this cluster with Fischer and Molero’s (2012) 
taxonomy finds no perfect match, but the presence of an unexpected variability in 
commercial achievements expresses the existence of riskier projects, where 
achievements are more relevant, but also are not necessarily associated with 
positive market outcomes. This leads us to classify this cluster as Risky Innovators. 
Nevertheless, we take into account that such results are highly dependent on firms’ 
perceptions, and do not represent essentially the existence of relevant market 
aspects.  
If we confront these three clusters regarding some relevant variables for the 
evaluation of the hypotheses formulated in this research, some further insights can 
be found in addition to those provided by logistic regressions. A summary of such 
approaches is reported in table 34. Categorical variables were tested through 
Mann-Whitney non-parametric tests for independent samples, where continuous 
variables were assessed through ANOVA (Bonferroni and Tamhane’s post hoc 
tests were assigned according to results of Levene’s homogeneity of variance 
tests). Also, descriptive statistics are provided for each variable within each cluster.  
 The variable RATIO_RD, a measure of firms’ innovative intensity and a 
proxy of absorptive capacity, does not result in an efficient indicator of differences 
between clusters. This can be gathered from an evaluation of means, medians, 
and standard deviations. The Mann-Whitney test for non-parametric differences 
between samples confirms this perception, where cluster comparisons are not 
significant in any pairwise contrast. A similar outcome is achieved for COUNTRY, 
indicating that clustering procedures according to firms’ outcomes (TECHACHIEV, 
COMMACHIEV, and EXP_IMPACT) do not produce internally homogeneous 
groups in terms of these two variables.  
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Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3
TOT_COST
7.362
(15.709)
3.383
(3.396)
2.853
(3.731)
DURATION
44.97
(22.716)
41.48
(16.591)
39.10
(21.256)
Cluster (I) Cluster (J)
Mean 
Difference I-J
Sig
2 3.978 .032
3 4.508 .012
1 -3.978 .032
3 .530 .845
1 -4.508 .012
2 -.530 .845
2 3.487 1.000
3 5.869 .296
1 -3.487 1.000
3 2.382 1.000
1 -5.869 .296
2 -2.382 1.000
Tamhane and Bonferroni's Post Hoc Tests 
*Tamhane´s post hoc tests. Levene´s sig. .001
**Bonferroni´ s post hoc tests. Levene´s sig. .293
1
2
3
1
2
3
One-Way Anova Results 
TOT_COST*
DURATION**
M eans (Std. Dev. in parentheses)
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3
RATIO_RD
2.12
(2)
[.677]
2.05
(2)
[.631]
2.05
(2)
[.714]
FUNCTIONING
1.97
(2)
[.407]
1.96
(2)
[.631]
1.29
(1)
[.502]
COUNTRY
1.93
(2)
[.805]
1.84
(2)
[.759]
1.94
(2)
[.826]
Cluster I Cluster J Sig. 
2 .532
3 .570
1 .532
3 .992
1 .570
2 .992
2 .799
3 .000
1 .799
3 .000
1 .000
2 .000
2 .525
3 .991
1 .525
3 .585
1 .991
2 .585
M eans (M edians in parentheses; Std. Dev. in brackets)
2
3
M ann-Whitney Tests for Pairwise Comparison
Non-Parametric Tests for Independent Samples 
2
3
1
2
3
1
RATIO_RD
FUNCTIONING
COUNTRY
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 34. 2000-2005 Clusters’ ANOVA and Mann-Whitney tests 
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 However, while the variable FUNCTIONING has a comparable structure 
between clusters 1 (Consistent Innovators) and 2 (Inventors), cluster 3 (Risky 
Innovators) is composed by better rates of project functioning (lower ratings 
represent better results; refer to table 9 for variables’ descriptions). We find 
statistical support for this indication in non-parametric tests, where cluster 3 is 
relevantly different from clusters 1 and 2. This is an indication that better results 
(technological, and economic) are again significantly related to projects that excel 
in managing networks properly. Even though cluster 3 has a stronger variance in 
terms of market achievements than cluster 1, firms from the former also achieve 
more relevant economic outcomes, thus excelling in innovative attainments.    
 In the case of the continuous variables, TOT_COST and DURATION, we 
remind that neither had expressive results in the regressions previously analyzed. 
On the other hand, differences between groups show that costlier projects are 
associated with cluster 1 (Consistent Innovators), which shows satisfactory, but not 
outstanding, results for firms. This particular variable complements, as pointed out 
before, the innovative intensity of projects (whereas RATIO_RD represents 
innovative intensity of firms).  
The conclusion that can be drawn from this analysis is that projects with a 
safer return involve larger amounts of investment, even if such investment shall not 
provide excellent effects. Under a different perspective, firms might be more critical 
when evaluating the results of these projects. Under this perspective, cluster 3 
would not necessarily outperform cluster 1, since opinions about achievements can 
be biased by the size of investment made, while firms from cluster 3 could be more 
sensitive to results in face of smaller R&D expenditures. This brings us to a 
discussion on the productivity of projects, and self-reports do not allow for a robust 
conclusion in this case. Nonetheless, such aspect is relevant for comprehending 
weaknesses of such method when gathering data.   
 In the case of DURATION, no difference between groups could be 
statistically identified, even though means and standard deviations give some 
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support to the possibilities outlined above, where cluster 3 is associated with 
projects of shorter duration, while cluster 1 presents those projects with longer 
periods of development (cluster 2 stands in the middle).  
 
 
 
8.6.2 2006-2008 Clusters (All Countries) 
 
 The analysis of clusters for the period 2006-2008 results in clusters of 
similar sizes in comparison to those found for projects finished within 2000-2005. 
Nonetheless, their internal structure differs significantly in terms of achieved 
results. We cannot exclude the chance of interference from different scales in the 
measurement of COMMACHIEV and EXP_IMPACT (please refer to table 10 for 
description of variables).  
The variable TECHACHIEV does not perform well in the process of cluster 
construction, as it can be seen by its lack of statistical significance (chi-square) for 
the three groups. The largest group in this case is cluster 3, which has worse 
outcomes in all of the levels under scrutiny. While its profile in technical terms is 
not properly bad, commercial achievements and expected impacts are fragile (and 
both are statistically significant regarding features of this cluster). This lack of 
marketability in face of relatively satisfactory technological leads us to classify this 
cluster under the Inventors category.  
 Cluster 2 is significantly defined only by its rate of commercial 
achievements. While TECHACHIEV suggests a very good profile in the technical 
dimension (similar to that of cluster 1 and above that of cluster 3), market results 
are poor, resulting in outcomes that are basically the same size of investments 
made. Expected impacts, though, are more optimistic, outperforming those 
observed in cluster 3, but not as positive as those in cluster 1. Such features, 
mainly the excellent capacity of achieving technological benefits, while “failing” in 
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capturing economic benefits from them in the present should lead us to classify this 
cluster also as Inventors. Nonetheless, future expectations indicate the possibility 
of satisfactory results in the market. Hence, we define this cluster as Risky 
Innovators, even if its correspondence with Fischer and Molero’s (2012) 
classification is imperfect.  
 
 
 
Table 35. 2006-2008 Clusters 
 
 
   
 Cluster 1 in 2006-2008 projects is the one which shows consistently better 
performances in the three dimensions used for cluster distribution (significantly 
represented by COMMACHIEV and EXP_IMPACT). We classify this cluster as 
Consistent Innovators. However, this classification does not represent perfectly the 
taxonomy proposed by Fischer and Molero (2012), since these companies 
Cluster 
Distribution
Correspondence to Fischer 
and M olero's (2011) 
Classification
Cluster 1 25 (21.7%) Consistent Innovators
Cluster 2 30 (26.1%) Risky Innovators
Cluster 3 60 (52.2%) Inventors
Missing -
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3
TECHACHIEV
Excellent (44%) and Good 
(52%) Technological 
Achievements
Excellent (40%) and Good 
(53.3%) Technological 
Achievements
Excellent (23.3%) and Good 
(58.3%) Technological 
Achievements. Also, 18.3% of 
Weak/Bad Attainments
COM M ACHIEV
Commercial Achievements of 2-
5 times RTD investment (76%) 
and +-10 times RTD investment 
(20%)*
Commercial Achievements < or 
= RTD investment (100%)*
Very Low  (100%) Commercial 
Achievements* 
EXP_IM PACT
Expected Impacts of 2-5 times 
RTD investment (32%) and +-10 
times RTD investment (56%)*
Expected Impacts of 2-5 times 
RTD investment (56.7%) and +-
10 times RTD investment 
(26.7%)
Very low  Expected Impacts 
(28.3%), < or = RTD investment 
(26.7%), and 2-5 times RTD 
investment (31.7%)* 
Cluster Profiles and Main Trends
*Clusterw ise Importance (chi-square at 95% confid.) 
Percentages correspond to w ithin cluster data. 
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outperform those from the other clusters in all of the aspects involved. An 
alternative would be to name such cluster as Successful Projects, where cluster 2 
would be in an intermediate relative position, and cluster 3 would not represent 
projects that necessarily failed, but those with the worst performance out of the 
three groups.  
 The analysis of differences between groups regarding a set of variables is 
presented below (table 36). As it can be noticed, none of such variables return 
significant results in terms of innovative intensity (RATIO_RD and TOT_COST), 
macroeconomic aspects (COUNTRY), and projects’ duration (DURATION). As 
occurred in previous assessments, comparisons between datasets (2000-2005 and 
2006-2008) do not perform well as a robustness evaluation.  
Besides differences in methods of data collection (Final Reports’ structure), 
such finding indicates that results must be regarded carefully, as statistical findings 
are not consistent over time. Therefore, implications arising from this present 
research must be regarded with strong support from additional theoretical and 
empirical sources, since sample sizes and variability of results provide a rather 
blurry map for interventions.  This lack of time consistence can be attributed to the 
quality of available information (clustering variables) regarding their 
representativeness of the sample in terms of cooperative dynamics.  
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Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3
RATIO_RD
2.16
(2)
[.688]
2.28
(2)
[.702]
2.19
(2)
[.754]
COUNTRY
2.12
(2)
[.881]
1.96
(2)
[.889]
2.23
(2)
[.851]
Cluster I Cluster J Sig. 
2 .519
3 .829
1 .519
3 .628
1 .829
2 .628
2 .521
3 .580
1 .521
3 .173
1 .580
2 .173
COUNTRY
1
2
3
RATIO_RD
1
2
3
M eans (M edians in parentheses; Std. Dev. in brackets)
Non-Parametric Tests for Independent Samples 
M ann-Whitney Tests for Pairwise Comparison
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3
TOT_COST
2.47
(3.941)
2.84
(5.388)
2.23
(.851)
DURATION
30.44
(15.798)
33.63
(15.294)
36.23
(12.795)
Cluster (I) Cluster (J)
Mean 
Difference I-J
Sig
2 -.367 1.000
3 -.086 1.000
1 .367 1.000
3 .280 1.000
1 .086 1.000
2 -.280 1.000
2 -3.193 1.000
3 -5.793 .265
1 3.193 1.000
3 -2.600 1.000
1 5.793 .265
2 2.600 1.000
*Levene´s sig. .954
**Levene´s sig. .591
TOT_COST*
1
2
3
DURATION**
1
2
3
M eans (Std. Dev. in parentheses)
One-Way Anova Results 
Bonferroni's Post Hoc Tests 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 36. 2006-2008 Clusters’ ANOVA and Mann-Whitney tests 
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8.6.3 2000-2005 Clusters (Spain only) 
 
 This third part of cluster analysis takes into account Spanish companies 
from projects finished within the period 2000-2005 for which we could collect 
corporate level information (namely Return on Total Assets – ROTA), thus allowing 
a comparison between firms in a more objective manner. In the division of these 
firms (77 Spanish companies), TECHACHIEV and EXP_IMPACT resulted as 
significant separators for the three clusters, while COMMACHIEV is significant only 
in the composition of cluster 3.   
 
 
 
 
 
Table 37. 2000-2005 Clusters (Spain only) 
 
 First of all, we would like to remind that this dataset corresponds to that 
used by Fischer and Molero (2012) for the construction of a taxonomy proposal for 
Cluster 
Distribution
Correspondence to Fischer 
and M olero's (2011) 
Classification
Cluster 1 37 (48.1%) Inventors
Cluster 2 21 (27.3%) Consistent Innovators
Cluster 3 19 (24.7%) Risky Innovators
Missing
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3
TECHACHIEV
Good (81.1%) and Weak 
(16.2%) Technological 
Achievements*
Good Technological 
Achievements (100%)*
Excellent Technological 
Achievements (94.7%)*
COM M ACHIEV
Good (29.7%), Weak (27%), 
and Nil (32.4%) Commercial 
Results
Good (71.4%), Weak (14.3%), 
and Nil (14.3%) Commercial 
Results
Excellent (36.8%), Good 
(31.6%), and Nil (21.1%) 
Commercial Achievements*
EXP_IM PACT
Large (32.4%), Small (51.4%), 
and Nil (16.2%) Expected 
Impacts*
Medium Expected Impacts 
(100%)*
Very Large (21.1%), Large 
(36.8%), and Medium (42.1%) 
Expected Impacts*
Cluster Profiles and Main Trends
*Clusterw ise Importance (chi-square at 95% confid.) 
Percentages correspond to w ithin cluster data. 
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firms engaged in international R&D cooperation. However, that assessment was 
exploratory in nature, where 8 variables were simultaneously used in the definition 
of clusters. Such procedure resulted in the proposition of groups which we have 
analyzed the present results against (Risky Innovators, Consistent Innovators, and 
Inventors).  
But this course of action creates undesirable instabilities in the generation of 
reliable structures for clusters, since as not all variables have a strong association 
with each other, some of them result as non-significant for all groups.  In order 
to deal with these issues, the clusters in this research are oriented towards firms’ 
outcomes, providing a contributive element for policy evaluation regarding such 
activities60.   
Cluster 1 represents the group with the worst level of attainments 
throughout the Spanish sample.  Firstly, it gathers all of the Weak/Bad results in 
technological terms (16.2% within cluster 1; 7.8% of total observations). For the 
case of the variable COMMACHIEV (which is not a significant dimension for this 
particular cluster) it shows a high level of variability in results (which explains the 
lack of statistical significance). Nonetheless, there is a slight predominance of Nil 
commercial achievements over Good and Weak results. Expected results are also 
mainly Small and Nil (cumulative percentage of 67.6% within cluster 1, more than 
twice the presence of Good expected impacts). In face of a relatively high rate of 
technological satisfaction in comparison to the lack of positive market exploitation 
from these firms, we classify this cluster under the Inventors category.   
Cluster 2 consists entirely of companies with positive technological 
achievements (but not excellent). Its commercial outcomes vary, but are 
predominantly Good (unlike cluster 1), while expectations regarding results 
unfolding in the future are conservative, and rate such prospects as Medium (100% 
                                                          
60
 The creation of clusters follows a principle of segmentation of the population into (more) 
homogeneous groups of firms, thus making it possible to address policy intervention and adaptation 
according to participants’ necessities. A lack of adequacy because of the existence of significant 
deviations within the population is then avoided.  
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of cases). This linearity within cluster 2 regarding firms’ results leads us to put it 
under the Consistent Innovators category, where variability in results is hardly 
noticed, and outcomes are fairly positive, though far from outstanding.  
In the case of cluster 3, for the TECHACHIEV dimension, firms are 
represented by only positive results, with an emphasis on Excellent results (94.7%, 
while the remaining 5.3% regards Good technological achievements). In this first 
item, cluster 3 performs consistently better than clusters 1 and 2. However, for the 
variable COMMACHIEV, the situation is blurrier (but statistically significant): 
Excellent results occur more frequently than for any other cluster, but there is a 
higher perception of Nil market results in comparison to characteristics found for 
cluster 2, which totalizes more positive results – 71.4% (accumulation of Excellent 
and Good outcomes) – than cluster 3 (68.4%).  
Nonetheless, for the third variable under scrutiny (EXP_IMPACT), results 
point towards consistent expectations of better performance arising as a result of 
firms’ participation in Eureka projects in cluster 3 when comparing its features to 
cluster 1 and 2. The higher relative technological capacity achieved by these firms, 
the combination of Excellent and poor market achievements, as well as the positive 
expectations that they have regarding future impacts of international R&D projects 
drives us to define cluster 3 as Risky Innovators, i.e., those firms that incur in 
higher variability regarding market achievements, but are also capable of attaining 
the most relevant benefits within the population.     
Turning to statistical analysis of differences between groups (table 38), it 
can be noticed that the relevance of FUNCTIONING is present, and again (as in 
the case for the analysis of all countries, 2000-2005) related to those firms which 
are associated with the best set of outcomes (Risky Innovators). It is interesting to 
see, though, that Consistent Innovators once more do not differ from Inventors in 
this regard. Excellence in projects’ capacity of network management seems to 
determine outstanding results, whereas fair functioning can lead to satisfactory 
market results, as well as to technological success without proper market success.  
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However (though without statistical significance), TOT_COST and 
DURATION behave similarly to results previously found for the complete 2000-
2005 population. Risky Innovators are related to shorter and cheaper projects, 
which might lead to a higher level of satisfaction in these firms even when results 
are not as relevant, since projects’ productivity may be considered as optimal. 
Consistent Innovators, on the other hand, once again are represented by 
companies with longer and costlier projects. Such features must be thoroughly 
regarded in the examination of these companies’ outcomes. In face of quantitative 
methods’ shortcomings, qualitative appraisal of results might be considered in the 
process of policy intervention.  
The next step of this analysis considers the inclusion of a corporate indicator 
of firm performance: Return on Total Assets (ROTA). The procedure is simple and 
analogous to those undertaken for differences between groups regarding variables 
of choice. We applied ANOVA tests for ROTA regarding firms’ corporate behavior 
three years prior to project completion, in the year of project completion, and 
results that unfolded three years after the project was finished. The timeframe 
varies according to the date of project completion for each firm, so the periods of 
analysis are stable across firms, but it does not comprehend a fixed period of time. 
The idea is to approximate the impacts that Eureka projects might have had on 
these firms, and if cluster classifications are accurate in capturing firms’ overall 
achievements61.  Results are presented in table 39. 
 
 
                                                          
61
 We would like to acknowledge the contribution of Prof. Phillip Shapira concerning this approach. 
Unfortunately, such procedure could not be applied for the whole set of firms for two reasons: the 
first one refers to the non-identification of German, French, Italian, and British firms in the database 
that was provided; secondly, access to firm-level financial data for cases located outside Spain 
represented an additional cost to this research that could not be covered by available funds. 
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Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3
RATIO_RD
1.93
(2)
[.740]
1.67
(2)
[.617]
1.62
(2)
[.650]
FUNCTIONING
2.00
(2)
[.632]
2.10
(2)
[.447]
1.32
(1)
[.478]
Cluster I Cluster J Sig. 
2 .253
3 .192
1 .253
3 .796
1 .192
2 .796
2 .692
3 .000
1 .692
3 .000
1 .000
2 .000
FUNCTIONING
1
2
3
Non-Parametric Tests for Independent Samples 
M ann-Whitney Tests for Pairwise Comparison
RATIO_RD
1
2
3
M eans (M edians in parentheses; Std. Dev. in brackets)
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3
TOT_COST
3.68
(6.607)
4.69
(7.750)
2.20
(1.251)
DURATION
39.84
(19.739)
47.00
(26.987)
37.37
(13.655)
Cluster (I) Cluster (J)
Mean 
Difference I-J
Sig
2 -1.007 1.000
3 1.487 1.000
1 1.007 1.000
3 2.494 .613
1 -1.487 1.000
2 -2.494 .613
2 -7.162 .633
3 2.469 1.000
1 7.162 .633
3 9.632 .442
1 -2.469 1.000
2 -9.632 .442
*Levene´s sig. .184
**Levene´s sig. .114
TOT_COST*
1
2
3
DURATION**
1
2
3
M eans (Std. Dev. in parentheses)
One-Way Anova Results 
Bonferroni's Post Hoc Tests 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 38. 2000-2005 (Spain only) Clusters’ ANOVA and Mann-Whitney tests 
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Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3
ROTA-3
-10.07
(80.133)
6.29
(4.284)
3.20
(13.700)
ROTA-2
-.31
(35.358)
6.03
(5.027)
-.90
(12.367)
ROTA-1
-1.57
(28.294)
5.27
(5.509)
4.29
(29.119)
ROTA 0
1.49
(21.690)
4.93
(5.892)
3.95
(14.898)
ROTA+1
6.82
(14.593)
2.50
(9.487)
.44
(19.078)
ROTA+2
6.82
(9.132)
3.96
(7.108)
2.23
(17.883)
ROTA+3
6.82
(13.470)
3.71
(7.747)
3.55
(17.006)
M eans (Std. Dev. in parentheses)
Cluster (I) Cluster (J)
Mean 
Difference I-J
Sig Cluster (I) Cluster (J)
Mean 
Difference I-J
Sig
2 -16.366 .956 2 4.312 .935
3 -13.274 1.000 3 6.372 .430
1 16.366 .956 1 -4.312 .935
3 3.092 1.000 3 2.060 1.000
1 13.274 1.000 1 -6.372 .430
2 -3.092 1.000 2 -2.060 1.000
2 -6.343 1.000 2 2.865 1.000
3 .588 1.000 3 4.595 .532
1 6.343 1.000 1 -2.865 1.000
3 6.931 1.000 3 1.729 1.000
1 -.588 1.000 1 -4.595 .532
2 -6.931 1.000 2 -1.729 1.000
2 -6.857 .968 2 3.113 1.000
3 -5.869 1.000 3 3.273 1.000
1 6.857 .968 1 -3.113 1.000
3 .987 1.000 3 .159 1.000
1 5.869 1.000 1 -3.273 1.000
2 -.987 1.000 2 -.159 1.000
2 -3.442 1.000
3 -2.465 1.000
1 3.442 1.000
3 .977 1.000
1 2.465 1.000
2 -.977 1.000
ROTA+3
1
2
3
*All variables show  homogeneity of variance (Levene´s sig. >.05)
ROTA+1
1
2
3
ROTA+2
1
2
3
ROTA-1
1
2
3
ROTA 0
1
2
3
Bonferroni's Post Hoc Tests* 
ROTA-3
1
2
3
ROTA-2
1
2
3
One-Way Anova Results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 39. 2000-2005 (Spain only) Clusters’ ANOVA tests for ROTA (Return on Total Assets) and its evolution over time 
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 It is important to notice that standard deviations within clusters’ are high for 
all periods of ROTA analysis, leading to the conclusion that firms with somewhat 
similar outcomes from Eureka projects are inherently different in terms of corporate 
finance, i.e., there is a marked heterogeneity between firms in each cluster when it 
comes to financial returns. This aspect indicates that means are not a good 
measure for cluster profiles regarding ROTA.  
 Nonetheless, if we analyze clusters’ evolution over time, cluster 1 
(Inventors) outperforms clusters 2 (Consistent Innovators) and 3 (Risky Innovators) 
after projects’ completion (considering averages), which is precisely the opposite of 
what one would expect. On the other hand, statistical measures do not give much 
reason to develop conjectures regarding such outcomes. This is reflected by the 
abovementioned standard deviations, and by ANOVA results: differences between 
clusters in terms of ROTA are largely non-significant. This confirms the existence 
of strong heterogeneity within groups concerning this indicator, thus not allowing 
confirmation of the existence of differences between them.  
 This result, however, is rich in analytical terms. They can be interpreted as 
the result of the overall impact of Eureka projects on firms’ overall situation. Even 
though such projects may not be peripheral to firms (Eureka, 2006) it would not be 
reasonable to assert that their outcomes are consistent determinants of the general 
corporate situation. The economic size of impacts shall vary from company to 
company, but to state that participation in a Eureka project defines the trajectory of 
a whole organization (even a SME) is to underestimate the capacity of firms’ 
strategists and managers in designing tools for organizational competitiveness.  
 It is more likely (and more logical) to say that firms with stronger market 
presence, as well as a stronger capacity of internationalizing R&D activities 
through networking, are more prone to engage in pan-European projects and 
submit them to Eureka. Their overall corporate performance should then represent 
the cause of their relationship with Eureka, not its effect.  
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9. Policy and Managerial Implications  
 
Technological policy evaluation is a process of utmost importance in any 
economic context that aims at fostering economic growth through technological 
progress and innovation. This research characterizes an exercise of constructive 
criticism with the ultimate goal of providing information and feedback in order to 
allow continuous improvement of any kind of initiative geared towards promoting 
international R&D cooperation – private, governmental or even supranational.  
The methodology used in our analysis had a quantitative character aiming at 
taking the step beyond purely descriptive assessments. It could be noticed that the 
overall rate of technological achievements is abnormally high and even the 
commercial achievements can be considered outstanding in a context of innovation 
where R&D outcomes can be considered as uncertain by its own nature (Silipo, 
2008). While this might indicate that Eureka is doing a really good job in selecting 
potentially successful projects, it might also suggest that companies may not be 
taking the level of risk necessary for introducing major relevant innovations in the 
market, which corresponds to Georghiou’s (2001) criticism that the quality of 
Eureka’s innovation projects seem to be diminishing over time. It could also mean 
that the questionnaires are failing in capturing the real complexity involved in the 
process (Georghiou, 1997) or are influenced by too optimistic respondents 
(Huggins, 2001).  
Overall results highlight the relevance of H2 which states that “The 
management quality of a given cooperative R&D project undertaken at the 
international level will influence the ultimate corporative outcomes of such project, 
both at the technological and economic (commercial) levels”. The relevance of the 
variable FUNCTIONING regarding its role as a determinant of TECHACHIEV, 
COMMACHIEV, and EXP_IMPACT may be related to an optimistic view of the 
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managing process in the face of positive outcomes, i.e., the respondent of 
Eureka’s Final Report may be biased in evaluating the quality of a given project’s 
functioning in face of successful outcomes, thus minimizing issues that may have 
happened during collaboration’s development.  
Nonetheless, innovation is a manageable process, not a result of chaotic 
forces acting by chance. Many authors have recognized through case studies and 
econometric analyses the central role played by organizational structure in 
fostering innovation. In this regard, the chain-linked model of innovation (Kline & 
Rosenberg, 1986) is an important framework of analysis, where proper 
coordination among different departments is of utmost importance in defining firms’ 
innovative capacities.  
This situation is not likely to change through outsourcing or open innovation 
settings, where the boundaries of firms are redefined. The formation of networks of 
innovation implies that good coordination must be present within and between 
agents involved in such activities. It is not surprising then that the rate of 
functioning works as a strong determinant factor in terms of both technology and 
market outcomes by firms. In an international context, such dimension is even 
more critical, provided that companies share distinct institutional environments, 
cultures, languages, and are geographically apart from each other (Bottazzi & Peri, 
2007). This particular result provides striking evidence in favor of a transaction cost 
perspective of R&D networks, where network management faces a wide array of 
constraints (outlined in our literature review) that largely shape innovative activity 
(with impacts comparable to those caused by purely technical developments). A 
direct implication of this finding regards the role played by alliance managers in 
setting the stage for effective interactions among firms. Ireland, Hitt and 
Vaidyanath (2002) refer to this viewpoint as the managerial imperative, which 
states that transaction costs represent core aspects in the definition of alliances’ 
dynamics. They also put emphasis on the importance of the Resource-Based 
View, but as we discuss below, our perceptions are somewhat different in this 
regard. 
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A policy implication related to this finding is one of efficiency of allocated 
resources. Much is argued about the need for improvement in the amount of 
financing for innovative activities. Nonetheless, the dynamics of these resources 
are bound to be affected not only by the institutional environment, but, as we have 
shown, they are also a function of companies’ managerial capabilities. Therefore, 
establishing behavioral patterns for the economic transaction that take place within 
these networks can be desirable in order to provide the dedicated funds with 
increased probabilities of generating optimal returns for firms and, consequently, 
for the economic system as whole. Hence, Eureka is likely to have an important 
role to play in monitoring the activities undertaken by its networks. In summary, 
investing more in innovation cannot be as beneficial for society as investing better. 
As the management of innovative activities lies at the core of the definition of 
“better”, improving the quality of coordination in R&D networks is of utmost 
importance.  
Hence, in a cooperative context, it is not surprising that inter-firm 
management plays a leading role in defining effectiveness of processes and 
outcomes. What is more important, however, is that the required managerial 
competences most likely differ from standard intra-firm administrative tasks, as 
hierarchical and departmental structures take more complex forms (often 
interdisciplinary when it comes to innovation), redefining the landscape for efficient 
coordination.    
     Furthermore, it is important to notice the relatively low level of importance 
of variables included in what we defined as Microeconomic and Macroeconomic 
Dimensions. If we resort to the foundations of economic thought, Adam Smith 
(1776)  in an Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations pinpoints 
the widely acknowledge philosophy of the invisible hand, an idea which explains 
rather simply that the search for individual profit would lead to society’s overall 
gains. With this idea in mind, organizations are similar in pursuing individual 
benefits (through innovation for a good contextualization in the terms of this 
research), but their strategies and tactics to achieve firm-specific goals are highly 
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idiosyncratic. This might represent a whole deal of subjectivity in the terms of 
what represents success or failure, but it also copes better with reality than to build 
investigations upon models that face such phenomena as irrelevant. This leads us 
to a perspective in which the Contextual Dimension rises as the logical determinant 
of outcomes (technological and economic) that are also context-specific.  
Firms are not equal, they do not behave equally, and they measure 
achievements differently62. Using inherently subjective analysis (e.g. using 
perception-oriented questionnaires) might not be optimal in terms of adequate 
consistence for what it is expected for firms. To rely on subjective observations is 
to believe that individual perception is related to also individual benefits or 
characteristics. Through the use of data gathered via projects’ questionnaires we 
were able to estimate and associate a rich set of variables, which would be 
otherwise impossible to verify63. It is not our intention to argue against the 
feasibility of evaluation assessments of RTD initiatives and policymaking given the 
subjectivity of firms. The use of instruments that collect information which is bound 
to face subjectivity “issues” (questionnaires, interviews, etc) can be extremely 
valuable when estimating quantitative and qualitative relationships between 
variables.  
Interestingly, the proxies for absorptive capacity did not correspond to prior 
expectations. Even considering that results are evaluated taking into consideration 
individual goals, one would argue that firms that are better capable of capturing 
results from networks would be better positioned to find their strategic goals 
satisfied. Our results suggest, on the other hand, that this situation does not hold 
for the samples under scrutiny. A possible explanation for such finding lies in the 
                                                          
62
 In an assessment of Framework Programme’s impacts, Georghiou (1994) points out that firms are 
strongly heterogeneous not only in their inherent characteristics (such as sector, size, etc.), but also 
in the strategies they seek. While this might sound somewhat obvious, it is an important remark for 
microeconomic approaches which often consider firms’ interests as given. Pinsonneault and Rivard 
(1998), studying the “productivity paradox” of IT, propose a very similar conclusion, though in a 
different context.  
63
 Bergek and Bruzelius (2010) suggest that surveys are likely to provide more in-depth knowledge 
on the analysis of R&D networks when compared to more objective indicators such as patents.  
204 
 
imperfectness of the variables used for such estimations, where organizational 
capabilities might not be well represented by R&D investment, firm size, or amount 
of funds dedicated to a given project, but rather on the quality of human resources, 
organizational culture, etc. This can be especially relevant when we consider 
market-oriented outcomes, provided that other abilities can be referred as more 
pertinent than the usual instruments of absorptive capacity. Nonetheless, our 
results offer scant evidence in favor of the relevance of the Resource-Based View 
as a useful approach regarding the determinants of success in international R&D 
networks. Further research in this regard, especially considering additional 
variables, is needed in order to verify this proposition.  
A similar conclusion can be directed towards the National Innovation 
System approach, since the country to which a given firm belongs seems to affect 
its results only marginally. Again, this outcome is based upon a very limited view of 
the NIS framework and a larger set of variables should be taken into account when 
considering the vast viewpoint that the macroeconomic context may carry with it.  
This unambiguously represents that the quality of international R&D 
cooperation projects is the core determinant of its results, regardless of firms’ 
characteristics or the broad environment in which they are located (Innovation 
Systems), considering that such outcomes are not static or exogenously defined, 
but rather depend on agents’ strategies and objectives64. In the policymaking 
realm, this means that the selection of projects must be based on the merits of 
propositions, not on who is proposing or to where they shall be located. Therefore, 
more emphasis should be given to the managerial structure of alliances when 
projects are analyzed ex ante, since purely technical aspects omit relevant aspects 
of projects’ development. Companies are then expected to dedicate full attention to 
international R&D networks’ excellence of management in order to develop 
consistent and successful initiatives. Such outcomes of this research provide 
                                                          
64
 This is especially true for the case of Eureka’s individual projects, since they are developed under 
a “bottom-up” structure.   
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strong support to criticisms made towards quasi-experimental methods as a robust 
source of innovation policy evaluation (section 7.2 Methodological Discussion). 
Another aspect to be pointed out regards the ad hoc variables, i.e., those 
that refer basically to the particular sort of achievements undertaken by firms 
(Product Innovation, Process Innovation, Service Innovation, and Strategic 
Alliances). Product innovation (PROD_INNO) presents a stronger relationship with 
achieved successful results (but not those that are expected to take place in the 
future), whereas the relevance of service and process innovations is inconstant 
across estimations. This outcome, however, should be carefully analyzed before it 
becomes a line of suggestion for projects’ appraisal. Innovation in products is more 
likely to provide tangible and immediate results both at the technological 
development and market environment, which leads to a better evaluation of the 
results arising from such activity.  
In its turn, Process Innovations are also tangible, and they are indeed 
associated with better technological outcomes. Nonetheless, such kind of 
innovative activity presents a non-significant level of association with market 
achievements. A plausible explanation for this situation is the inherent internal 
character of process innovation, improving productive activities, while not 
necessarily resulting in observable market success in the short term. For the case 
of service innovations, results do not indicate reliable associations between such 
kind of activity and positive outcomes, which is likely to be related to the 
technological orientation (hard innovation) of Eureka individual projects (table 15).      
For the case of the creation of strategic alliances (STRAT_ALL), estimations 
point towards the importance of the existence of competitors within the network 
(2000-2005) and positive technological and market achievements (2006-2008). 
Regarding cooperation involving rivals, these results are an indication of the 
necessity of more structured agreements in order to face potential risks among 
partners in terms of knowledge and capability sharing, thus leading to networks 
with longer duration than those that are exclusively project-specific. Transaction 
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costs seem to play yet another important role in this regard. The attainment of 
positive outcomes functions as catalyst of inter-firm connections, where successful 
developments guide firms towards more stable relationships.  
Oddly, the quality of projects’ functioning and results that are expected to 
unfold in the future do not represent significant factors affecting such behavior. An 
explanation for this can be found in the specialized literature. Fernández-Ribas and 
Shapira (2009) indicate that industries with a high dynamic of technological change 
are not prone to engage in what they call harder forms of cooperative agreements 
(alliances, joint ventures, and other forms of contractual agreements). Therefore, 
such aspects that were unobservable in the sample (to preserve firms’ identities) 
can be present in this interaction, thus making relationships with other variables 
blurry.  
Moreover, we can consider the generation of strategic alliances as an 
indicator of behavioral additionality, a desirable feature in an initiative with the 
characteristics of Eureka (perhaps the most desirable). Considering the relative 
values of STRAT_ALL over the two datasets (2000-2005 and 2006-2008), we can 
notice a significant increase of this dimension, with special impact on the Spanish 
case. However, such observations are not able to provide an examination of robust 
trends over time.    
 Concerning the use of clustering techniques for the evaluation of firms’ 
results according to relatively homogenous groups, this procedure is based on an 
analogous approach to that used for market segmentation. The underlying 
rationale is that policy intervention is more likely to succeed if it fits adequately 
groups with similar characteristics, instead of approaching heterogeneous groups 
of firms in a similar manner. In this research, this fragmentation of Eureka 
participants follows a post hoc structure, where the occurrence of relatively stable 
(and similar) groups of firms according to technological and market-related results 
seems to be more efficient than the use of firm-level information or macroeconomic 
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conditions for formulation and adaptation of international R&D cooperation 
initiatives.  
This particular methodology can function as a valuable instrument for 
policymakers in terms of international R&D networks monitoring and ex post 
intervention. The basic structure tested in this case is that of Fischer and Molero 
(2012), which divides companies in three different categories. Robustness of this 
framework was relevant across datasets.  
Each group presents strengths and weaknesses that can be supported 
through technical and managerial support. Risky Innovators lack steadiness in their 
ability to market results. Consistent Innovators represent companies with projects 
that could be addressed in terms of their incapacity to exceed fair results (and 
achieve excellence). Inventors are those companies that could not meet their 
market goals, even in face of positive technological outcomes. As a control 
instrument, the cluster analyses facilitate evaluations, as well as further capacity to 
deal with such constraints in a combined manner (instead of a case-to-case 
approach). This tool also serves the purpose of identifying complementary agents 
that could be matched for future projects (according to their particular strengths). 
Furthermore, this approach allowed a closer examination of influential 
variables in the determination of outcomes arising from Eureka’s individual 
projects. Instead of the sole use of regression statistics, we could complement this 
approach with a verification of differences between relatively homogeneous groups 
of firms regarding their inherent differences in a set of aspects. Once again, quality 
of projects’ management (FUNCTIONING) was significantly associated with higher 
rates of combined outcomes. This situation allowed a confirmation of the 
Contextual Dimension’s importance in terms of results achieved by firms.   
Focusing on the properties of overall results from the perspective of Spanish 
companies, relevant aspects arise. Even though the Macroeconomic Dimension’s 
hypothesis was partially accepted, some level of consistency existed for the case 
of expected outcomes. Drawing from the structure of results, we develop some 
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implications and useful insights for integrants of this specific Innovation System 
regarding their interaction with international R&D networks. 
The sample of Spanish firms seem to be in a better situation in terms of 
appropriation of results coming from international R&D networks than its peers 
located in more developed Innovation Systems, which is gathered from descriptive 
statistics (table 15). Inferential statistics provide significant support for such 
expectation in the cases of technological outcomes (2006-2008) and expected 
impacts (2000-2005). As previously outlined, other relationships do not provide 
conclusive considerations. Nonetheless, we found fair indications that Spanish 
agents included in our analysis are bound to increase their competitiveness when 
resorting to open innovation strategies, even lagging behind its peers in terms of 
measurable absorptive capacity (R&D intensity).  
As literature suggests that R&D networks function, among other things, as a 
way for companies to achieve a higher capacity of R&D spending, the Spanish 
economic structure (mainly based on traditional sectors’ SMEs with lack of 
innovation investment capacity) can find in European partners the source for their 
evolution, thus bringing benefits to those individual actors that are prone to (and 
capable of) establishing international connections with the aim of generating 
innovations, even though our results cannot be regarded as representative of the 
whole Spanish context. 
Nonetheless, considering the usual constraints of the Spanish economy 
regarding its Innovation System (amplified by the current socioeconomic situation), 
promoting this behavior is an advantageous form of building long-term innovation 
strategies while increasing the productivity of RTD resources. Taking into account 
that this country finds itself in a relatively laggard position in most innovation-
related indicators, more concern on the ways of closing technological gaps through 
absorption of external knowledge that (and especially within Europe) is likely to 
provide better results than independent, internal, initiatives (as suggested by 
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Herstad et al, 2010)65. Nonetheless, this does not mean that policies oriented 
towards domestic cooperation are not relevant, but that a combination of both is 
likely to be more effective than if they happen in isolation. This perspective is 
reinforced by the damages caused by the economic turmoil faced by Spain. 
Further access to foreign markets is of utmost importance for innovative 
companies to achieve sustainable growth in this moment. If our results hold true for 
the population of Spanish enterprises, then international cooperation can provide 
these firms with sufficient structure for that to happen.  
The creation of networks’ support system in Spain is an interesting aspect to 
be considered. This suggestion comes from endemic problems that this country 
faces, such as the low level of foreign languages’ skills (Heijs, 2009) and the higher 
relative levels of instability that Spanish agents face in international relationships 
(Segarra, 2011). A dedicated infrastructure in this case shall be cost-efficient and 
fruitful in strengthening the cooperation abilities of Spanish organizations as a 
whole. Such sort of innovation policy actions would not render this economy less 
dependent on foreign sources of technology in the short term, but would create the 
environment for future competitive and long term-oriented development of 
companies located within this National Innovation System. Once again, however, 
we must be cautious in appropriating results from a limited sample of companies 
participating in Eureka and drawing broader conclusions for the remaining of 
Spanish firms.    
Some additional limitations exist regarding the appropriation of outcomes of 
this research, as outlined throughout most of our empirical assessment and 
methodological definitions. Analytical variables offer meager conclusions regarding 
their overall explanatory power. In-depth case studies may be recommended in 
order to design other aspects regarding Eureka’s Final Reports so they can gather 
more contributive information, especially regarding detailed aspects of managerial 
activities that take place in networks, since our results streamline the relative 
                                                          
65
 Even though the necessary scale for this to happen would have to be much larger than Eureka-
based cooperation.  
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importance of coordination in shaping ultimate results. Identifying the existence of 
previous ties among agents, kind of cooperative agreement (governance modes), 
evaluation of specific cases of transaction costs are examples of dimensions that 
can be usefully included in these questionnaires.  Moreover, other limitations of our 
assessment regard barriers regularly faced by R&D cooperation researchers (for 
an example, see Gallié & Roux, 2010): selection bias, lack of partners’ information, 
and single data cross section, which does not allow the control of firms’ evolution 
over time, thus somewhat limiting the validity of our findings to the sample under 
scrutiny.  
 
 
 
  
211 
 
10. Concluding Remarks 
 
 As Carlsson (2003) puts it, “the European Union appears to be the only 
major supranational scientific and technological block now emerging”. In fact, and 
in many aspects, the international approximation between EU’s member states 
represents a search for closer interaction, coordination, and, consequently, 
appropriation of benefits that are expected to arise from large markets (at least 
from the economic perspective).    
 Initiatives such as the European Research Area, the Innovation Union, Joint 
Technological Initiatives, and Eureka/Eurostars represent efforts in this direction. 
All of them propose support for creating stronger innovative capabilities within 
Europe through the generation of collaboration in innovative activities across the 
continent, i.e., involving agents belonging to different national settings (National 
Innovation Systems).  
The durability of Eureka shows that this initiative can be considered as a 
relevant RTD program. However, evaluating its effectiveness via an input-output 
approaches is not likely to provide the evaluator with a good perspective of the 
whole context (Georghiou, 1999a). Multiple dimensions influence the overview of 
outcomes’ quality (Dyer & Powell, 2002). Aspects like these highlight the need for 
further efforts in assessing systemic impacts of international R&D cooperation, 
where Social Network Analysis is bound to provide interesting findings. Therefore, 
approaches that consider the structure of Eureka’s networks as a whole shall 
contribute to understand the generation of behavioral additionality in agents 
(possibly the core goal in the promotion of R&D cooperative settings). 
In this case, economic and technological results are not the sole objective. 
Such strategies must be regarded according to an efficiency perspective, together 
with its efficacy. The efficacy of such programs is related to innovative results that 
are or are not achieved, thus corresponding to a linear and result-oriented 
evaluation of RTD policies. On the other hand, the efficiency of these initiatives 
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should be understood not only as the measures of proper allocation of resources 
(additionality), but also as the construction of a more integrated business/research 
environment in terms of innovation.  
 Nonetheless, few countries consider the focus on international integration of 
innovation systems as a policy tool (Edler, 2008), where usual initiatives are 
directed towards enhancing R&D support through availability of funds and 
promotion of stronger linkages between firms, universities and research institutions 
within national boundaries. Even though these policies are beneficial for Innovation 
Systems, they shall not by themselves create an optimal framework for 
development if they do not consider the productivity that may arise from 
interactions with foreign organizations. As classical economic theory predicts, 
overall benefits arise from specialization and trade, thus some form of R&D 
internationalization can analogously result in an increased outcome for economies.   
The promotion of an integrated European Innovation System works as a 
way to achieve stronger integration among different regions, amplifying economic 
development throughout the continent. This would in its turn promote an 
environment of further incentives to investment in innovative activities in economic 
agents. In a context of economic crisis, structural demands are usually maintained 
unattended to the benefit of more “urgent” policy initiatives. The current public 
debate has been around Keynesian (economic stimuli) and neoclassical (austerity) 
approaches, where the Schumpeterian view would focus on innovation and 
entrepreneurship as a form of confronting such period of recession/depression 
(Audretsch & Link, 2011). Many reasons why this innovation oriented perspective 
is desirable are made explicit in this research, even though it must be 
acknowledged that our empirical assessment only marginally tackles the much 
wider perspective regarding the ERA. Therefore, our results can shed some light 
on this issue, but do not warrant a broader level of analysis.  
Under a macroeconomic perspective, innovation is a desirable and relevant 
event because of its inherent capacity of generating economic growth. Literature 
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acknowledges the complexity involved in this context, where investment, monetary 
policy, institutions, geography, education, etc. represent influential variables. 
Unfortunately, little consensus exist on to how to promote economic growth, as well 
as on how to develop stronger Innovation Systems.  
We hope that this research has contributed in this direction. For such, we 
have approached the international R&D cooperation phenomena in a way to offer 
insights on what factors determine firms’ performance, as well as establishing 
behavioral patterns in these agents. Achieved results put emphasis on the internal 
developments of networks as main influential dimensions in terms of technological 
and economic attainments. This perspective highlights the importance of 
managerial capabilities for the success of collaborative arrangements, highlighting 
the importance of transaction costs involved in the process. Identified patterns 
suggest that Eureka’s participants highly succeed in the technological arena, but 
actual innovation is limited to fewer firms: RTD cooperation might reduce risks that 
are inherent to the innovative process, but not eliminate them.    
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APPENDIX I – Supplementary Graphs on the Relative 
Position of the Spanish Innovation System 
 
Total intramural R&D expenditure (GERD) – Business Enterprise Sector (% of 
GDP). Source: Eurostat, 2012.  
 
Total R&D personnel (FTE – Business Enterprise Sector (% of Active 
Population). Source: Eurostat, 2012.  
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High-Tech patents granted by the USPTO per million inhabitants. Source: 
Eurostat, 2012. 
 
R&D intensity of High-Tech Manufactures (using production data). Source: 
STAN Indicators/OECD Stat, 2012. 
Note: R&D intensities expresses R&D expenditures as a percentage of production. This indicator is 
calculated as follows: 100 * (ANBERD_i / PROD_i) where ANBERD: Analytical Business Enterprise 
Research and Development 
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R&D intensity of Medium High-Tech Manufactures (using production data). 
Source: STAN Indicators/OECD Stat, 2012. 
Note: R&D intensities expresses R&D expenditures as a percentage of production. This indicator is 
calculated as follows: 100 * (ANBERD_i / PROD_i) where ANBERD: Analytical Business Enterprise 
Research and Development 
 
 
R&D intensity of Medium Low-Tech Manufactures (using production data). 
Source: STAN Indicators/OECD Stat, 2012. 
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Note: R&D intensities expresses R&D expenditures as a percentage of production. This indicator is 
calculated as follows: 100 * (ANBERD_i / PROD_i) where ANBERD: Analytical Business Enterprise 
Research and Development 
 
 
R&D intensity of Low-Tech Manufactures (using production data). Source: 
STAN Indicators/OECD Stat, 2012. 
Note: R&D intensities expresses R&D expenditures as a percentage of production. This indicator is 
calculated as follows: 100 * (ANBERD_i / PROD_i) where ANBERD: Analytical Business Enterprise 
Research and Development 
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R&D Cooperation Profiles of selected countries disaggregated by firm size – 
Manufacturing and Services. Source: Eurostat, 2012 (Community Innovation 
Survey, waves 4, 5, and 6).  
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APPENDIX II – SPSS TwoStep Cluster’s Operational details 
(Source: SPSS 16.0.0) 
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Log-Likelihood distance – Clustering Algorithms 
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